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Abstract 
Creativity is a valuable attribute that involves the generation of original ideas; 
attention is a vital function that facilitates information selection. Past research has 
related these cognitive constructs, having found that highly creative people tend 
to be more distractible than those less creative, which allows them to produce 
more novel associations. 
This thesis aimed to test the relationship between these two processes using 
multiple tests of creativity (e.g., achievement, divergent thinking, and collage-
making) and attention (e.g., focused, sustained, selective, and divided attention), 
which represented the complexity of each construct, and improved upon the 
methods previously reported. Additionally, the performance of participants with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) was compared to those without.  
Four studies were carried out. Within the first two, creativity scores were 
compared and related to attention scores, within and between control and ADHD 
groups. No consistent relationships were found. The ADHD group had higher 
creativity scores on average, but the differences were not significant. 
Study three incorporated eye-tracking techniques to explore the effect of visual 
stimulation on creativity and attention performance between-groups. It was found 
that the ADHD group looked at the attention task targets significantly less, yet 
their performance was not significantly worse. No between-group differences in 
creativity were found. The visually stimulating environment did not affect 
performance. 
Study four investigated the effect of an incubation period on creativity. Results 
showed that incubation increased the proportion of original ideas, but 
performance did not vary according to incubation task demand. However, self-
report responses indicated that participants did not sufficiently engage in the 
incubation period, as they continued to think consciously of solutions. 
The link between creativity and attention is not supported, and the idea that 
ADHD is beneficial to creativity is not fully upheld. Further research should 
examine creativity and attention in work or university settings, to consider the 
existence of a ‘real life’ relationship.  
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1.1 Introduction  
“A well-published university Professor and inventor was stopped from walking 
down a corridor by a student asking for help with a maths problem. After 
explaining and solving the problem, the Professor asked the student to help 
him, by reminding him in which direction he had been travelling. When the 
student answered, his reply was ‘thank you very much, that means I haven’t 
had lunch yet’” (Douglas, 1995, p15). 
The idea that there is a link between creativity and attention originated with a 
stereotype of the ‘absent-minded genius’ (Necka, 1999: p85) and anecdotal 
reports from notable creators (Kasof, 1997). The stereotype refers to inventors, 
creators, and scientists whose attention would jump from one issue to another, 
meaning that they would struggle to concentrate on one task at a time, but would 
manage to create items or theories that could dramatically change and improve 
their field. For instance, the anecdote above illustrates that although a genius in 
his field, the Professor was unable to remember where he was going, or even if 
he had eaten or not, after being briefly distracted. Similarly, it has been 
commented that Albert Einstein, despite being a scientific genius, would forget to 
wear socks, again showing that no matter his scientific contribution, he could not 
pay attention to one task (e.g., dressing) for long enough to complete it (Radcliff, 
2008). 
Further anecdotal evidence for a relationship between creativity and attention 
includes statements from people such as Charles Darwin and Edgar A. Poe who 
both indicated that they were highly distractible, and both have said that they felt 
they noticed more, things that could simply evade the attention of others (Darwin, 
1958; Silverman 1991; both as cited in Kasof, 1997). The famous inventor 
Thomas Edison was highly distractible and impulsive to the extent that he was 
expelled from school (Hartmann, 2003). Additionally, many creative scientists 
have themselves declared that before the moment of insight, their attention is 
broad and dispersed, but becomes more focused after a possible solution has 
been identified (Kasof, 1997; Necka, 1999).  
Anecdotally, there appears to be a relationship between creativity and attention, 
and this will be the focus of this thesis. On the basis of the literature that will be 
reviewed, the research presented in this thesis used multiple measures of 
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creativity and attention in order to determine exactly what a relationship between 
creativity and attention may look like, if it at all exists. Does a scattered mind lead 
to better creativity? Or is the ability to focus attention more important? 
 
1.2 Creativity: A Literature Review 
1.2.1 What is Creativity? 
A common statement in discussions of creativity is: ‘I’m not creative; I can’t draw 
very well’. One’s ability to draw, however, holds no bearing on their creative 
potential. The results of a simple internet search questioning ‘what is creativity?’ 
will lead the user to learn that it is synonymous with inventiveness or innovation, 
and is the ability to ‘see things in new ways’, or to ‘think outside the box’. Many 
online popular-culture articles generically list the ‘things that creative people do 
differently’. These commonly include linking existing concepts to create new 
ones, resisting perceived boundaries, and observing the world more than others.  
Although these clichés and suggestions of what creativity is may not be clear or 
precise, a further exploration of the psychological definitions of creativity shows 
that they are represented in theory and evidence.  
In a psychological context, creativity is defined as the generation of original, 
appropriate, useful, and valuable ideas, products, or solutions (Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010; Schmajuk, Aziz, & Bates, 2009; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). 
Combining seemingly unrelated ideas to form new solutions (Ansburg & Hill, 
2003; Mednick, 1962), the production of multiple responses to a problem 
(divergent thinking; Guilford, 1967; Runco, 2004; Torrance, 1966) and the 
invention of unexpected, novel concepts (Memmert, 2011) are all descriptors of 
creative behaviour. 
One thing in common with almost all definitions and articles regarding creativity, 
is that it is deemed a valuable and desirable attribute within the fields of business, 
sports, the arts, and science. In fact, the arts and science would not exist at all if 
it were not for creativity (Feist, 1998). Creativity represents a relatively small 
research field in psychology, despite its worth and attraction.  
The study of creativity within psychology grew from almost nothing in the 1950s, 
after J. P. Guilford used his Presidential speech at the American Psychological 
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Association (APA) to highlight that the subject area had been neglected, leaving 
a research gap to be filled. In a subsequent review, Guilford (1987) stated that 
this lack of investigation was “appalling” (p.34) and that he himself approached 
the area with caution, as it was ordinarily “feared” (p.33) by psychologists. One 
reason for the absence of creativity research cited the difficulty of inducing 
creativity in a laboratory setting, and in measuring a concept that tends to occur 
by accident (in moments of insight, for example). Guilford (1987) argued that if 
researchers reviewed their understanding that creativity was limited to 
discoveries of “unquestioned excellence” (p.34), and instead considered that 
there are discernible differences between the creative potential of individuals on 
a smaller scale, then there would be more examinable acts to study. Since 1950, 
and with this in mind, it was determined that typical tests of intelligence (as were 
used in the measurement of creativity up to that point) did not provide the 
opportunity for individuals to portray their creativity, as they required convergent 
thinking (CT), the production of one correct answer. This led to a departure from 
the traditional intelligence tests in measuring creativity, and to the development 
of tests designed specifically to measure creativity and creative potential.  
The antithesis of CT is divergent thinking (DT), which involves the production of 
numerous answers for one given question or problem, an example being ‘list 
unusual uses for a tin can’ (Torrance, Ball, & Safter, 1992). DT tests were 
recognised as facilitating the measurement of creativity, as the participant has an 
opportunity to provide multiple original, appropriate, useful, and valuable ideas or 
answers, thus conforming to the definition of creativity itself. Specifically, fluency, 
flexibility, originality, and occasionally elaboration (mainly used in tasks requiring 
drawn responses) scores can all be recorded from one DT task. Fluency is the 
number of ideas the participant produced, flexibility is the number of different 
types of response, originality is a measure of how unique or novel the idea is, and 
elaboration refers to the amount of detail the participant provided. These terms, 
and the measurement of creativity using DT tasks as well as other methods, are 
explained in more detail in the following section. 
The invention of tasks measuring DT (a creative act in itself) aided the rise in 
creativity research as requested by Guilford in his speech, and most of the 
research publications measuring creativity empirically have used a form of a DT 
task.  
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The study of creativity should be of interest so that it can be spotted, harnessed, 
and encouraged (Guilford, 1950), and as it could develop our understanding of 
how different cognitive processes may work interdependently. It is a common 
misconception that creativity is limited to gifted individuals or geniuses, and that 
few people can be legitimately creative (Guilford, 1987; Ward, Smith, & Finke, 
1999). Conversely, Ward and colleagues (1999), from the cognitive psychology 
point of view, argue that the capability to be creative is embedded within human 
cognition, allowing it to be examined in the general population. 
Researchers from various perspectives have studied creativity, leading to a broad 
range of theories including those based on cognition, intelligence, and 
personality. All three of these are heavily represented in the field so are therefore 
discussed in this chapter. The study of creativity in psychology has also taken 
various forms in terms of focus: for example, researchers have looked at the type 
of person that behaves creatively, the internal and external processes involved, 
the products of creativity, and the effects of the individual’s environment (e.g., 
resources, support, pressures) on creative potential.  
A cognitive approach was adopted in this thesis. The study of creativity from a 
cognitive point of view is concerned with determining which processes underlie 
creativity. Experimental methods are often used, and there has been more 
research carried out in the cognitive approach than any of the others (Runco, 
2007). In general, researchers aim to draw links between creativity and other 
cognitive functions such as attention, perception, and information processing, as 
well as with factors such as association making and problem solving.  
Broadly, this thesis examines the relationship between two cognitive processes: 
creativity and attention. The source of the conception that there could be a 
relationship between these two ostensibly disparate processes is based on 
literature alleging that a link exists between high levels of creativity and 
distractedness. This postulation is detailed in chapter three.  
 
1.2.2 Divergent Thinking 
Creativity has been measured in many different ways: through divergent thinking 
(DT) tasks, convergent thinking tasks (e.g., Mednick, 1962), the creation of a 
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product (e.g., collages; Amabile, 1982; Baer, 1996; poems: Kasof, 1997; and 
stories; Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001), and also with larger batteries of multiple types 
of test (e.g., Guilford, 1967; Torrance, from 1974). 
Tests of DT are the most commonly used method of measuring the creative 
process and are considered to be predictors of creative potential (Kuhn & Holling, 
2009; Runco, 2004; Torrance, Ball & Safter, 1992). In some articles, DT has 
become synonymous with creativity, which does not reflect the complex nature 
of creativity, but does give merit to the importance of DT tasks in the 
measurement of creativity. This stems from their development in the 1950s with 
the majority of creativity research focusing solely on these until the 1980s 
(Kaufman, Plucker, & Baer, 2008). For these reasons, this section will describe 
divergent thinking and its measurement, with the aims of providing context for 
some of the future arguments presented in this thesis, and to illustrate the 
presence of these ideas in the wider literature. 
DT is considered to be a significant element of the creative process, and is 
valuable for assessing the potential for creative thought (Runco, 2007). Although 
everyone is capable of DT (Baer, 2014), it is thought that by measuring the 
responses for aspects of creativity, this can separate those inclined to be creative 
from those not (Hocevar & Bachelor, 1989). 
There are two main types of DT task: verbal DT, which is the production of written 
responses, and figural DT, which requires drawn responses. Verbal DT tasks 
tend to request that the participant produces multiple ideas for unusual uses for 
an everyday item, or ways to improve an item, or alternative endings to a story, 
for example. Figural DT tasks will usually present the participant with a series of 
identical shapes or line sets, which they have to incorporate in to multiple different 
pictures. These resulting idea lists or drawings are scored for fluency, flexibility, 
originality, and in the case of figural DT tasks, elaboration.  
DT is the main feature in the three most widely used test batteries for creativity: 
the divergent production tests by Guilford (1967), similar tests by Wallach and 
Kogan (1965), and the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) battery, by 
Torrance (1974). These particular sets of tests have been widely used and tend 
to be held in high regard. However, there have been criticisms about the heavy 
reliance upon DT tests in creativity research. 
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Firstly, it has often been posited that fluency confounds the scores of flexibility 
and originality: that is, a high fluency score is required for flexibility and originality 
scores to be high (see Kim, 2006). Indeed, there are strong correlations between 
the three scores, and fluency scores can predict flexibility and originality scores 
(Runco, 2008). However, this may just point to the relationship between quantity 
and quality, and show that with numerous ideas, it is more likely that there will be 
creative and original ideas (Simonton, 1990, Torrance & Safter, 1999). When the 
aim is to consider creative potential, then it is flexibility and originality that are the 
important indices, as they measure aspects specific to the definition of creativity. 
It has been determined that even when fluency scores are controlled, the 
variance in flexibility and originality scores are reliable (Runco, 2008).  
A further criticism is that the tests are vulnerable to administration and scoring 
biases (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999). This is because the tasks can be administered 
by anyone who has bought the materials, and although this is mostly carried out 
by competent individuals in research or education, this leaves room for uneven 
confounding variables and test environment differences across studies (Plucker 
& Renzulli, 1999). Although it can be argued that this is the case for all manually 
scored measures in psychology and beyond, the scoring of originality may be 
particularly subjective when responses lie outwith the comprehensive guides 
provided by the authors of the tasks. 
Cattell (1971, as cited in Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999) went further to complain that 
the part of divergent thinking in the study of creativity is overvalued, and that 
originality scores merely come from the scorer viewing a response as odd in 
comparison to the others. Cattell’s (1971) alternative was that real life creativity 
is a more suitable measure, which may be fair, but he then states that this is 
reliant on an individual’s intelligence, which, as later argued, is not necessarily 
the case. 
Facing the criticism are high levels of statistical support. The TTCT battery in 
particular has had empirical support from a range of studies, and the vast amount 
of research on this bank of tests generally indicate high levels of reliability and 
validity (Kaufman et al., 2008). Test-retest reliability scores have varied from .50 
to .93 (Torrance 1966; 1974), which is a large range but in favour of the tests. It 
was stressed that this range was due to the complexity of creative performance 
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(Kim, 2006). Inter-scorer reliability of over .90 has also been found between the 
official TTCT analysts where tests from 88,355 participants were scored 
(Torrance, 1990). A longitudinal study found evidence of predictive validity, when 
the TTCT was completed seven years after it was initially carried out by the 
participants, with scores on the three divergent thinking scales (fluency, flexibility, 
and originality) being moderately, positively related to real life creative 
achievement (r = .39 to .48, p < .01; Torrance, 1972; Kim 2006). Plucker (1999) 
reanalysed the data provided from Torrance’s longitudinal studies and concluded 
that the TTCT was the most proficient predictor of adult creative achievement (r 
= .60), especially compared to that of varying intelligence measures (r = .19). 
Further, it was found that divergent thinking scores better predicted creative 
achievement than IQ scores, academic attainment, or scores by peers (Kim, 
2006). The TTCT has fewer limitations than other creativity tests, and has more 
supporting evidence than any other creativity measure. Tests of divergent 
thinking are therefore still widely used measures of creativity today (Plucker & 
Renzulli, 1999). 
Although DT tasks are now used as a measure of creative potential in their own 
right, independent from the measurement of intelligence, the production of DT 
tasks started with research in to the relationship between creativity and 
intelligence. 
 
1.2.3 Creativity and Intelligence 
The relationship between creativity and intelligence was a divisive debate in the 
1950-60s (Runco, 2007). In order to justify research into creativity, it was 
necessary to find a distinction between the two concepts, otherwise creativity 
would be merely considered as an aspect of intelligence (Runco, 2007). However, 
many researchers found that intelligence was indeed related to creativity (for a 
review, see Hasan & Butcher, 1966; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). The arguments 
for and against the relationship will be presented, followed by an explanation of 
the threshold theory for creativity and intelligence.  
Guilford (1950) had a huge influence on the field of creativity research when he 
suggested that creativity as a construct was under-examined, which encouraged 
others to pay more attention to the relatively overlooked topic (Barron & 
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Harrington, 1981; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). He created a Structure of Intellect 
(SI) model (1967), which contained three dimensions of intelligence: 1. 
Operations (cognition, memory, divergent production, convergent production, 
and evaluation), 2. Content (figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioural), and 3. 
Products (units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, and implications). 
In particular reference to creativity, is the cognitive process of divergent 
production or divergent thinking (Kuhn & Holling, 2009; Sternberg & O’Hara, 
1999). Guilford (1967) developed a comprehensive battery of tasks aimed at 
measuring DT, and found that performance on these tests was positively 
correlated to intelligence (r = .37, Guilford & Hoepfner, 1966, as cited in Sternberg 
& O’Hara, 1999). It was therefore concluded that creativity was a subset of 
intelligence (Guilford & Christensen, 1973; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999).  
In agreement with Guilford and his various colleagues, Cattell (1971) also viewed 
fluency and originality as subsets of intellectual abilities. However, subsequent 
investigations found very few or low correlations between creative measures and 
Cattell’s intelligence types (Rossman & Horn, 1972). Similarly, Gardner (1983) 
suggested that creativity was a subset of multiple intelligences, and that 
individuals could have different forms of creative intelligence. For example, a 
musician is intelligent in a way that is different to the way of an interior designer, 
and although some will have strengths over many fields, there will inevitably be 
fields that are weaker. Yet, within his research, Gardner (1993) found that when 
seven renowned high achievers had their largest breakthroughs, they were 
surrounded by a high standard of support, and that they sacrificed their social 
and personal time in order to achieve at the highest level. This implies that 
creativity goes beyond a requirement for intelligence, but also depends on 
personality traits, encouragement, motivation, resources, and commitment. 
Others have argued that creativity and intelligence are the same thing, and that 
creativity is merely an extraction of intelligence (Haensly & Reynolds, 1989). This 
is the ‘nothing special’ view (Perkins, 1981, as cited in Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999, 
p.263), where it is thought that the same cognitive processes are used for 
creativity as for normal, non-creative problem solving tasks.  
The strongest arguments however, are that creativity and intelligence are distinct 
from each other, and can therefore be measured separately, yet no one has 
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stated that they are entirely unrelated (Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). One study 
used two groups of school pupils, one high in creativity (based on the scores of 
five measures, including word association, DT, drawing, problem solving, and 
storytelling) and lower on IQ, and one lower on creativity and high on IQ. Both 
groups were found to perform better in standard school tests than the rest of the 
school population (Getzels & Jackson, 1962). Despite this commonality in 
achievement, the groups behaved differently from each other in terms of 
personality, ambitions, priorities, and task strategy. For example, in a drawing 
task, those in the high IQ group drew detailed, annotated drawings, where as 
those in the high creativity group were more likely to disregard perceived task 
boundaries, and were less concerned with communicating effectively (Getzels & 
Jackson, 1962).  
Wallach and Kogan (1965) developed their own set of creativity tests that were 
not unlike those used by Getzels and Jackson (1962), and adopted a game-like 
approach to their creativity and intelligence testing, in response to previous 
studies, who they criticised for using inflexible and stringent methods. It was 
argued that by using a casual game-like procedure during testing, that creativity 
would be measured distinctly from intelligence, as the awareness and stress 
related to a time limit would be diminished. In the end, Wallach and Kogan (1965) 
again found that there were qualitative differences between those who were high 
or low on creativity and intelligence. Summarising, differences existed in 
personality traits (particularly extraversion and conscientiousness), concentration 
and focus levels, self-confidence, academic achievement, and peer engagement. 
Torrance’s (1975) findings further supported this work. Through empirical 
research and reviews, Torrance concluded that there was, at best, only a 
moderate relationship between creativity and intelligence. Furthermore, he 
trialled his testing sessions with various time allowances and instruction types, 
finding that the participant stress levels cited by Wallach and Kogan (1965) were 
unfounded, and a time-consuming game-like approach was unnecessary.  
That intelligence is a central factor for creativity, as illustrated, is a disputed point. 
The consensus tends to be that intelligence is a ‘threshold characteristic’ that is 
necessary but not sufficient for creativity (Hughson & Hughson, 2004; Plucker & 
Renzulli, 1999; Runco, 2007). 
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Threshold theory is perhaps a compromise in the creativity and intelligence 
relationship debate. It concludes that there is a relationship between intelligence 
and creativity, but only in terms of the standard of intelligence necessary to 
enable creative thinking. There is a lower threshold, or minimum level of 
intelligence required in order for it to be possible for an individual to be creative 
(Kim, 2005; Runco, 2007; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). Creative potential is not, 
and cannot be, present in those with low intelligence scores, but creativity is not 
necessarily present in those with higher intelligence scores, although these 
individuals have the capacity to be creative (Kim, 2005; Runco, 2007; Sternberg 
& O’Hara, 1999). There must be more than above threshold intelligence to lead 
to creative behaviour, beyond that, factors such as personality, resources, 
attention, and motivation could limit or enhance creativity, to name but a few. 
Creativity and intelligence are therefore related according to threshold theory, but 
only in that one is required for the other to exist.  
According to the existing literature, until recently only one attempt had been made 
to propose a minimum general IQ score for creative behaviour (IQ of 120; Barron, 
1963, as cited in Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999; see also Batey & Furnham, 2006; 
Kim, 2005; Runco & Albert, 1986) and the results of studies retesting this claim 
have been varied and inconclusive (see Healey & Rucklidge, 2006; Kim, 2005; 
Plucker & Renzulli, 1999; Preckel, Holling, & Wiese, 2006; Runco & Albert, 1986). 
This value was based on a number of studies using inconsistent measures of IQ. 
Recently however, it has been posited that the threshold of 120 was repeatedly 
tested without convincing justification, and without empirical evidence to support 
it (Jauk, Benedek, Dunst, & Neubauer, 2013). After a comprehensive 
investigation using 297 participants, it was concluded that IQ (based on a German 
measure of general intelligence) thresholds exist for scores on creative potential 
tasks (i.e., DT tests) but not for measures of creative achievement. There was a 
threshold of 85 IQ points for the production of ideas (fluency only), the threshold 
for producing two original ideas was 100 IQ points, but that rose to 120 when 
many original ideas were requested (Jauk et al., 2013). This supports the theory 
that a certain level of intelligence is required for creative potential, but, as with 
the previous findings presented, it was determined that personality factors, 
specifically openness to experience, affect creative potential after the threshold 
IQ has been reached.  
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With fairly contentious debates about the relationship between creativity and 
intelligence, it is argued here that the threshold theory provides a plausible 
description and explanation of the extent of the relationship, without overstating 
it. This literature has been discussed in order to provide context for the 
importance of creativity, and the study of creativity. A frequent feature of these 
arguments has been the influence of personality on creative behaviour. 
 
1.2.4 Creativity and Personality 
As with intelligence, there are varying perceptions and theories about the links 
between creativity and personality. Many studies, especially the earlier ones, 
measured both creativity and personality in inconsistent ways, using various 
measures and definitions, making it difficult to find patterns in the findings (Batey 
& Furnham, 2006). 
Barron and Harrington (1981) conducted a review of several personality studies 
over many creative domains and drew out what they describe as a “fairly stable 
set of core characteristics” (p.15) of highly creative people: 
“high valuation of aesthetic qualities in experience, broad interests, attraction to 
complexity, high energy, independence of judgment, autonomy, intuition, self-
confidence, ability to resolve antinomies or to accommodate apparently 
opposite or conflicting traits in one’s self-concept, and, finally, a firm sense of 
self as ‘creative’”. (Barron & Harrington, 1981, p.15). 
Feist (1998) published the first meta-analysis on the topic and resolved that it was 
likely that creative individuals have a set of personality traits and characteristics 
that are distinct from those who are not, and that these traits are related to 
creative achievement. From an array of personality traits, some of the largest 
effects found that creative people are more impulsive, and less conscientious. 
These aspects in particular have been identified in individuals with attention 
disorders (Nigg et al., 2002), which points to a link between poor levels of 
attention and/or focus, and creativity. Other aspects such as openness (Furnham, 
Zhang & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2005-2006), extraversion (Sen & Hagtvet, 1993), 
and intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1985) have all been positively related to 
creative behaviour. 
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Looking specifically at the results of studies comparing artists and/or scientists 
against norm groups, the meta-analysis indicated that a distinct representation of 
a creative personality exists, irrespective of the measures used to measure both 
creativity and personality (Feist, 1998). The largest differences lay between 
scores on the traits of openness, conscientiousness, self-acceptance, hostility, 
and impulsivity, although this trait profile was not mutual to both artists and 
scientists. Precisely, it was found that artists were more emotionally unstable and 
were more able to discard group customs than scientists were. Differences in 
scales of responsibility, socialisation, good impression, and conformity separated 
artists (lower scorers) and non-artists, whereas highly creative scientists were 
less conscientious and more open-minded than their non-creative counterparts. 
A study of art students found that the students who scored higher in creativity 
spent more time in preparation before working (Getzels & Csikszentmikalyi, 1976, 
as cited in Runco, 2007). A follow up study 18 years later found that this group of 
students, compared to their less creative peers, had more successful art careers, 
scored higher on personality traits such as introspection, imaginativeness, and 
sensitivity, and lower on traits such as conformity, conscientiousness, and 
cheerfulness (Csikszentmikalyi, 1990, in Runco, 2007). It is unclear what the 
preparation difference means, that is, were these students creative because they 
prepared, or did they prepare because they were creative? 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) theorised that personality was structured around 
three traits: neuroticism, extraversion, and psychoticism, and suggested that 
creative behaviour was related to variations in psychoticism. Psychoticism 
specifically is comprised of attributes such as aggressiveness, impersonal 
behaviour, coldness, egocentricity, impulsiveness, stubbornness, and 
creativeness (Batey & Furnham, 2006). In order to explain this relationship, 
Eysenck (1993) proposed that there are differences between individuals in their 
understanding of relevance. Those with a broad or wide definition of relevance 
are referred to as ‘over-inclusive thinkers’, and are more likely to produce unusual 
responses or make original associations in tasks measuring creativity, in turn 
making them more creative than those with a narrow definition of relevance. 
Further to this, those with an over-inclusive thought tendency have high scores 
on the trait of psychoticism, but are unlikely to actually be psychotic (Eysenck, 
1993). It was argued that psychoticism has been the most widely found trait linked 
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to creativity (Eysenck, 1995), and that this was due to unusual ideation, mental 
illness, illusive thinking, and emotional instability being qualities of both creative 
and psychotic thinkers (Batey & Furnham, 2006).  
In support of this position, evidence of the relationship between creative thinking 
and creative achievement with psychoticism has been found from many studies, 
particularly between the personalities of creative people and those with 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder (see Batey & Furnham, 2006; Zabelina, 
Condon, & Beeman, 2014). Studies have also highlighted the relationship 
between psychoticism in its extreme form and those who are regarded as highly 
creative, for example, in artist Vincent van Gogh (Wolf, 2001) and writer Ernest 
Hemingway (Post, 1994). Further, in a comparison of creative writers and 
matched controls, the writers were more likely to have bipolar tendencies 
(Andreasen, 1987). There is a large amount of evidence for a relationship 
between creativity and psychoticism, however this should not be over 
generalised, as not all creative individuals will have mental health issues 
(Gilhooly, 2002). Accordingly, Waddell (1998) conducted a review of the creativity 
and mental illness literature, with the results indicating that findings fluctuated too 
much in order to reach a reliable and consistent conclusion.  
Art and music therapy are common in mental health centres or hospitals, and 
given the relationship described above, this may be seen as a way of channelling 
challenging behaviours in those with various disorders. Interestingly, despite the 
range of evidence linking creativity and mental illness, online articles and guides 
regularly proclaim creativity to have a positive effect on mental health. Recently, 
it has been determined that both negative and positive correlations can be found 
between creativity and mental illness/disorder, and that this depends on the 
sample and methods used by the researcher (Simonton, 2014). 
The relationship between creativity and personality, as is standard with concepts 
of this nature, remains to be unclear. However, there is a strong argument that 
creative individuals have a different personality type compared to non-creative 
people, with aspects such as impulsiveness, lack of conformity, and emotional 
instability appearing time and again in the literature. It is perhaps easy to 
understand why these traits co-exist with creativity, as by their nature, they would 
be of benefit to the production of novel and original ideas, or products that break 
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from the norm. Furthermore, these traits and the ability to break from the norm 
may help an individual to make creative associations between ideas or concepts.  
 
1.2.5 Creativity and Association 
It has been posited that successful creative thinking may be the result of forming 
new and useful associations between previously disparate concepts (e.g. 
Gilhooly, 2002; Mednick, 1962; Schmajuk et al., 2009). The thought that creativity 
consists of an associative process is an “old and sturdy” (Barron & Harrington, 
1981, p.12) theory in psychology, with the most well-known contribution being 
from Mednick (1962). The associative theory of the creative process is thought to 
explain creative thought across fields, and was produced following biographical 
reports by scientists and artists, who claimed to have combined seemingly 
unrelated concepts in the creation of their work (Mednick, 1962). This theory can 
coexist with the work on divergent thinking, as it aims to differentiate between the 
production of creative concepts, as opposed to non-creative concepts. 
An association is a link between two ideas, elements, or stimuli, which can be 
strong or weak, although Mednick (1962) argued that the weaker or more remote 
the association is, the more creative it is. In order to be creative, the associations 
must also be original and useful.  
Using an unusual uses for a cardboard box DT task as an example, to combine 
the box with the idea of storage is to make a strong, useful association, but the 
idea is not original. To combine the box with the solution of making it into a boat 
is a weaker association, and is therefore more original, but less practical and 
useful. To combine the box with the idea of visual equipment, to make it in to a 
viewing screen for an eclipse for example, is useful, and has a weak association, 
so is therefore original too.  
Within the associative theory, word association tasks are frequently used. So to 
use one as an example, strong associations with the word ‘table’, would be ‘chair’ 
and ‘cloth’, whereas less common (remote) associations could include ‘food’ and 
‘fable’ (Abraham & Windmann, 2007; Friedman, Fishbach, Forster, & Werth, 
2003; Mednick, 1962). To produce remote associations is thought to indicate that 
the individual was able to process and produce solutions beyond the obvious, 
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these are therefore creative (Abraham & Windmann, 2007; Friedman et al., 
2003).  
Mednick (1962) argued that there are three methods of reaching a creative 
solution by association: serendipity, similarity, and mediation. Serendipity is the 
accidental or unplanned combination of stimuli by the individual and has been 
used to describe discoveries such as x-ray and penicillin. Similarity is when 
combinations are made because each element is similar in nature. An example 
of this would be the use of rhyme in the creation of poetry, or rhythm and riffs in 
the creation of music. Mediation describes the combination of items that have 
elements in common. Mednick explains that this is particularly important in fields 
where symbols and formulas are used (e.g., maths, chemistry, physics), or where 
symptoms or manifestations might be common (e.g., psychology, or medicine). 
Creative output is consequently due to the ability to make such combinations and 
associations, whereas a preference to follow existing ideas would limit creativity.  
There are some prerequisite criteria that determine whether or not an individual 
will efficiently arrive at a creative solution. Firstly, a knowledge of the separate 
concepts must be present, as these cannot be combined or associated with one 
another if the individual does not know about their existence in the first place 
(Mednick, 1962). Knowledge of these parts, as well as cognitive access to them, 
may imply an overlap with intelligence (Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). 
Secondly, Mednick (1962) describes associative hierarchies, which are an 
illustration of how quickly associations will be made, how they are organised, and 
how remote they could be. Using the example provided above, an individual with 
a steep associative hierarchy would combine the words ‘table’ and ‘chair’ 
together, as they are closely related semantically and are therefore easily 
accessed. Those with a flatter associative hierarchy would be more likely to 
combine the word ‘table’ with ‘food’ as they are less obviously associated (see 
Gilhooly, 2002 for a summary). This coincides with Eysenck’s (1993) theory of 
over-inclusive thinking. It was concluded that creative individuals are regarded as 
having flatter hierarchies, allowing them to make weaker, and thus more creative, 
associations (Gilhooly, 2002; Mednick, 1962). This is measured by the Remote 
Associates Test (RAT: Mednick & Mednick, 1967), where participants are 
presented with three apparently unrelated words, and they have to find a fourth 
Chapter 1 - Introduction & Creativity Literature Review 
 
28 
 
word that independently links to each one (e.g., wheel, electric, and high, are all 
related to the answer, which is chair: Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Mednick, 
1962; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999, p. 263). This is a departure from DT and a focus 
towards CT. 
The associative theory of creativity and the RAT were influential in their time, but 
have received little adaptation since their creation. In particular, the methods for 
making associations (i.e., serendipity, similarity, and mediation) have little 
discussion surrounding them, and investigations of the steep and flat associative 
slopes have been unsuccessful in their aim to return supporting data (e.g., Yahav, 
1965, as cited in Mendelsohn, 1976). Gilhooly (2002) suggests that overall, the 
associative theory seems too simple.  
The studies run by Mednick and his associates claiming to have found 
constructive and predictive validity for the RAT did not control for intelligence, and 
featured participants who were arguably both highly intelligent and creative; 
architects, scientists, and engineers (see Mendelsohn, 1976 for a review). 
Whereas it has been demonstrated that tests of DT have predictive validity with 
other measures of creativity (e.g. Runco, 2004), the RAT has rarely been even 
moderately related to DT (Lee, Huggins, & Therriault, 2014). This implies that the 
RAT involves processes outwith those in creative thinking. Furthermore, beyond 
the study of creativity, the RAT has been used in studies investigating bipolar and 
manic-depressive disorders (Fodor, 1999), the effect of feedback on performance 
(McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984), search strategies (Smith, Huber, & Vul, 2013), 
social intelligence (Keating, 1978), and even erotomania in celebrity worship 
(McCutcheon, Ashe, Houran, & Maltby, 2003). This highlights that the RAT is a 
flexible measure, which thereby demonstrates its lack of construct validity. 
It can be argued that the RAT may not be manageable for participants with limited 
vocabulary or knowledge of the verbal cues used, thus the reliance on CT and 
intelligence, rather than creative thinking, may be too high. In support of this, it 
was found that the RAT has higher correlational values with IQ, specifically 
aspects of verbal IQ, working memory, cognitive speed and accuracy, and school 
achievement, than it does with any DT score (Lee et al., 2014; Taft & Rossiter, 
1966). With DT being indicative of creative thought (Guilford, 1956; Mendelsohn, 
1976), accordingly, the RAT has been criticised as measuring CT and analytical 
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processes rather than creativity. It is generally accepted now that the RAT 
measures CT, but it is still unclear if it examines CT within creativity, or separate 
analytical cognition (Lee et al., 2014). 
Mendelsohn (1976) responded to the poor RAT support by suggesting that when 
verbal intelligence is controlled, it is differences between individuals in their 
attentional processes that relate the RAT to creativity. It was found that those with 
high RAT scores were more likely than low scorers to notice and use cues from 
their environment during problem solving tasks. It was also reported that the 
ability to hold and use several streams of information in mind at once (i.e., holding 
several RAT problems in mind whilst considering various solutions, and whilst 
utilising environmental cues) is indicative of a large cognitive capacity. This was 
referred to as having broad attention, in that one can spread their focus broadly 
over numerous stimuli, facilitating their chances of producing original 
associations (Kasof, 1997; Mendelsohn, 1976). However, attention may not be 
the only cognitive process in use as this theory suggests, as working memory is 
likely to be heavily involved too. Nevertheless, Mendelsohn pointed out that 
attention and intelligence have been found to be independent processes, yet both 
are related to RAT performance. This could indicate that differences in attentional 
‘traits’ or patterns could be related to differences in creativity. 
Overall, the associative theory has to be recognised as having an impact on the 
field of creativity research, as it has been so frequently reported over the years, 
even though the evidence for both the theory and the assessment tool has been 
contentious. The argument that the RAT is not an optimal measure for creativity 
is convincing, so it has therefore not been used in the present thesis. 
Although methods by which creative ideas can come together were offered by 
the associative theory, little was clarified about the cognitive process involved in 
creativity. The arguments for a creative process are therefore presented in the 
next section.  
 
1.2.6 The Creative Process 
In order to illustrate how creativity might occur in our cognition, and how creativity 
may be related to attention, there are several models that have been produced 
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to map or at least explain the cognitive process of creativity. These aid in the 
understanding of the different stages in the act of thinking up a creative solution. 
Most of these theories concern creative problem solving specifically, which 
involves using or producing novel and original methods or solutions to a problem, 
by combining seemingly unrelated stimuli in a useful way (Isen, Daubman, & 
Nowicki, 1987).  
Wallas (1926) provided one of the first cognitive models concerning the creative 
problem solving process and the importance of different attentional stages, and 
it has been used as a base for theories ever since (Kristensen, 2004). This model 
is highly regarded, and is still accepted, usually without challenge, in the literature 
today. It was developed from anecdotal and introspective information from 
creators and problem solvers such as Poincaré and Helmholtz, who both had 
similarities in their descriptions of the process by which they came to their 
solutions (Gilhooly, 2002). 
Wallas’s model has four stages: preparation, incubation, illumination, and 
revision. The preparation stage involves the solver exploring, focusing on, and 
becoming familiar with the problem. This requires focused attention and 
concentration as the individual learns the construct of the problem, the constraints 
and limitations, and systematically and actively attempts to work towards the 
solution, usually without success. This early stage is thought to be crucial in order 
to successfully solve the problem at a later stage (Gilhooly, 2002; Wallas, 1926). 
Incubation is a period of time post-preparation, during which focused attention is 
not required, as the problem is not consciously attended to (Wallas, 1926). 
Experimental studies have investigated the effect of incubation during a creative 
problem solving task, with findings determining that in certain conditions, 
incubation can increase the quantity and quality of solutions (Baird et al., 2012; 
Gilhooly, Georgiou, & Devery, 2013; Snyder, Mitchell, Ellwood, Yates, & Pallier, 
2004). There are four main theories that have aimed to clarify why a period of 
incubation would be useful and how it works to improve problem solving success. 
The first two are the relief of fatigue (Wallas, 1926), and the relief of 
mindset/beneficial forgetting (Gilhooly et al., 2013; Posner, 1973 in Snyder et al., 
2004) theories, both of which regard incubation as a time for the mind to rest and 
recover capacity, with the latter specifying that this allows the individual to forget 
Chapter 1 - Introduction & Creativity Literature Review 
 
31 
 
the misleading assumptions or barriers that are inhibiting the production of a 
solution. The third, the intermittent conscious work theory, proposes that short 
periods of conscious work on the problem occur during incubation, which 
eventually leads to the formation of a solution (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, 
Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995). Lastly, the non-conscious work theory (Dijksterhuis & 
Meurs, 2006; Gilhooly et al., 2013) suggests that incubation is successful as it 
allows for the problem to be considered non-consciously whilst the conscious 
mind is distracted with an alternative, unrelated task. Wallas (1926) himself stated 
that resting the mind would be most beneficial during incubation, although work 
on easy, everyday tasks that require little cognitive effort could also be 
constructive. (More details on incubation and these theories are provided in 
chapter eight). 
The third stage is illumination. At this stage, a possible idea, solution, or a hint to 
the solution comes to light in the solver’s mind. If a feeling of pending illumination 
is sensed, the individual should eliminate distractions and focus in order for the 
idea to come, according to Wallas (1926).  
Last is the verification stage. During this phase, the solver concentrates on 
consciously considering the ideas and potential solutions that were produced at 
the illumination phase. They are processed for their appropriateness, usefulness, 
and effectiveness, before being accepted or rejected. Problem solvers can revert 
to earlier stages if ideas are deemed unsuitable in this revision stage, and more 
than one stage can be experienced at once if there is more than one problem in 
hand (Lubart, 2000-2001; Wallas, 1926). The model assumes that aspects of 
creative thinking occur subconsciously (Lubart, 2000-2001), for example the 
coming together of remote ideas and solutions is a process out-with conscious 
thought. This four-stage model is still influential in the field, and can be applied to 
creative behaviour as measured by many different tasks, including DT and 
association tasks.  
Attention appears to be an important variable within this four stage analysis of 
the creative process. The preparation stage requires focus and concentration, 
whereas the incubation stage requires broad and dispersed focus of attention in 
order it to be successful. The illumination stage appears to require a switch from 
broad to narrow attention, as an idea comes to mind and must be focused on. 
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Finally, the verification stage appears to be rather like the preparation stage, in 
that the individual must pay attention to the ideas they have produced, and 
concentrate on deciding on their usefulness. It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that there may be a link between creativity and attention.  
Empirical evidence for Wallas’s four-stage model has been provided by Patrick 
(1935, 1937, as cited in Gilhooly, 2002). Patrick recorded the words, strategies, 
and techniques used by both artists and non-artists during a sketching task. After 
splitting the task completion time in to four equal periods, it was consistently found 
that preparation occurred in the first quarter, illumination instances took place in 
the third, and most verification took place in the final quarter thus matching the 
proposed stage model. The evidence for incubation in this study was questioned, 
as work continued on the task continuously, without an incubation period. 
However, as mentioned above, further empirical evidence has been found 
separately from this study in support of the existence and benefit of the incubation 
period.  
Wallas’s model places a heavy influence on subconscious progressions. 
However, it is not accepted across the board that creativity is mostly a 
subconscious process. It may be more likely that the moment of insight, or idea 
realisation, is led to by subconscious associations, but the processes leading to 
and beyond that point require consciousness and awareness. One particular 
cognitive model that holds this point of view is the geneplore model of the creative 
process by Finke, Ward, and Smith (1992). This model features two phases both 
requiring conscious processing by the individual: these are the generative phase 
and exploratory phase (generate + explore = geneplore; Finke et al., 1992). The 
generative phase is when an individual brainstorms possible solutions to a 
particular problem and develops mental representations of these options. 
Existing cognitive structures are used at this point, with unique combinations of 
these structures producing more creative solutions (Finke, 1996). The exploratory 
phase sees these solutions and ideas being focused on and analysed for 
appropriateness and usefulness, with the best option(s) being chosen for further 
development (Finke et al., 1992).  
The geneplore model of the creative process is simpler than the four stage model 
by Wallas (1926), although it is clear that influences from this were taken, as the 
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exploratory phase features similar processes as the revision stage previously 
mentioned. The two-phase model recognises that creative problem solving 
requires conscious work, focused attention, and information manipulation by the 
individual, although the bringing together of seemingly unrelated cognitive 
structures (existing ideas) leading to insight can be a subconscious process 
(Finke, 1996). Again, features of attention have been utilised in this theory. 
Some forms of research have not found empirical evidence to support these 
stage-specific models of the creative process. Studies analysing the process of 
artists creating a picture that represented a story over a period of weeks, regularly 
recorded work progress and the thought processes of the individuals (by way of 
the diaries they were asked to keep), and found no evidence for two or four 
distinct stages (Eindhoven & Vinacke, 1952; see similar work by Ghiselin 
1952/1985). Instead, it was proposed that creativity is a dynamic, integrated 
process that involves the fluctuation between aspects featured in Wallas’ model 
(1926) and/or generation and exploration.  
With the uncertainty of exactly which cognitive processes are at work during 
creativity, it is therefore necessary to isolate distinct processes in order to 
determine the extent of their effect on creativity (for example the roles of attention, 
working/long term memory, decision making, etc.). Attention seems to be an 
important feature that is required to be flexible between the stages of the creative 
process, regardless of preferred model. It is for this reason that the present study 
focuses on the cognitive process of attention and its relationship with creativity.  
 
1.3 Conclusions 
From being regarded as a neglected, underdeveloped field in the 1950, creativity 
research has expanded, with dispute and uncertainties encircling almost every 
theory and perspective. The historical debates within the creativity research have 
stemmed from the relationship with intelligence and personality, with broad 
results that are difficult to refine. This chapter concludes that creativity can be 
measured experimentally, and separately from the constructs of intelligence and 
personality.  
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Creativity in the field of psychology is not concerned with how artistic an individual 
is, as the opinion may be in the general domain, but rather how well one can 
produce original, appropriate, useful, and valuable ideas, products or solutions 
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). The theories of divergent thinking and association 
can coincide, and richly describe the production of creative ideas, and what 
separates them from non-creative ideas. The creative process models help in the 
understanding of how these ideas may be generated in cognition.  
Many of the theories discussed in this chapter made reference to, or could be 
allied with, the cognitive function of attention. It seems that a commonality 
throughout most of the research is that our focus and concentration must, at some 
point be, dispersed or broad, to allow creative solutions to be produced, for 
original associations to be made, or at least to allow the unoriginal and unhelpful 
mindsets to be forgotten. Further exploration of a potential relationship between 
creativity and attention led to the discovery of a wealth of research linking the two 
concepts. A literature review of attention is presented next, followed by further 
details on the correlation between creativity and attention. 
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A student attending a lecture hears the voice of the lecturer, as well as the 
background sounds of hushed conversations, rustling papers, the inevitable 
ringtone, and the one classmate who insists on eating a full packed lunch. The 
student also contends with the PowerPoint presentation, the lecturer themselves, 
their notes and their thoughts, the actions of surrounding attendees, the 
temperature in the draughty classroom, their comfort in the chair, all the way 
down to the colour of the carpet, and the feeling of their clothes on their skin. 
Despite this vast amount of information available to the student, their job is to 
concentrate on the information being provided, whilst attempting to comprehend 
it and frantically write notes, and whilst ignoring all of the information that is not 
relevant to this goal. 
 
 
2.1 What is Attention? 
The senses are continuously inundated with information in various forms, some 
of which is important and relevant to the goals of the individual, but most is not. 
Attention refers to the conscious or unconscious selection of information for 
cognitive processing. This involves the brain directing focus and managing 
sensory inputs so an individual can process what is important in any given 
situation. The cognitive processing capacity for new information is limited, 
meaning that the selection of only relevant, goal-related stimuli for further 
processing is crucial (e.g., Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Lachter, 
Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004). As with any cognitive ability, attention is vulnerable to 
dysfunction, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) will be discussed 
later to contribute to our understanding of the function of attention. 
Definitions of attention in the psychology literature are rarely precise, and it has 
been proposed that it is an umbrella term for multiple psychological processes 
(Styles, 2006), which is not constructive to the study of the phenomenon. Some 
attempts have been made though, as James (1890, as cited in Styles, 2006) 
defined attention as “the taking possession of mind in clear and vivid form…it 
implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others” (p.1). 
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James (1890) also famously suggested that “everyone knows what attention is”, 
however research has uncovered the complexity of attention, with authors of 
more recent work opting to support the stance that no one knows exactly what 
attention is (e.g., Frey, Ruhnau, & Weisz, 2015; Pashler 1999; Styles, 2006). Still, 
there is a general consensus that attention is the purposeful distribution of limited 
resources for information processing (Styles, 2006). 
Attention is thought to underpin most other cognitive functions (e.g., Cooley & 
Morris, 1990). The mechanisms by which sensory information is selected and 
transformed into short term memory for immediate use, or to then be rehearsed 
for long term memory, has been the focus of past studies and has formed the 
base of most attention-related research (see, for example, Driver, 2001). 
Broadbent (1958) was one of the first to provide a model of how information is 
selected with his filter theory. This theory was largely influential in the 
psychological study of attention, and has led to the production of adapted 
versions, such as the attenuation theory by Treisman (1969). Preceded by an 
explanation of the different types of attention, both of these early selection 
theories will be discussed as they are viewed as two of the most important in the 
field of attention research.  
There are arguably various types of attention that lend themselves to different 
tasks, goals, and environments. Many different types of attention have been 
recognised, with varying amounts of empirical support.  
Researchers have identified a hierarchy of five main types of attention, each 
being a more complex process than the one before - focused, sustained, 
selective, alternating, and divided attention (e.g., Bajaj et al., 2008; Bennett, 
Raymond, Malia, Bewick, & Linton, 1998). Although each of these types of 
attention can involve both conscious and unconscious processing, a combination 
of both is necessary for most tasks (Bennett et al., 1998). Due to time constraints 
and in an attempt to avoid excessive cognitive fatigue, a measure of alternating 
attention was not included in the present research. As alternating and divided 
attention are regarded as the two most challenging processes, it was determined 
that only one of these would be included, and divided attention was chosen as 
there appeared to be more relevant research in this area. The remaining four 
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types of attention are described below, with the definitions based on the work by 
Bajaj and colleagues (2008) and Bennett and colleagues (1998). 
 
2.1.1 Focused Attention 
Focused attention is the ability to identify and respond to single items of task-
relevant information, and is thought to be the simplest form of attention (Bajaj et 
al., 2008; Bennett et al., 1998). This involves the concentrated processing of a 
selected stimulus and the reduction of awareness of non-selected stimuli, such 
as background noise. It has been suggested that focused attention, being the 
simplest form, is a precondition for all other modes of attention (Egeland & 
Kovalik-Gran, 2010; Van der Meere, 2002). As focused attention requires the 
individual to directly observe and react only to task-relevant stimuli, all tests of 
attention require focused attention to varying degrees (Bennett et al., 1998), but 
the attentional blink paradigm may be the purest task of focused attention. 
An attentional blink (AB) occurs when the detection of a second target (T2) is 
compromised if it appears within approximately 500 milliseconds (ms) of the first 
target (T1) (Di Lollo, Kawahara, Shahab Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005; Shapiro, Arnell 
& Raymond, 1997; Vogel & Luck, 2002). It is normal to find that participants can 
easily report T1 but T2 is much less commonly reported within the 500ms 
timeframe (Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998; Vogel & Luck 2002). AB tasks involve 
the participant consciously reporting if they saw either or both of the pre-specified 
target stimuli amongst a stream of flashing stimuli, with the second normally being 
missed due to the processing of the first (Shapiro et al., 1997).  
Explanations for the occurrence of the AB include; the inhibition model, the 
interference theory, bottleneck models, the temporary loss of control hypothesis, 
and the delayed attentional re-engagement account. The inhibition model 
(Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) suggests that the stimuli following the 
presentation and identification of T1 are perceptually suppressed and inhibited, 
in order to limit confusion between the features of T1 and the distractors. If T2 is 
presented during this period of suppression, it cannot be processed and 
subsequently, goes unreported. The interference theory (Shapiro, Raymond, & 
Arnell, 1994) was an update of the inhibition model, and indicated that the 
processing of T2 is diminished due to an inefficiency within the working memory 
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system to separate the target from distractors before their features are crossed, 
or interfered. However, evidence was found by Chun and Potter (1995) 
demonstrating that the AB can occur even when there is no potential for the target 
features to be confused. This led to their proposal of a two stage ‘bottleneck’ 
model of the AB. Firstly, the stimuli are recognised by their stored cognitive 
representations, which leads to stage two, where the representations are 
consolidated into working memory. The AB may therefore be due to either 
decayed or overwritten representations, but more likely, the limited capacities in 
both attention and working memory lead to the displacement of T2.  
The temporary loss of control hypothesis states that an attentional filter, 
controlled by a central processor, is programmed to select targets and ignore 
distractors (Di Lollo et al., 2005). When T1 appears, the central processor 
switches from observing the incoming data, to consolidating the target 
information. As the central processor is said to be capable of completing just one 
task at a time, this leads to the deficit seen in the AB. Finally, the delayed 
attentional re-engagement theory suggests that the presentation of T1 interrupts 
the top-down processing of the task (Nieuwenstein, 2006), which does not have 
sufficient time to recover or re-engage when T2 is presented within 500ms of T1. 
The commonality amongst these theories, although only briefly described, is the 
limited capacity both in time and space for items to be attended to and processed. 
The study of focused attention in this manner therefore illustrates the restricted 
ability of humans to consciously perceive stimuli over short periods of time (Dux 
& Marois, 2009), and indicates that the processing of one pre-specified target 
may take up to 500ms, before another stimulus can be managed.  
 
2.1.2 Sustained Attention 
Sustained attention is the ability to maintain focused attention, vigilance, and 
response consistency over a period of time, usually whilst completing a repetitive 
task (Bajaj et al., 2008; Bennett et al., 1998). This is different from focused 
attention as it requires the direct focus of concentration to be maintained for a 
relatively long time, whilst ignoring distractor stimuli, a task that is particularly 
difficult during mundane, repetitive circumstances. Continuous performance 
tasks (CPTs) are the most commonly used tool for measuring sustained attention 
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both in clinical and research environments (Riccio, Reynolds, Lowe, & Moore, 
2002), and have been found to be reliable and impervious to practice effects 
(Halperin, Sharma, Greenblatt, & Schwartz, 1991). These tasks have been 
valuable in developing a comprehension of attentional control and deficits in 
attention (Helton & Warm, 2008). When completing a CPT, participants must view 
a constant stream of stimuli, and respond only to a pre-specified target whilst 
ignoring the distractors (e.g., Egeland & Kovalik-Gran, 2010; Helton & Warm, 
2008). Generally, the stimuli are presented for around 100ms, and inter-stimulus 
intervals (ISIs) vary from 1000ms to 2500ms (e.g., Shalev, Ben-Simon, 
Mevorach, Cohen, & Tsal, 2011), as is necessary to avoid the AB from affecting 
performance. Error rates and reaction time (RT) scores are recorded across the 
length of the task. Specifically, omission errors (missing the targets) are thought 
to be indicative of inattention, and commission errors (responding to non-targets) 
are said to be representative of impulsivity (e.g., Marchetta, Hurks, De Sonneville, 
Krabbendam, & Jolles, 2007). It has been suggested that if attention is not “tightly 
focused” (Unsworth, Redick, Lakey, & Young, 2010, p.112) on the task, then RTs 
will increase and there will be lapses in performance. 
An example of the common findings of this task was provided by Shalev and 
colleagues (2011). When 91 participants were asked to respond only to a red 
square amongst distractors of several colour and shape combinations, it was 
found that RT increased over the length of the CPT (approximately 12 minutes; 
Shalev et al., 2011). This increase in RT across a sustained attention task has 
been so frequently found that it has been named ‘vigilance decrement’, and is 
thought to be due to a reduction in cognitive arousal as a result of low levels of 
stimulation (Corkum & Siegel, 1993; Helton, Weil, Middlemiss, & Sawers, 2010; 
MacLean et al., 2010; Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008). In support of 
this, it was found that extraverts (who are typically low on cognitive arousal; 
Eysenck, 1976) make more errors, and do not perform as efficiently as introverts 
on measures of sustained attention (Corkum & Siegel, 1993).  
There are another two opposing theories that aim to explain the vigilance 
decrement, the mindlessness theory and the resource theory. Both theories can 
be credited to multiple authors and are summarised by Helton and Warm (2008). 
The mindlessness theory proposes that lapses in sustained attention are due to 
a switch from controlled, focused responding to automatic responding, especially 
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when the stimuli appear at infrequent and unpredictable intervals. Monotony and 
the lack of cognitive stimulation during CPTs are thought to lead to task unrelated 
thoughts, which contribute to this switch, leading to an increase in RTs and errors. 
The resource theory alternatively suggests that the deterioration in vigilance 
performance is due to an exhaustion of the attentional processing capacity, which 
does not have an opportunity to be restored during such a lengthy cognitive task. 
Concluding their research, which combined the measurement of self-report states 
of arousal and CPT performance, Helton and Warm (2008) found little supporting 
evidence for the mindlessness theory, and instead attributed vigilance 
decrements to decreasing resources and mental fatigue, and not boredom.  
Measuring sustained attention can demonstrate the participant’s ability to 
maintain alertness and focus over time, and their capacity to ignore distractors.  
 
2.1.3 Selective Attention 
Selective attention describes the ability to select and respond actively to relevant 
information whilst ignoring distractions and irrelevant stimuli (Bajaj et al., 2008; 
Bennett et al., 1998). In keeping with the role of attention, the process of selection 
is an important part of attention in order to preserve the limited processing 
capacity only for goal related stimuli (Chun et al., 2011; Lachter et al., 2004). To 
inhibit a natural response to irrelevant stimuli can be difficult when the target and 
the distracters are similar or conflicting.  
The Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) is a popular task for measuring selective attention 
and response inhibition (e.g., Ben-David, Tewari, Shakuf, & Van Lieshout, 2014; 
Clarke, Hart, & MacLeod, 2014; Kane & Engle, 2003; Vendrell et al., 1995). The 
Stroop task has been adapted several times using a variety of stimuli; however 
the most common version involves the presentation of colour words (red, green, 
and blue) written in either a congruent colour (i.e., the word green written in 
green) or an incongruent colour (i.e., the word green written in red). The 
participants are required to state the font colour, not the word itself, which should 
force the active suppression of the natural response, which is to read the word 
(Kane & Engle, 2003). Reaction times and accuracy rates are recorded. 
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It is normally found that participants take more time to ignore the irrelevant factor 
within the Stroop test resulting in slower RTs for incongruent trials (see MacLeod, 
1991 for a review, more recent examples include Ben-David et al., 2014; Cohen 
Kadosh, Gevers, & Notebaert, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2003). This RT can be 
compared to the time taken for congruent trials in order to determine if there is a 
significant difference between the two, which would illustrate the extent of the 
deficit. The incongruity effect illustrates the limited capacity of attention, as when 
conflicting information is presented, the individual cannot seem to process the 
information speedily, as shown by the RT deficit. 
There are two key theories that aim to explain the Stroop effect: the relative speed 
of processing theory, and the automaticity theories. Each theory has been 
proposed in slightly different words by various authors and were summarised by 
MacLeod (1991) in his review. The first simply advocates that words are read 
quicker than colours are named, a difference that is accentuated when the 
stimulus consists of two conflicting cues. Included in this theory is the idea of 
response competition, as Treisman (1969) for example understood that the 
response delay in incongruent trials was due to the indecision of which cue to 
respond to: the word or the colour. The automaticity theory is similar, and 
suggests that the processing of a colour requires more attentional resources than 
the reading of a word, and further states that reading a word is an automatic, 
everyday process, whereas naming colours is not. 
 
2.1.4 Divided Attention 
Divided attention is thought to be the most complex task for attention, and reflects 
the ability to react concurrently to the demands of two or more tasks (Bajaj et al., 
2008; Bennett et al., 1998), in other words, dual/multi-tasking.  
Dual-tasking is used in psychological research to measure divided attention and 
attentional control abilities in participants (Della Sala, Foley, Beschin, Allerhand, 
& Logie, 2010; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Within laboratory settings, this involves 
participants carrying out two single cognitive tasks and the recording of the 
appropriate scores (e.g., reaction time and/or accuracy), before combining the 
tasks together for them to be carried out at the same time, thus dividing attention 
(Della Sala et al., 2010). By measuring single task scores first, it is possible to 
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determine if there is a deficit in one or both of the tasks when they are combined, 
and to ascertain the extent to which one task is cognitively favoured over the 
other, if at all (Della Sala et al., 2010; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Within non-
clinical samples, it is ordinary to find that participants perform less well in the dual-
task condition (e.g., Moisala et al., 2015; Pashler, 1994; Strayer & Johnston, 
2001; Wood et al., 2011). 
For most individuals, carrying out two things at once should not present any major 
problems if they are procedural, everyday tasks, for example conversing whilst 
exercising. If the tasks involved use similar cognitive resources (e.g., two visual 
tasks), it has been suggested that they are more difficult to carry out 
simultaneously than tasks using diverse resources (e.g., a visual task and an 
auditory task), due to constraints on processing capacities (Bennett et al., 1998; 
Wickens, 2002). However, a deficit in performance can still be found when 
attention is divided between two dissimilar tasks (e.g., Spence and Driver, 1997). 
The theory of a bottleneck system in dual-tasking is well established within the 
literature, and asserts that when two paths of information are being 
simultaneously processed, a cognitive bottleneck-like structure results in the 
perceptual slowing and impairment of reaction and response (e.g., Fischer & 
Hommel, 2012; Pashler, 1994; Wood et al., 2011). 
Existing studies that used the dual-tasking method have included tasks ranging 
in complexity, with some researchers using difficult tasks such as verbal 
shadowing (Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999), sending/receiving 
messages on social media (Wood et al., 2011), and others using fairly simple 
tasks such as walking (Yamada et al., 2011), and maze tracking (Della Sala et 
al., 2010). However, a review found that using simple tasks is more effective and 
can reveal far more about an individual’s ability to divide attention than if 
complicated tasks are used (Pashler, 1994). It was argued that even when two 
tasks seem relatively easy they can yield severe limitations in cognitive 
functioning when they are combined.  
The existence of these distinctive types of attention is not widely accepted, as for 
example, focused and selective attention are frequently presented as the same 
thing (e.g., Marchetta et al., 2007), and focused/selective and divided attention 
have been seen as the two main types. However, it is clear that attention has 
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been deemed a flexible process that is required to work in different ways 
depending on the immediate goal.  
 
2.2 How does Attention Work? 
There are two main sets of theories that aim to explain how attention may work: 
the early selection and the late selection theories. Early selection theories are 
based on the assumption that it is beneficial, practical, and intuitive to select the 
relevant information for processing early, before too much cognitive effort is 
deployed. Late selection theories adopt the alternative standpoint that information 
selection occurs after an initial analysis of the available information has taken 
place (Pashler, 1999). 
 
2.2.1 Early Selection Theories 
The most well-known early selection theory is the filter theory by Broadbent, 
published in 1958. This theory consists of three stages: the sensory register, the 
selective filter, and the short-term memory store (see, for example, Lachter, 
Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004, for a review). Input from the senses enters the sensory 
register where the rudimentary, physical properties of each piece of information 
are established (e.g., tone, pitch, colour, orientation). The representations of 
these characteristics are then passed to the selective filter, where those that are 
irrelevant for the task in hand are dropped (filtered) from processing, and 
important, relevant information is transferred to the short-term memory store, in 
order for a response to be made. 
Broadbent (1958) argued that the successful filtering and subsequent processing 
of relevant information is due to the individual’s ability to attune to a definable (by 
sensory characteristics) stream or channel of information. This means that 
information that does not correlate to the attended channel is filtered from 
processing. For example, if an individual is listening for their mother’s voice in a 
situation where multiple sounds are present, then information that does not match 
this characteristic (i.e., male voices, background noise, and different tones) is not 
carried on for further processing. Another example would be visually searching 
for a friend wearing a red hat in a crowd, where everything red is attended to and 
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other stimuli are filtered out and ignored. This procedure can be either, or a 
combination of both, top-down (pre-specifying a channel) and bottom-up (filtering 
according to sensory information) processes. 
The filter theory was based on the idea that processing capacity is limited, yet 
these exact limits are unclear and were not alluded to by Broadbent himself 
(Lachter et al., 2004). It was also argued that the information that was deemed 
irrelevant and therefore filtered out of processing left no traces in the individual’s 
memory (Broadbent, 1958; Cherry, 1953; Driver, 2001; Moray, 1959). However, 
this idea became controversial after studies using dichotic listening tasks found 
that individuals were able to repeat samples of information or answer questions 
on what they had heard from the unattended ear (Treisman, 1960). Moreover, 
Broadbent (1958) hypothesised that information was filtered according to 
physical characteristics only (such as sounds, colour, etc.), yet when participants 
were conditioned (by use of electric shock) to fear certain words, a physiological 
reaction of an increase in galvanic skin response was found when these words 
were presented to the unattended ear (Corteen & Dunn, 1974). 
These findings demonstrate that although the unattended ear may not be fully 
processed, small amounts of information can be. In order to meet these new 
experimental findings, Treisman (1969) presented an adaptation to Broadbent’s 
filter theory. 
Treisman’s attenuation theory (1969) looks almost the same as the filter theory. 
However, the selective filter has become the attenuator, where most irrelevant 
information is filtered from processing, but small amounts leak through to short 
term memory. It was suggested that the attenuator deciphers which channel of 
information is important for processing based on more than just physical 
properties, as suggested by Broadbent (1958). Rather, it was proposed that 
stimuli were analysed systematically, first for physical characteristics, then for 
semantic meaning. 
It was argued that the type of task-irrelevant information that was likely to leak in 
to the short term memory store would be primed as personally relevant or 
interesting to the individual, for example, the person’s name (Driver, 2001; 
Lachter et al., 2004; Treisman, 1969). Anticipated and relevant sensory input 
require less processing capacity as the unexpected, which allows space for 
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unattended information to leak through the filter. The unattended information that 
does enter the short term memory store is not as strongly processed as the 
relevant information, and therefore may not always induce a response from the 
participant, but is not so weak that it cannot be extracted and used if it becomes 
necessary (Driver, 2001; Treisman 1969). The attenuation theory therefore 
predicts that a little irrelevant information can still be processed at a basic level, 
which accounts for the findings from the dichotic listening trials (Treisman, 1960), 
and the physiological response tests (Corteen & Dunn, 1974). 
Support for the early selection models of attention has come from research into 
visual search and preattentive processes, culminating in the feature-integration 
theory by Treisman and Gelade (1980). Studies have shown that when a visual 
target has features that are particularly salient and easily differentiated from 
surrounding distractors, it appears to “pop-out” (Treisman, 1985, p.170), that is, 
it is recognised instantly. Single, salient targets can be identified amongst large 
arrays in as little as 200-250ms, and given that a saccade takes around 200ms 
to begin, this identification takes place in one look, in less time than is required to 
process the entire scene (Healey & Enns, 2012). This indicates that some featural 
processing may precede awareness. When the features of the target are not 
easily discernible, individuals take longer to identify the target, indicating that they 
may be analysing each stimulus separately (Treisman, 1985). 
The feature-integration theory was proposed as an explanation of these findings. 
It reasons that preattentive processes in visual tasks identify basic physical 
features separately, such as colour, movement, and orientation, before the 
application of focal attention is required (Treisman, 1985; also see Müller & 
Krummenacher, 2006 for a review). These processes are said to be effortless, 
fast, and run in parallel, as they incorporate whole visual sets, ultimately providing 
a spatial map or representation of the identified physical features (Treisman, 
1985; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Preattentive processes are then thought to 
guide attention to the most important or most relevant item in view. Thereafter, 
visual attention is engaged, and the location of the stimuli are identified serially, 
with features being combined or ‘integrated’ when they appear within the same 
focal point (Treisman & Gelade, 1980).  
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The early selection theories have been influential in the area of attention 
research, and both highlight the role and importance of attention. Furthermore, it 
is agreed on both parts that the processing capacity for new information is very 
limited and therefore successful filtration of at least most of the irrelevant sensory 
stimuli in our environments is important for cognitive functioning. Preattentive 
processes may help with this. 
 
2.2.2 Late Selection Theories 
Both early and late selection theorists support the idea of two systems governing 
the selection of information for attention. For early selection theorists, the first is 
the filter or attenuator, and the second system has a limited capacity that selects 
information for further processing. Late selection theories disregard the partial 
analysis made by the early filter as being key to the selection of relevant 
information for processing. Instead, they tend to suggest that information is fully 
analysed for meaning as well as physical characteristics in the first stage, before 
the selection of what is important is made in an intermediary period, in the limited 
capacity processor (Duncan, 1980). The second stage is the awareness to and 
response by the participant. This stance was adopted by Deutsch and Deutsch 
(1963) and Duncan (1980), the latter being described below. 
The first stage of the late selection model of attention involves a complete 
analysis of all available sensory stimuli, in parallel, and without the use of divided 
attention (Duncan, 1980). This analysis is supplemented by any available data 
from memory, and includes the detection of form, colour, size, and location, as 
well as meaning, and stimuli classification. This is possible according to late 
selection theorists, as there is no limitation on the capacity of the initial 
identification process. During this first stage, it is proposed that the individual 
cannot make a response according to what they see or hear, as the information 
has not yet reached awareness, which also means that they are vulnerable and 
open to interference. Before the second response stage can be reached, the 
analysed information must pass through the selection system, which is limited in 
working and storage capacity (Duncan, 1980). 
This model specifies that any and all of the information processed in stage one 
can cross over in to the selection phase, yet only information that fits the goal 
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(i.e., targets) is forwarded for a response, according to the classifications made 
in stage one. This was called a selection schedule by Duncan (1980), with 
information that has been identified as useful and featuring on the selection 
schedule being passed through the limited capacity system to reach stage two. 
However, if only the targets are gaining entry to the limited capacity processor, 
then a form of selection or filtering must have already taken place. The existence 
of a selection schedule, and the claim that this can guide the type of information 
that reaches the selection system and therefore stage two of the model, implies 
a top-down process that must involve an earlier filter. Duncan (1980) seems to 
effectively describe a filter, as in the early-selection theories, but just does not 
refer to it as one.  
Late selection theories that propose a full semantic analysis of the available 
information takes place in parallel before selection, are mainly based on findings 
from studies using single word cues, or very short sentences (Pashler, 1999), 
which of course does not reflect the nature of real life speech and language use. 
As shown by the literature, the simultaneous processing of two paths of 
information results in the perceptual slowing of the reaction and response 
(Fischer & Hommel, 2012; Pashler, 1994). If these information streams were 
being analysed fully at the same time pre-selection, the process would be slow, 
cumbersome, and inefficient. As we pay attention and can respond to stimuli 
extremely quickly, and usually with ease, as illustrated by Healey and Enns 
(2012), the late selection theories seem unlikely. 
More recently, and in response to late selection theories, there has been an 
attempt at a revival of Broadbent’s theory. Lachter, Forster, and Ruthruff (2004) 
carried out a series of experiments that indicated the unattended and irrelevant 
information that made it to short term memory (as found in the dichotic listening 
tasks, and as explained by Treisman’s theory, 1969) was not due to leakage, but 
due to slips in the focus of attention. This means that the individual briefly 
attended to and, therefore, processed the irrelevant information, even though it 
was unrelated to the task (Lachter et al., 2004), a finding that also was reported, 
by Dykes and McGhie (1976). Slips in attention had not been controlled for in 
previous studies, as determined by their review of the literature. This is certainly 
a plausible alternative explanation as to why participants had memory of, or 
reacted to, ‘unattended’ information. Studies have shown that it is difficult to 
Chapter 2 – Attention Literature Review 
 
49 
 
maintain concentration and focus on a single task (e.g., Bajaj et al., 2008; Bennett 
et al., 1998), which could explain why attention occasionally slips, in the way 
described by Lachter, Forster, and Ruthruff (2004). The authors state that their 
findings provide evidence against attention models that account for ‘leakage’ 
during selection, that attentional slippage is well reported, and that this explains 
the findings of those who adapted or rejected Broadbent’s filter theory (1958). 
 
2.2.3 Visual Attention Systems 
Within the research field of visual attention, it has been proposed that two major 
attentional systems exist, one based on top-down processing, and the other, 
bottom-up processing. Top-down processing uses the individual’s aims, existing 
knowledge, and expectations to guide attention, whereas bottom-up processing 
utilises environmental and sensory information, irrespective of the individual’s 
goals, to guide attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). These two systems are 
said to govern visual attention. Posner’s (1980) theory and Corbetta and 
Shulman’s (2002) theory will be presented here in illustration of this view point.  
Posner (1980) carried out experiments in which he claimed to study “complex 
human activity” (p.4). The participants of these studies were required to react as 
quickly as possible to the onset of a light. Before the light appeared, a valid, 
invalid, or neutral cue was presented to participants in either their central, or 
peripheral visual field. The valid cues consisted of an arrow pointing to the side 
the light would show, the invalid cues pointed to the incorrect side, and the neutral 
cues consisted of a central cross (see figure 1). For arrowed trials, the cue was 
valid on 80% and invalid on 20% of the presentations.  
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Figure 1: Cueing paradigm. Illustration adapted from Posner (1980). 
 
It was found that valid cues led to the fastest response times, followed by the 
neutral cues, then the invalid cues. It was also found that invalid central cues 
could be more easily inhibited than peripheral cues. Posner likened attention to 
a spotlight that can move around flexibly, where processing is focused and clear 
at the centre of the beam of light, and little is processed beyond it. It was therefore 
concluded that processing is enhanced at the point of focus for attention, and that 
valid cues can guide or ‘zoom’ attention to facilitate this effect. 
The results of these experiments directed Posner (1980) to differentiate between 
two systems of how we orientate our attention, an endogenous attention system 
and an exogenous attention system. It was proposed that the endogenous 
system is a top-down system, managed by the objectives and expectations of the 
individual, and is in use when peripheral cues are involved. The exogenous 
system is a bottom-up, automatic system as it moves attention to unexpected or 
salient information, and is in use when the peripheral cues are unhelpful (Posner, 
1980).  
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) proposed a very similar theory to that by Posner 
(1980), and attempted to identify the neural basis for top-down and bottom-up 
processing. The first of their two attentional systems was the dorsal network, and 
the second was the ventral network. The dorsal network, named so as neural 
analysis found that activation was concentrated in the dorsal posterior parietal 
and the frontal cortex, is occupied with the task of cognitively selecting 
information and producing a response  This is a top-down process that bears 
similarities to Posner’s endogenous system (1980). Activation in the 
Neutral Cue 
Trial +
Valid Cue 
Trial ←
Invalid Cue 
Trial ←
Cue
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temporoparietal and ventral frontal cortex is apparent during the use of the ventral 
network, which is used during the identification of sensory information. This is a 
bottom-up process, and is aligned with Posner’s exogenous system (1980).  
The dorsal network is thought to be goal-directed, therefore guiding attention 
according to the aims of the individual (e.g., Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 
2010; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Shulman et al., 2009). This system is able to 
facilitate processing by biasing it towards goal related information according to 
the ability of the individual to form a cognitive representation of the pre-set 
information (i.e., the ability of the individual to set their goal to only searching for 
the colour red, when searching for their friend wearing a red hat). By doing so, 
this would conserve an amount of the limited processing space, as irrelevant (i.e., 
non-red) information would not be processed and attended to (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002). This explains the finding that participants can locate a target 
more quickly after being given information about its nature (i.e., location, 
appearance) as participants can attend to the target relevant information, which 
in turn leads to a quicker response. 
The ventral network is stimulus-driven, so is controlled by sensory input and will 
guide attention either when there are no overriding goals, or with the presence of 
salient stimuli. In relation to stimuli that appear suddenly, such as a spark from 
an electrical appliance, it was suggested that these can immediately gain control 
of the information selection process (Lachter et al., 2004). It is thought that the 
unconscious redirection of attention, eye-gaze, and behavioural response to 
unexpected, salient information occurs in a circuit breaker system in the ventral 
network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Information selection is interrupted in the 
presence of an unexpected stimulus, especially if a behavioural response is 
required (i.e., to attend to the spark, or to leave a building if a fire alarm goes off). 
This circuit breaker system is consequently advantageous for the well-being of 
an individual, and can be quickly overridden by conscious processors if logical 
analysis indicates that there is no need for a behavioural reaction (i.e., if the spark 
was in fact a reflection, the appliance was turned off, or if the fire alarm was a 
practice) and the individual can return to the normal filtering of information.  
More recently, an investigation using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) found that the dorsal and ventral networks do not only exist in relation to 
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external attention (i.e., attention paid to external stimuli), but also in relation to 
internal brain activity, independent of external task demands (Fox, Corbetta, 
Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 2006). Furthermore, support for Corbetta and 
Shulman’s (2002) model has been provided in neuroimaging studies concerning 
colour or orientation target detection (Giesbrecht, Woldorff, Song, & Mangun, 
2003), spatial navigation (Iaria, Fox, Chen, Petrides, and Barton, 2008), and 
target prediction (Hahn, Ross, & Stein, 2006).  
Although the two systems approach was proposed decades after Broadbent’s 
filter theory, they seem to be compatible. Both the dorsal and the ventral systems 
can work together, as the ventral system selects information from the senses 
according to the goals controlling the dorsal system (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
The ventral system relates to the filter, as they both work from sensory 
characteristics, and the dorsal system is comparable to the limited capacity 
processor, as both select information according to what is important to the 
individual at that point in time. Broadbent (1958) had alluded to the existence of 
a circuit breaker system in the presence of unexpected stimuli, and the version 
proposed by Corbetta and Shulman (2002) could seamlessly coincide with the 
filter theory, as well as with Treisman’s (1969) attenuator theory. Therefore, it is 
suggested that these theories complement each other, with the Filter theory 
(Broadbent, 1958) providing detail of how selection works, and the visual 
attention networks theory (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) giving more detail on how 
the processing system of attention works, with evidence from neuroscience. 
The studies contributing to the theories and support for the visual attention 
systems used measures of focused attention in various forms. Neuroimaging 
studies comparing the differences between selective and divided attention have 
demonstrated that attention can be considered an executive function, as 
discussed below.  
 
2.3 Attention and Executive Function 
Attention is a complex function that enables information to be processed, the 
ability to concentrate and learn, and ultimately, it allows for goals to be attained. 
Within the literature, attention is often referred to as one of the executive functions 
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(EFs), which are a diverse set of processes that serve to enhance and manage 
performance on a range of tasks (e.g., Hawthorne et al., 2014; Robbins, 2000).  
Broadly, it has been suggested that EFs are all-purpose control processes that 
govern the complexities of human cognition (Miyake et al., 2000). EFs have also 
been described as crucial, high-level cognitive processes that govern the abilities 
to perform appropriately, effectively, responsibly, and socially (e.g., Lezak, 1983), 
and to form goals, plan, and implement goal related plans (e.g., Jurado & 
Rosselli, 2007). More specifically, there are thought to be three key constituents 
of EF: “1) attentional control: selective attention and sustained attention; 2) 
cognitive flexibility: working memory, attentional shift, self-monitoring, and 
conceptual transfer; and 3) goal setting: initiating planning, problem solving, and 
strategic behaviour” (e.g., Anderson, Northam, Hendy, & Wrennall, 2001, p.93). 
Attention is a regularly featured concept in discussions of EF, highlighting its 
importance as a function and its substantial involvement in cognition. 
Neurologically solidifying the status of attention as an EF, imaging studies have 
determined that most attentional processing, including distraction prevention, 
occurs in the frontal lobes (Filley, 2002; Vendrell et al., 1995), where EFs are 
known to operate (e.g., Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss & 
Alexander, 2000).  
Further neuroimaging evidence for the role of attention in EF has shown neural 
differences in selective and divided attention processing (Johnson & Zatorre, 
2006). Participants were given two simple tasks (one auditory, one visual) and 
were requested to either attend to one (selective attention) or both (divided 
attention). Using fMRI, it was found that during selective attention, neural 
activation was increased in the relevant sensory cortices, and was reduced in the 
irrelevant sensory cortices (Johnson & Zatorre, 2006; Loose, Kaufmann, Auer, & 
Lange, 2003). During divided attention, there was additional activation in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and reduced activation in the sensory 
cortices, thought to be due to capacity limitations being reached (Johnson & 
Zatorre, 2006; Loose et al., 2003, see also Moisala et al., 2015). As divided 
attention is a more difficult task than selective attention, the authors suggested 
that neural activity during divided attention was moved to the prefrontal cortex in 
order to maintain and manage processing and functioning with the increase of 
Chapter 2 – Attention Literature Review 
 
54 
 
task demand, and the subsequent reduction of available working capacity in the 
cortices where selective attention took place. 
A follow up study by Johnson, Strafella, and Zatorre (2007), featuring the same 
two tasks and conditions, used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to 
temporarily interfere with the functioning of the DLPFC. This interference led to 
an inability in processing both tasks simultaneously, with performance resembling 
that of selective attention rather than divided attention. Therefore, by location 
association and the nature of divided attention, it can be suggested that divided 
attention is an EF. 
The evidence and literature presented illustrate both the roles of EF, and of 
attention within EF. Recognising and appreciating the important roles of attention 
and EF can aid with the understanding of the symptomatology of attention 
disorders. This will be discussed further, after an explanation of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, which follows.  
 
2.4 Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
As with any cognitive ability, attention is vulnerable to dysfunction. This overview 
will highlight the symptoms and deficits associated with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) – the most common and best understood deficit of 
attention. By understanding ADHD, we can learn more about attention. 
“The essential feature of [ADHD] is a persistent pattern of inattention and/or 
hyperactivity-impulsivity that interferes with functioning or development” 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, p.61). According to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (fifth edition) (DSM-V; APA, 
2013), ADHD has chronic, impairing symptoms including inattention, 
disorganisation, impulsivity, and hyperactivity, as well as indicators such as 
failure to pay attention to detail, the production of thoughtless mistakes, 
forgetfulness, and the appearance of not listening when spoken to. Individuals 
with ADHD will experience all or a selection of these impairments across different 
settings (i.e., at home, school, work, and when socialising), although the 
presentation or severity of each symptom can vary across environments.  
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The DSM-V (APA, 2013) specifies that there are three main subtypes of ADHD: 
impulsive type, inattentive type, and combined type. The difference is, those with 
impulsive type display more outward behavioural symptoms of ADHD, such as 
hyperactivity, fidgeting, excessive movements when the expectation is to be still 
(e.g., in situations like classrooms or meetings), and disproportionate talking. 
Those with ADHD-inattentive type tend not to display these behaviours, but can 
be more internally distracted, restless, and struggle to stay on task. Those with 
ADHD-combined type display the symptoms of both the inattentive and the 
impulsive types. From this point, the author will refer just to ADHD without further 
specification of subtypes. 
According to the DSM-V, there are comorbid conditions that are frequent in 
individuals with ADHD. Specifically, oppositional defiant disorder co-occurs most 
commonly, within about a 25-50% of children with ADHD (APA, 2013). With 
children and adolescents with ADHD, conduct disorder can be experienced in 
around a quarter of cases. Specific learning difficulties and disruptive mood 
dysregulation disorder can also be comorbid with ADHD. Adults with ADHD are 
more likely to have comorbid conditions such as anti-social and other personality 
disorders, and intermittent explosive disorder. Other disorders that only a minority 
of those with ADHD will have, but appear more frequently in those with ADHD 
than in the general population, include anxiety and depression, and substance 
misuse (APA. 2013). Other comorbidities include obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
tic disorders, and autistic spectrum disorder.  
 
2.4.1 Prevalence of ADHD 
ADHD is one of the most pervasive psychological conditions in children (e.g., 
Gomez & Condon, 1999), and contrary to common opinion, is a prevailing 
condition in adulthood (Harpin, 2005; Murphy & Barkley, 1996; Simon, Czobor, 
Bálint, Mészáros, & Bitter, 2009), and can even originate in adulthood (Moffitt et 
al., 2015). Many studies have aimed to determine the exact prevalence of ADHD 
in society. Surveys have shown that ADHD exists across cultures, with around 
5% of children and 2.5% of adults having the condition (APA, 2013). In the USA 
alone in 2011, 11% of children had been officially diagnosed with ADHD with 
6.1% of those children receiving treatment by medication (Centres for Disease 
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Control & Prevention, 2013). Approximately 65-80% of children with ADHD will 
also have the condition in adolescence and adulthood (Faraone, Sergeant, 
Gillberg, & Biederman, 2003; Faraone, Biederman, & Mick, 2006). One 
systematic literature review found that the worldwide incidence of ADHD was 
5.29% (Polanczyk, de Lima, Horta, Biederman, & Rohde, 2007). 
ADHD is diagnosed significantly more in the United States compared to both 
Africa and the Middle East (Polanczyk et al., 2007), but the same study found 
that there were no prevalence differences between the United States and Europe, 
South America, Asia, or Oceania. Cultural differences exist in the attitude toward 
and management of ADHD. For example in Germany, it is thought to be caused 
by dietary deficiencies, or food sensitivities, meaning it is treated with diet 
adjustments (Schmidt et al., 1997), yet elsewhere it is more likely to be treated 
with medication and/or therapy (Dopheide & Pliszka, 2012: treatment is further 
discussed in section 2.4.3).  
There is also a lack of consistency across nations in how ADHD is measured, 
diagnosed, and treated, and it is thought that there is a high rate of under-
diagnosis (Asherson et al., 2012). It is possible that this is due to the 
misconception that ADHD is a childhood disorder, given that it was only 
inaugurated in to the DSM as an adult disorder for the first time in 1994. The lack 
of understanding and diagnosis of the disorder is also thought to be due to 
inconsistent measuring methods (Asherson et al., 2012), misinterpretations in the 
media (i.e., ADHD is an excuse for bad behaviour or bad parenting), and a 
reluctance of general practitioners to identify and deal with the disorder (Shaw, 
Wagner, Eastwood, & Mitchell, 2003).  
ADHD is a debilitating condition that can affect all areas of an individual’s life and 
can lead to poor academic achievement, low self-esteem, decreased 
employment opportunities and lower occupational status, poor relationships, 
anxiety and depression, and substance misuse (Advokat, Lane, & Luo, 2011; 
APA, 2013; Barkley, 1997; Faraone et al., 2003; Harpin, 2005). In the USA it is 
thought to be a significant public health issue and the cause of a substantial 
financial weight upon both families and society (Polanczyk, et al., 2007). Despite 
the large impact that ADHD can have on individuals and society, the cause of 
ADHD is still unknown. 
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2.4.2 Possible Causes of ADHD 
Neurological studies have determined that the rate of cortical development of the 
prefrontal regions of the brain is significantly slower in those with ADHD when 
compared to control individuals (Shaw et al., 2007; Shaw et al., 2012). This 
indicates that it is possible for abnormalities in neural development to cause EF 
impairment, which in turn could cause ADHD. This is one of many proposed 
causes of ADHD, yet a recent review found that no single factor can be attributed 
to the cause of ADHD (Thaper, Cooper, Eyre, & Langley, 2013) 
The authors of the review listed the potential causes of ADHD, according to 
previous research, as factors such as genetics, pre- and perinatal risks, 
psychosocial stability, and environmental contaminants (Thaper et al., 2013). 
ADHD is heritable (up to 75%: Faraone et al., 2005; Freitag, Rohde, Lempp, & 
Romanos, 2010; 75-91% Levy, Hay, McStephen, Wood, & Waldman, 1997), but 
there are numerous variables that can affect this, such as family members, 
excessive early hardship, birth weight, and gene variants/expressions. Maternal 
smoking and stress are two pre- and perinatal factors that have been considered 
in previous studies, leading to their recognition as risks to ADHD, but there is no 
evidence of a causal relationship between these and ADHD. Environmental 
toxins such as pesticides and lead have also been highlighted as risk factors, but 
no causation has been determined. As for psychosocial factors, low income, 
adversity, and parent/child conflict have been correlated with the presentation of 
ADHD, but the link is not causal. Of all of the variables deliberated, severe early 
childhood deprivation was the only aspect to be considered a “likely causal risk 
factor” (Thaper et al., 2013, p.8). 
However, not all individuals with ADHD have been exposed to severe deprivation 
in their childhood. In the absence of a definitive cause, psychological research 
has led to the development of theories of how ADHD may be caused and how it 
works. These are elaborated upon following a discussion of treatments for ADHD. 
 
2.4.3 Treatment of ADHD 
Unfortunately, there is no cure for ADHD, but treatments such as medication, 
therapy, and a combination of both, have been found to lessen the symptoms, 
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leading to the improved management of day to day life (MTA Cooperative Group, 
1999; NHS, 2014). 
There are two different categories of licensed medications that can treat ADHD: 
stimulants or non-stimulants (NHS, 2014). The stimulants aim to increase neural 
activity in areas controlling attention, in order to limit distractedness and 
impulsiveness. Non-stimulants on the other hand, increase noradrenaline, which 
can aid concentration and help to control impulses. Therapies for ADHD offered 
within the UK include psychoeducation to improve the individual’s awareness of 
their symptoms, behaviour therapy using rewards for good behaviour (for use 
with children), social skills training, and cognitive behavioural therapy to alter 
faulty thought patterns (NHS, 2014). 
In a review of medication use in the USA, it was reported that in 2005, 4.4% of 
children (this rose to 6.1% by 2011: Centres for Disease Control & Prevention, 
2013) and 0.8% of adults were prescribed medication for ADHD (Castle, Aubert, 
Verbrugge, Khalid, & Epstein, 2007). In the UK, the number of ADHD medication 
prescriptions increased by 9.36% between 2013 and 2014, to 793,749 (Care 
Quality Commission, 2015), but to date and to the author’s knowledge, there is 
no report of the statistics in the UK similar to that by Castle and colleagues for 
the USA. 
The effectiveness of treatment options for ADHD was tested with a randomised 
clinical trial involving 579 children with ADHD over a 14-month period. There were 
four conditions: medication management, intensive behavioural treatment, a 
combination of both, or ordinary community care (MTA Cooperative Group, 
1999). The findings indicated that all participants had a reduction of outward 
ADHD symptoms, but the medication management and the combination group 
members showed significantly better improvement than the others. Interestingly 
however, these differences did not persist, as three year (Jensen et al., 2007) 
and eight year (Molina et al., 2009) follow up studies determined that there were 
no significant differences between the treatment groups.  
Past research has found that the use of medication to treat ADHD can improve 
the outward behavioural symptoms, but it can have little or no effect on an 
individual’s ability to learn and utilise knowledge (Gualtieri & Johnson, 2008; 
Advokat et al., 2011). Furthermore, it has been found that those with ADHD find 
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it very difficult to self-motivate, especially if they find tasks mundane and 
uninteresting, and if there are no immediate benefits from completing the task 
(Carlson, Booth, Shin, & Canu, 2002). This leads to the individual committing less 
effort to unexciting tasks than those without ADHD, who can more easily 
understand the importance of such tasks (Egeland, Nordby Johansen, & Ueland, 
2010). 
Studies looking at the effect of teacher-based interventions on the behavioural 
and academic difficulties seen in ADHD children have found that although 
behaviour can be improved, there are only very small, if any, advances to an 
individual’s academic work (DuPaul & Eckert, 1998; Iseman & Naglieri, 2011; 
Reid, Vasa, Maag, & Wright, 1994). Furthermore, it has been stated that the 
environment in which students with ADHD study should be “sensitive” (Harpin, 
2005, p.i2) to the requirements of the individual, although there are no details 
provided stating what this would consist of. 
It has been posited that as ADHD is a chronic disorder, brief and time-bound 
treatments, regardless of their method, are inappropriate (Pelham & Fabiano, 
2008). Following from inconsistent findings of treatment effectiveness and 
longevity, and a lack of studies with adult samples, more evidence based 
research is required to inform clinicians, patients, and their families of the best 
options for them.  
Having presented the nature, symptoms, and impairments associated with 
ADHD, there follows a summary of how the disorder affects the four types of 
attention previously discussed; focused, sustained, selective, and divided 
attention. 
 
2.5 ADHD and Types of Attention 
Although ADHD can be a hugely debilitating condition in children and adults in 
everyday life, traditional laboratory based tasks of attention do not always exhibit 
the expected deficits in performance. Research has considered ADHD in relation 
to the different types of attention, as illustrated here.  
Focused Attention. The rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task 
demonstrating the AB paradigm has been used to test for differences in focused 
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attention between those with and without ADHD. In children, it was found that 
those with the disorder made more errors during an AB task, but there were no 
significant differences between the groups in processing recovery times (Mason, 
Humphreys, & Kent, 2005). Yet, between-group differences in AB performance 
have been found elsewhere, with poorer scores for those with ADHD (e.g., Li, 
Lin, Chang, & Hung, 2004; López et al., 2008), and a related study found AB 
deficits in highly impulsive children compared to those low in impulsivity (Li, Chen, 
Lin, & Yang, 2005).  
In research with adults, it has been reported that those with ADHD missed more 
targets and took longer to recover following an AB (Armstrong & Munoz, 2003a; 
Hollingsworth, McAuliffe, & Knowlton, 2001). In a manipulation of the time 
between T1 and T2 presentation, adults with ADHD performed as well as control 
adults after a very short interval (90ms), but significantly poorer after longer 
intervals (450-720ms; Hollingsworth et al., 2001). It was therefore suggested by 
these authors that there was a deficit in the recovery of controlled processing, but 
not in automatic processing (also found in children: Li et al., 2004). More research 
is required in this area, and measuring adult ADHD and control groups on AB 
performance could highlight any differences in the ability to reinstate processing 
following the detection of a target.  
Sustained Attention. There appear to be more studies concerning sustained 
attention in ADHD than focused attention. Findings have shown that children with 
ADHD perform poorer than control groups in measures of sustained attention 
(e.g., Börger et al., 1999; Christakou et al., 2013; Epstein et al., 2003; Harper & 
Ottinger, 1992; Johnson et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2015; Stern & Shalev, 2013; Tucha 
et al., 2008; van der Meere, Shalev, Börger, & Gross-Tsur,1995). These studies 
outweigh the findings that there were no between-group differences (e.g., 
Corkum & Siegel, 1993; van der Meere & Sergeant, 1988). Still, in these cases, 
differences on RTs and errors were found, but there were no significant 
interactions with group.  
In studies with adults, it has so far been found that those with ADHD have slower 
and more variable RTs during sustained attention tasks (Advokat, Martino, Hill & 
Gouvier, 2007; Marchetta et al., 2007; Riccio & Reynolds, 2001; Rodriguez-
Jimenez et al., 2006; Tucha et al., 2008). These summarised findings show that 
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sustained attention may be affected by ADHD. However, caution is encouraged 
by Riccio and Reynolds (2001), who illustrate that continuous performance tasks 
are also sensitive to disorders comorbid with ADHD.  
Selective Attention. It is often intimated that the underperformance of selective 
attention and response inhibition is indicative of ADHD by definition. Indeed, 
inattention, distractibility, and impulsivity, core components of ADHD, can be 
thought of as failure to select and attend to information, and a failure to suppress 
irrelevant stimuli, respectively. Studies have shown this to be the case, with 
poorer performance on selective attention measures found in those with ADHD 
(e.g., Brodeur & Pond, 2001; Lansbergen, Kenemans, & van Engeland, 2007; 
Marije Boonstra, Oosterlaan, Sergeant, & Buitelaar, 2005; Mason, Humphreys, & 
Kent, 2003). However, it is still a debate within the literature if selective attention 
is a primary deficit in ADHD or not, as it has also been the case that no 
performance differences between the groups have been found (e.g., Huang-
Pollock, Nigg, & Carr, 2005; Schwartz & Verhaeghen, 2008) and in one study, 
only those with ADHD and a comorbidity had deficits in selective attention 
(Marchetta et al., 2007). It is possible that the main reason for a lack of consensus 
on the efficacy of selective attention in ADHD is the inconsistent array of 
measures used.  
Divided Attention. There is a debate in the literature regarding divided attention 
and ADHD. With the consideration of the impairments featured in ADHD, it would 
be expected that carrying out two tasks at once would be very difficult, and would 
lead to errors and reduced RTs. This assumption was supported by some 
empirical findings (e.g., Karatekin, 2004; Savage, Cornish, Manly, & Hollis, 2006). 
However, there is an alternative thought that those with ADHD may perform as 
well as, (e.g., Miyahara, Piek, & Barrett, 2006) or even better than non-ADHD 
adults in tasks requiring divided attention (e.g., Hartmann, 1993). This may be 
because they are habituated to contending with numerous stimuli at once (due to 
their inattention), and having more than one task to attend to could in fact 
increase their cognitive stimulation to a level that allows them to perform 
efficiently (e.g., Zentall & Zentall, 1983). There are no clear results pertaining to 
either argument. 
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It appears that performance on attention tasks by those with ADHD is not always 
as poor as would be expected, given the definition and symptoms of the disorder. 
It has been argued that much less is known about the presentation of ADHD in 
adults compared to children, and that this leaves uncertainties over the deficits in 
attentional processes in adults (Marchetta et al., 2007). The vast majority of the 
available research concerning ADHD use samples of children (Riccio & 
Reynolds, 2001).  
 
2.6 Psychological Theories of ADHD 
Most of the research and publications in relation to ADHD has been descriptive 
and atheoretical (Castellanos & Tannock, 2002). For example, despite a large 
volume of research and publications in the fields of both early selection theory 
and ADHD, an explicit projection of how these concepts work together could not 
be found. It could be the case that ADHD is indicative of a fault at any stage of 
the early selection models of attention. At the sensory register stage of both 
Broadbent’s (1958) and Treisman’s (1969) models, a fault may consist of the 
incomplete pre-selection analysis of the physical characteristics of stimuli: 
however the evidence presented so far does not lend itself to this suggestion. It 
could be assumed though, that the filter (Broadbent, 1958) or attenuator 
(Treisman, 1969) is somehow faulty.  
There are three possible faults with the filter/attenuator that could be existent in 
ADHD. Firstly, it may be that those with ADHD are unable to make the distinction 
between what is relevant and what is not. This could stem from their inability in 
the first place to focus on the task in hand, in order to determine what is relevant, 
creating a circle of inattention. Secondly, Bush (2010) mused that there may be 
an inability to filter out irrelevant data from the environment, meaning that too 
much information gains access through the filter or attenuator, and would enter 
the limited capacity processor, thus slowing down processing and increasing 
inattention and distraction. Thirdly and alternatively, it may be the case that not 
enough information is passing through the filter or attenuator, which leaves the 
individual looking for more information to process, leading to distractedness.  
Defects could also exist at the processing stage, which is limited in capacity. It 
could be the case that those with ADHD have too little capacity, leading to an 
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inefficient and blocked processing system. On the other hand, the capacity may 
not be as limited as in those without the disorder, leading to an overload of 
information reaching short term memory. 
The final stage of each model is the short-term memory store, where information 
is either rehearsed for memory storage, or lost. A fault at this stage would be 
coherent with the theories of EF impairment in ADHD, meaning that individuals 
would be unable to successfully rehearse the information in order to make an 
appropriate response. 
This application of the early selection theories to ADHD is new in this thesis, and 
although it may make logical sense, publications making the same links have not 
been found. In review of the literature then, firstly, one of the newer neuroscience 
theories will be introduced, the dynamic developmental theory of ADHD, before 
four of the more established theories of ADHD are summarised, namely the 
cognitive energetic model, the unified theory, the delay-aversion theory, and the 
dual-pathway model of ADHD.  
There has been a recent surge in neuroscience research in to ADHD, with most 
of the theories now implicating dopamine and dopamine dysfunction in the 
possible cause of ADHD (see Gizer, Ficks, & Waldman, 2009 for a review). One 
example of these theories is exemplified below, and was published by Sagvolden, 
Johansen, Aase, and Russell (2005). 
 
2.6.1 Dynamic Developmental Theory 
The dynamic developmental theory of ADHD is grounded in the proposal that an 
interaction between hypofunctioning dopamine branches and the environment 
can predict the symptoms of ADHD (Sagvolden et al., 2005). Dopamine is a vital 
neurotransmitter that plays a key role in cognitive, motor, and limbic functions 
(Nieoullon, 2002), and it regulates activity in the prefrontal cortex (Sagvolden et 
al., 2005). Low levels of dopamine can therefore lead to behavioural and EF 
impairments, and these hypofunctioning dopamine branches can lead to a 
number of difficulties. A difficulty in distinguishing between types of behavioural 
reinforcement (caused by a hypofunctioning mesolimbic dopamine branch) can 
result in hyperactivity, impulsiveness, poor sustained attention, and disinhibited 
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behaviour. A problem with producing attentional responses and planning (caused 
by a hypofunctioning mesocortical dopamine branch) can lead to disoriented 
responses, poor focus and response to targets, and impaired EFs. Difficulties 
with poor motor and non-declarative memory management (caused by a 
hypofunctioning nigrostriatal dopamine branch) could result in delayed 
development, clumsiness, and poor response inhibition. The composition of 
these dopamine branches may be different between individuals, and the 
expression of these, along with influences from the environment and medication 
can yield the enduring behavioural patterns seen in ADHD (Sagvolden et al., 
2005). 
Although support for the role of dopamine dysfunction in ADHD has been granted 
(e.g., Söderlund, Sikström, & Smart, 2007; Spencer et al., 2007), Karatekin 
(2005) argues that this theory is too broad and that it requires refinement in order 
to be testable. It may be the case, that following refinement, this theory can 
enhance and inform the cognitive theories of ADHD, and its emphasis on the 
workings of dopamine could be what underpins them.  
The first of these cognitive theories of ADHD is the cognitive energetic model, 
which discusses an interplay between attentional processes, states of arousal, 
and EFs. 
 
2.6.2 Cognitive Energetic Model 
The cognitive energetic model (CEM) was proposed by Sergeant, Oosterlaan, 
and van der Meere (1999; reviewed by Sergeant, 2005) and considers that 
proficient information processing is governed by the interaction between three 
levels: computational mechanisms of attention, state factors, and EF (Sergeant, 
2005). The first level, computational mechanisms of attention, consists of four 
attentional processing stages: search, encoding, decision, and motor 
configuration. The second level, state factors, includes three distinctive energetic 
pools: effort, arousal, and activation. Effort can be affected by cognitive load and 
motivation, and is identified as the energy required to fulfil the demands of a task. 
Arousal is regarded as the variable level of stimulation that can be affected by 
novelty, interest, and signal intensity. Activation is the readiness to respond, and 
can be affected by preparedness, alertness, time of day, and task duration. 
Chapter 2 – Attention Literature Review 
 
65 
 
Sergeant (2005) emphasises that the relationship between these three state 
pools is of specific relevance to ADHD, as it can have an effect on motor output 
and outward behaviour. The third level of the CEM is EF, and incorporates the 
cognitive functions previously associated with the prefrontal cortex.  
It is hypothesised that these three levels work together in a bottom-up or top-
down manner, context and task dependent, and that ADHD can cause 
weaknesses at each of these three levels of the CEM (Sergeant, 2005). An 
instability or defect at any of these stages, or the aspects within the stages, would 
lead to inefficient information processing, which is thought to lead to the 
symptoms of ADHD. The lead author of the CEM admits that more research and 
the production of precise tests for the measures of the state factors are necessary 
in order to support this theory fully. Furthermore, it is suggested that 
neuropsychological studies that investigated the CEM could be affected by 
inconsistent methods, and variable cortical development and maturation stages, 
resulting in the mixed support for the theory. Rapport, Chung, Shore, and Isaacs 
(2001) argue that the CEM works in theory, but is untestable and lacking in 
verifiable support. However, other have emphasised the importance of 
considering the cognitive energetic factors in theories of ADHD (Schatz & 
Rostain, 2006; Sonuga-Barke, 2003), and findings have supported the inclusion 
of EF management in the CEM, as discussed in relation to Barkley’s theory 
(1997).  
 
2.6.3 Unified Theory 
Barkley’s unified theory of ADHD (1997) suggests that there are four key deficits 
to the disorder: “(a) poor investment and maintenance of effort, (b) poor 
modulation of arousal to meet situational demands, (c) a strong inclination to seek 
immediate reinforcement, along with (d) […] difficulties with impulse control” 
(p.65). These four factors corroborate with the symptoms of ADHD.  
According to this theory, a proposed cause of ADHD is a deficit in EF, as EF 
impairment is often found in individuals with the disorder. Barkley (1997) 
advocated that poor response inhibition was the main problem (this assertion is 
supported by many others, for example: Berlin & Bohlin, 2002; Groman, James, 
& Jentsch, 2009; Nigg, 1999; Slaats-Willemse, Swaab-Barneveld, De Sonneville, 
Chapter 2 – Attention Literature Review 
 
66 
 
Van Der Meulen, & Buitelaar, 2003) and attributed this to the functioning of the 
frontal lobes, where EFs are operated from. Inhibition is the process of 
diminishing neuronal, intellectual, or behavioural action (Clark, 1996), and this is 
thought to play an important role in the management of behaviour. Inhibition can 
be cognitively assessed by the individual’s ability to withhold or delay a response, 
the termination of an existing response, and resistance to distraction (Barkley, 
1997). It was further stated that there are four EFs that specifically guide self-
regulation and goal-directed behaviour, which depend on successful behavioural 
inhibition. The four EFs are working memory (e.g., keeping information in mind, 
and manipulating or using it), self-regulation of affect/motivation/arousal (e.g., 
emotional, drive, and stimulation control), internalisation of speech (e.g., 
reasoning, problem solving, and rule following), and reconstitution (e.g., 
behaviour analysis, verbal/behavioural fluency, creativity). A deficiency in 
inhibition leads to an impairment in these four EFs that affect self-regulatory 
behaviour and behavioural fluency, a lack of which is evident in the symptoms of 
ADHD.  
Support for Barkley’s (1997) unified theory was evidenced by a meta-analysis of 
83 studies that tested those with and without ADHD on measures of EF. It was 
concluded that those with the disorder had significantly poorer performances on 
all of the EF tasks utilised (Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & Pennington, 2005). 
Medium effect sizes were shown for these findings, with the greatest and most 
stable deficits being in response inhibition, vigilance, working memory, and 
planning (Willcutt et al., 2005). The differences could not be explained by 
variation in IQ or the symptoms of comorbid conditions.  
In further support, children with non-medicated ADHD were tested on five EF 
tasks (the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, the Stroop Test, the Matching Familiar 
Figures Test, the Trail Making Test, and the Tower of London), and their 
performance was compared to a control group without ADHD (Houghton et al., 
1999). It was found that those with ADHD had poorer behavioural and response 
inhibition scores than those in the control group. As the ADHD group were clear 
of any comorbid conditions, it was determined that the deficits in EF were an 
ailment of ADHD itself. Furthermore, when tested on the EFs of response 
inhibition, working memory, and flexibility (akin to Barkley’s (1997) reconstitution), 
it was observed that those with ADHD had significantly more impairments than 
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those who did not, and that they showed no improvement in EF with age (Happé, 
Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006).  
It has been clarified that the behaviour of those with ADHD is likely to be 
influenced by situational context, more so than for those without the disorder 
(Brown, 2013; Houghton et al., 1999). This means that it should not be taken for 
granted that those with ADHD will have EF impairment irrespective of what they 
are doing and the context they are in. It is probable that those with ADHD will 
have a range of tasks that they will be fully able to engage with, without EF 
decrement, leading to their successful completion. Brown (2013) explained that 
these tasks are usually of high personal interest to the individual, which therefore 
enhances their motivation, resulting in higher levels of concentration. For 
instance, one may find it very difficult to read an instruction manual, but may have 
no problem with reading a book from their favourite genre. There is also a second 
type of situation that would lead to higher levels of focus, which is when the 
incompletion of a task is perceived to have immediate negative consequences. 
For example, a student with ADHD may find report writing very challenging and 
may therefore procrastinate as much as possible, but when the deadline is closer, 
they should find it easier to produce the work due to the worry of acquiring a failed 
assessment.  
That some tasks are carried out more successfully than others should not lead to 
the opinion that those with ADHD have a lack of willpower on the tasks they 
struggle with. Concentration cannot always be enforced by the person with ADHD 
as EFs are automatic procedures (Brown, 2013). Factors that are thought to 
influence this fluctuation in EF performance are contextual and include personal 
interest, perceived reward/reinforcement, task type and requirements, and 
internal cognitive and physiological elements (Brown, 2013).  
 
2.6.4 Delay-Aversion Theory 
The ADHD as a ‘motivational style’ argument is less dominant in the literature, 
and purports that ADHD symptoms are a function of a drive to avoid delay (e.g., 
Haenlein & Caul, 1987; summarised by Sonuga-Barke, 2002). Studies have 
supported this idea, by demonstrating that those with ADHD prefer smaller 
immediate rewards, rather than waiting longer to receive a more substantial 
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reward (e.g., Marco et al., 2009; Paloyelis, Asherson, & Kuntsi, 2010). It is 
therefore inferred that when no choice is available, those with ADHD show 
inattention and/or hyperactivity, and use their environment, in an effort to lessen 
their awareness of time. This position relates delay aversion to deficits in EFs 
such as time-management, working memory, and planning (Sonuga-Barke, 
2002). 
Sonuga-Barke (2002) argued that these theories that attempt to find one cause 
of ADHD are insufficient, and undermine the intricacies of the disorder. In 
response, he introduced the dual-pathway model, a neuro-cognitive model of 
ADHD.  
 
2.6.5 Dual-Pathway Model  
The two competing accounts of ADHD regarded the disorder as either a condition 
of executive dysfunction (EDF) that is sustained by poor inhibition (e.g., Barkley, 
1997) and hyperdopaminergic branches (e.g., Sagvolden et al., 2005), or as a 
motivational type, characterised by delay aversion (e.g., Sonuga-Barke, 2002). 
That EDF is a feature of ADHD is relatively accepted within the recent literature, 
and Sonuga-Barke (2002) maintains Barkley’s (1997) emphasis on the problems 
with behavioural disinhibition. The motivational style argument also has 
supporting evidence. When the two theories were directly compared in a ‘head to 
head’ study, it was found that performance on an inhibitory control task correlated 
with observed ADHD behaviour, and performance on a delay-aversion task 
correlated with observed behaviour, teacher ratings, hyperactivity, and 
aggression (Solanto et al., 2001). Performance on the tasks was not correlated, 
yet both were found to individually discriminate those with ADHD from those 
without, and their discriminant validity was higher when they were combined, with 
performance analysis detecting nearly 90% of ADHD cases. This led to the 
conclusion that ADHD is the consequence of two discrete processes, and the 
production of the dual-pathway model of ADHD. 
The dual-pathway model has two routes that lead to the same ADHD-combined 
type diagnosis, the dysregulation of thought and action pathway (DTAP – 
representing the theories on EDF), and the motivational style/delay aversion 
pathway (MSP; Sonuga-Barke, 2002). It is suggested that those who appear to 
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reach ADHD through the DTAP will exhibit more severe cognitive deficits, 
whereas those on the MSP have more control over their EFs, and are affected 
by their underdeveloped ability to process time, and their impatience for reward. 
Social factors are considered within the MSP, as inflexible parenting and high 
expectations of self-control are thought to lead to delay aversion (Sonuga-Barke, 
2002). Furthermore, the DTAP is also thought to be indicative of a 
hypofunctioning mesocortical dopamine branch, and the MSP of a 
hypofunctioning mesolimbic dopamine branch, as is consistent with the dynamic 
developmental theory of ADHD (Sagvolden et al., 2005).  
As it stands, the dual-pathway model appears to be the most comprehensive 
theory of ADHD, and explains the variation in the results of previous studies by 
combining two previously established theories. It acknowledges the complexity 
of ADHD, and illustrates the importance of avoiding unitary theories. Models 
published since the dual-pathway theory was proposed appear to corroborate 
with it (e.g., Bunford et al., 2014; de Wit, 2009), specifically neurobiological 
evidence has been provided that matches the symptoms expressed from each 
pathway.  
Despite the profound and widespread interest in ADHD, scholars frequently 
comment on the lack of consensus and evidence about the cause and nature of 
the disorder. Investigations of the psychological causes of ADHD still yield 
incongruous results as illustrated, even with the advances in neurological 
methods, as convincing findings are often followed by convincing counter-
findings. When consistencies are established, they are often accompanied by 
small effect sizes (Sonuga-Barke, 2002). With consideration of the evidence 
presented, along with the definitions of EFs, and the symptoms of ADHD, all that 
is clear is that deficits of EF are related to the attention disorder.  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
Attention is a complex cognitive process that selects information from the senses 
and our minds for further analysis and processing. As cognitive systems are 
limited in capacity, it is important that only task-relevant information is processed 
in order to achieve immediate goals.  
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Early selection theories have been proposed that emphasise the limited capacity 
of processing, and provide detail on how selective attention may work. Late 
selection theories of attention have also been offered, however there are gaps 
and criticisms, as previously presented, which leave these ideas in the shadow 
of early selection theories. Research in to the existence of two visual attention 
systems was evaluated, both of which are similar, and illustrate the difference 
between bottom-up and top-down processing, 
This chapter concludes that there are clear differences in the behavioural patterns 
between those with and without ADHD, making it possible to compare the groups 
across different tasks. The present study aimed to fill some of the gaps in the field 
in relation to ADHD specifically in adults, and how it affects the processes of 
focused, sustained, selective, and divided attention. It also aimed to investigate 
the relationship between creativity and attention, and the differences between 
those with and without ADHD.  
So far, the processes of creativity and attention have been discussed separately. 
There now follows a chapter about the research so far on the relationship 
between attention and creativity. 
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Attention, one of the EFs, has been found to be related to creativity (Hawthorne 
et al., 2014). The creative person has often been typified as having poorer 
attention than non-creative people (e.g., Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; 
Finke et al., 1992; Kasof, 1997; Memmert, 2011; Vartanian, Martindale, & 
Kwiatkowski, 2007). There are several anecdotes and illustrations of creative 
geniuses who appear absent minded and inattentive (such as Einstein, Darwin, 
Poe, and Edison), and some researchers have attempted to examine this 
empirically, typically using just one or two measures of creativity and attention.  
From a review of this small literature field, most of which is dated, the main 
argument about the nature of the relationship between creativity and attention 
appears to be that creative individuals may have ‘broad’ or ‘leaky’ attention.  
 
3.1 Creativity and Broad Attention 
A poor attentional system allows too much irrelevant information to pass through 
into the limited capacity processor (Vartanian et al., 2007). In the literature that 
relates creativity to attention, this has often been referred to as a ‘leaky filter’, or 
as ‘broad’ attention.  
Broad attention is a description of diffused attention. It is defined as increased 
distractibility due a deficit in cognitive inhibition, meaning that irrelevant 
information from the environment is often processed further than it should be, and 
is therefore a cause of distraction (Kasof, 1997; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007; 
Vartanian et al., 2007). Breadth of attention is said to relate to the number and 
range of stimuli being focused on, with those with broad attention focusing on 
many different stimuli at once (e.g., Memmert, 2011). Narrow attention is the 
opposite, the ability to focus on task and to ignore irrelevant information (Kasof, 
1997; Rowe et al., 2007). Those with narrow attention only focus on a small 
number of items at once, and tend to remain impervious to what is within their 
environments. 
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3.1.1 Anecdotal Evidence of a Relationship between Creativity and Attention  
A number of renowned creators have voiced their difficulties with having broad 
attention. Kasof (1997) provided a summary of those who found themselves 
particularly distracted by incidental noise. Richard Wagner, the composer, 
conductor, and theatre director, claimed that calmness and quietness were 
imperative needs to creative individuals, a statement that is emphasised by Arthur 
Schopenhauer (philosopher) who said that incidental noises had been a daily 
torment he had endured his whole life. Both Marcel Proust and Thomas Carlyle 
(writers) reported soundproofing the rooms they worked in to limit their 
distractibility, with people even laying hay on the ground in front of Carlyle’s home 
to reduce the noise they made when walking by (Kasof, 1997). Franz Kafka, a 
prolific writer, said himself: “I need isolation in order to write, not like a hermit, but 
like a dead man” (as cited in Blanchot, 1997, p.280), as he described his preferred 
manner of writing. It appears to be the case that these creators were distracted 
by nature, but required focus to develop their ideas.  
These well-established creators found that they could not pay attention to the 
task in hand when there was background noise distracting them. This shows that 
they had difficulty in only selecting relevant information for processing, and that 
irrelevant information was often prioritised. As the cognitive capacity for 
processing new information is very limited (Chun et al., 2011; Lachter et al., 
2004), this meant that these individuals may not have had the ‘space’ to process 
both the irrelevant and relevant information in their environments, leading to 
distraction and a lack of productivity. Their attempts to reduce distractions in order 
to focus shows that both broad and narrow attention seem to be important for 
creativity.  
Besides the moderate amount of anecdotal evidence, empirical evidence also 
exists in support of this leaky attentional filter, or broad attention idea. Most of this 
has been based on measures of selective attention. 
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3.1.2 Empirical Evidence of a Relationship between Creativity and Broad 
Attention 
It is argued that creative individuals have broad, defocused attention that enables 
their ability to produce original responses (e.g., Kasof, 1997; Kharkhurin, 2011; 
Necka, 1999).  
The main feature of broad attention is poor selective attention and response 
inhibition, which has again been related to creativity, this time in the form of 
creative achievement. Creative achievement is the total number of creative 
products (e.g., patents, ideas, inventions, or artistic/musical pieces) made in the 
lifetime to date (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). According to Carson, 
Peterson, and Higgins (2003), in order to for an item to be ‘creative’, the product 
should be appropriate to reality, useful, and relatively unique. Their analysis of 
two studies found that those with particularly high scores on creative achievement 
measures had significantly lower inhibition (selective attention) scores. This 
relates to the idea that broad attention is crucial, as the highly creative individuals 
were seven times more likely than low creativity scorers to have broad, 
uninhibited attention (Carson, et al., 2003). 
Dichotic listening tasks have been used as measures of selective attention 
(Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Necka, 1999) in the investigation of the relationship 
between creativity and attention. These tasks require the participant to attend to 
(select) the information being channelled in to one ear, whilst ignoring a different 
channel of information as it is presented in the other ear. Dykes and McGhie 
(1976) provided participants with assessments from the Wallach and Kogan 
(1965) tests of creative thinking. From a group of 300 students, the 24 highest 
and the 24 lowest scorers were categorised in to high and low creativity 
comparison groups. It was found that those in the high creativity group reported 
significantly more stimuli from the irrelevant listening channel than those in the 
low creativity group, a finding that could not have been attributed to word 
association or mode of presentation (i.e., prose or single word list). The authors 
also compared these findings to a group with schizophrenia, finding that 
individuals with the disorder had very similar attentional profiles to the highly 
creative group members. The main difference was that the performance of those 
with schizophrenia suffered due to the wide attentional range, whereas as those 
with high creativity could cope with the broader than average stimuli input, with 
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the ability to process this information successfully and without overload (Dykes & 
McGhie, 1976). 
Rawlings (1985) designed a similar experiment, where participants were asked 
to either follow one channel of information as a focused/selective attention task, 
or to follow both channels as a divided attention task. Highly creative participants, 
as determined by two tests of the Wallach and Kogan (1965) battery, made 
significantly more intrusion mistakes on the divided attention task than the low 
creativity group did. It was hypothesised that this may be due to an aspect of 
impulsivity, however this was related specifically to those with psychoticism 
(Rawlings, 1985). 
In a task involving the detection of a pre-specified visual stimulus amongst 
distracter stimuli, it was found that the more creative participants, as estimated 
by a DT task, made more errors than the less creative participants (Necka, 1999). 
The scores of the creative people worsened as the number of irrelevant stimuli 
increased, perhaps showing that they were less able to separate relevant 
information from the irrelevant (Necka, 1999).  
Vartanian, Martindale, and Kwiatkowski (2007) found that when there were no 
distracting stimuli, creative individuals had faster reaction times to the 
appearance of a light, and faster rule comprehension times, than non-creative 
people. Conversely, when in-task response inhibition was required in the 
presence of irrelevant, interfering cues, those high in creative potential had slower 
reaction times than others, indicating that they were distracted by, paid more 
attention to, and therefore processed the irrelevant information (see also 
Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova, & Vartanian, 2008; Kwiatkowski, Vartanian, & 
Martindale, 1999). Carson, Peterson, and Higgins (2003) also found that 
participants who scored highly in their measure of creative achievement, had 
significantly lower latent inhibition scores, meaning they were less able to filter 
out from awareness stimuli that had previously been viewed as irrelevant. This 
reduction in latent inhibition may be the key to the creation of original ideas, as 
there is an increased opportunity to combine unrelated concepts to produce novel 
ideas (see also Zabelina, O’Leary, Pornpattananangkul, Nusslock, & Beeman, 
2015). 
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Additionally, Ansburg and Hill (2003) stipulated that as original solutions come 
from the combination of seemingly unrelated concepts, creative thinkers must 
have the capacity to process the problem in hand whilst remaining aware of the 
supposed irrelevant information around them that may be useful in finding a 
creative solution. In contrast, analytic thinkers would utilise focused, sustained, 
and directed attention in an attempt to solve a problem in their manner. With this 
difference in thinking style noted, the authors hypothesised that high scorers on 
the RAT would make more use of peripheral, environmental cues when 
completing an anagram task than low scorers. Indeed, it was found that those 
who were successful in making atypical combinations in the RAT were more likely 
to attend to information outwith the focus of the task, as they “allocate their 
attention in a diffuse manner” (Ansburg & Hill, 2003, p.1148). However, it was 
suggested that not all problem solvers use the broad attention strategy. Instead, 
the adoption of this technique differentiated creative thinkers from analytic 
thinkers (see also Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky, Kounios, & Beeman, 2012; 
Wiley & Jarosz, 2012).  
 
3.1.3 Empirical Evidence for a Relationship between Creativity and Attention from 
the use of Environmental Cues  
The argument so far has illustrated that a broad attentional scope is related to 
higher creativity scores. If this was the case, then creative individuals should 
utilise cues from the environment, more so than non-creative people. Evidence 
for this has been found.  
Revisiting the RAT, it has been claimed that broad attention is conducive to 
creative behaviour as the distractibility allows for more remote associations to be 
made (as opposed to strong associations) by using the stimuli present in the 
environment as cues (Abraham & Windmann, 2007; Carson et al., 2003; 
Vartanian et al., 2007). It is therefore commonly suggested that those with broad 
attention are likely to unknowingly use this as an advantage in situations requiring 
aspects of creativity (e.g., problem-solving), as they can make remote 
associations between the stimuli that are distracting them, whereas those with 
trait narrow attention are less likely to spot these (Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Fink, 
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Grabner, Benedek et al., 2009; Friedman, et al., 2003; Kasof, 1997; Necka, 1999; 
Vartanian et al., 2007). 
The common method of examining this is to provide participants with a task for 
which the answers have previously been implicitly or explicitly exposed (Ansburg 
& Hill, 2003; Dewing & Battye, 1971; Friedman et al., 2003). For instance, 
participants were provided with a list of words to memorise (focal cues) whilst a 
different list was read aloud in the background with the instruction to ignore them 
(peripheral/conceptual cues: Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Dewing & Battye, 1971; 
Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1964). Following this, anagram problems were given to 
participants, of which ten answers had appeared in the memorised list and ten 
had appeared in the peripheral list. Tasks to measure creativity, usually the RAT 
(Mednick, 1962), were also deployed. It was found that those who had scored 
more highly on creativity tests used more of the environmental cues than low 
creativity scorers for the anagrams task (Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Dewing & Battye, 
1971; Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1964). Furthermore, it was found that children 
who scored well on DT fluency were more successful in a cue-rich environment 
in comparison to plain surroundings, whereas low DT scorers performed 
consistently across both environments (Friedman, Raymond & Feldhusen, 1978).  
These studies show a potential relationship between high creativity scores and 
the use of environmental cues (see also Clapham, 2001; Memmert, 2009). As it 
has been stated that those with broad attention have a wider attentional scope, it 
is more likely that they would utilise information from the environment in this way. 
Although there is research showing a link between creativity and broad attention, 
that this is a fixed trait is controversial (e.g., Dewing & Battye, 1971; Eysenck, 
1995; Kasof, 1997; Memmert, 2007; Mendelsohn, 1976; Necka, 1999). The 
problem lies in the development of potential ideas. For example, broad attention 
is suited to producing creative and novel ideas (by making remote associations), 
but broad attention would be a problem when the idea needs to be evaluated and 
honed for their relevancy (Martindale, 1999). This is why some authors indicate 
that a fluctuation with narrow attention is also required for creativity (e.g., Ansburg 
& Hill, 2003; Dykes & McGhie, 1976; Friedman et al., 2003; Martindale, 1999; 
Vartanian et al., 2007). 
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3.1.4 Creativity and Attention as a Flexible Process 
It has recently been tentatively suggested that focus and concentration (narrow 
attention) are necessary to produce original solutions (Zabelina et al., 2015). 
Some distinguished creators have in fact corroborated this idea. Writer E. B. 
White (1969) stated in an interview that he did not have the mind-set to listen to 
music whilst writing, but he did work in his busy living room, which he described 
as a ‘carnival’ of activity. He also stated that “a writer who waits for ideal 
conditions under which to work will die without putting a word on paper” (White, 
1969, in response to interview question 12). Zabelina and colleagues (2015) also 
describe scientist Marie Curie as entirely focused on her work irrespective of 
surrounding noise, and Leonardo da Vinci as having “obsessive attention to 
detail” (p.78) and the ability to ignore distractions. These anecdotes portray an 
ability of these highly creative individuals to focus solely on their work, whilst 
remaining productive and unaffected by immediate distractions. 
As a part of this argument, it has been suggested that successful creative 
problem solving comes first from a period of preparation, where one gets to know 
the problem, as described by Wallas (1926), and that persistence and focus on a 
problem leads to a creative solution (Zabelina et al., 2015). However, as 
previously described, Wallas (1926) also emphasises the importance of a period 
of incubation when working towards the production of an original solution, which 
by definition, involves broad attention and not focusing on the problem. 
This stance is weak compared to the evidence presented for the importance of 
broad attention in creativity. 
Other studies have shown that highly creative individuals are at least capable of 
having narrow attention. For example, using a Stroop task, which measures 
response inhibition and selective attention, Gamble and Kellner (1968) and 
Golden (1975) found that those who scored highly on creativity measures were 
less affected by irrelevant information and therefore performed better than those 
less creative individuals. Furthermore, Stavridou and Furnham (1996) and Green 
and Williams (1999) both found that creativity in terms of DT is unrelated to broad 
attention. These findings were boldly stated by the researchers in question, as 
the relationship between creativity and attention was not the focus of their 
research (they mainly investigated personality disorders), and their sample sizes 
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were small. By using samples of participants with disparities in cognition, it is to 
be expected that results may differ from those without disorders. 
It had earlier been postulated that creative people “deployed their attention more 
widely, were more aware of and receptive and retained more prior stimulus 
experience in usable form, tending not to screen out the irrelevant” (Dellas & 
Gaier, 1970, p.55). This statement implies that although creative individuals took 
in and processed more irrelevant information, they seemed to be able to manage 
this successfully, as the information was usable. Accordingly, Dykes and McGhie 
(1976) established that an ability and inclination to incorporate a broader range 
of accessible information, and to consider the usefulness of all available data, 
may be more beneficial to the production of novel and original solutions than the 
ability to focus attention and to solely concentrate on the problem in hand.  
However, Martindale (1999), who is frequently cited in the literature, proposed 
that a general trait of broad attention or narrow attention is not what is involved in 
creativity, but rather that an attention fluctuation from broad to narrow (and vice 
versa) is required (see also De Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012; 
Vartanian, 2009; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). It was argued that during the 
generative stage of problem solving, the creative individual uses defocused, 
broad attention to search for clues, but when the solution begins to become clear, 
narrow attention is used to define and organise the idea (Martindale, 1999; 
Vartanian et al., 2007). This idea was also present in Wallas’s (1926) model of 
the creative process, with broad, diffused attention required at the incubation 
stage, and narrow, focused attention being necessary at the preparation and 
verification stages. This means that creative people are better at adjusting their 
attentional focus, rather than being affected by one type or another.  
On one hand, it is argued and evidenced that broad, diffused attention is a trait 
found in creative individuals and is used for the successful production of creative 
ideas and solutions (Kasof, 1997; Necka, 1999), but the studies of this type do 
not go further to explain how those with broad attention go on to reduce and 
enrich their ideas. The theory by Martindale (1999) attempts to explain this idea 
development issue by proposing that creative individuals actually have more 
attentional control than previously thought, as they can switch flexibly from broad 
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to narrow attention, as and when required. However, the evidence for this 
argument is limited.  
Broad and narrow attention are terms that seem only to be used by creativity 
researchers. This shows that this distinction is perhaps only relevant to the field 
of creativity, and not cognitive psychology in general.  
Perhaps some of the most compelling observable evidence of a relationship 
between creativity and attention, comes from studies of individuals with ADHD. 
Broad attention has been used synonymously with distractible, and diffused 
attention, and those with broad attention perform poorly on measures of attention. 
It could therefore be assumed that those with ADHD have broad attention.  
 
3.2 Creativity and ADHD 
Broad, diffused attention and decreased inhibitory control are thought to be 
indications of both ADHD and creativity (Barkley, 1997; White & Shah, 2006), 
therefore, studies have aimed to determine if those with the condition are 
generally more creative than those without.  
 
3.2.1 ADHD as a Benefit for Creativity 
Armstrong (2012) has emphasised that ADHD can be beneficial in an 
environment that allows creativity. Few studies have directly studied creative 
performance between those with and without ADHD, those that have been found 
are described here. White and Shah (2006) compared a group of students with 
ADHD and a non-ADHD control group. Creativity was measured by an unusual 
uses DT task and the RAT, and inhibition was measured as a feature of selective 
attention. The authors found that those with ADHD outperformed the control 
group on the DT task, but performed poorly on the RAT, a result that was partly 
mediated by inhibition differences (White & Shah, 2006; 2011). A similar 
comparison study also considered past creative achievement as a measure of 
creativity, as well as DT tasks. It was found that those with ADHD had higher 
scores in creative achievement, and the previous finding was replicated in that 
those with the disorder performed better on DT tasks than those without.  
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However, a convergent thinking task may not measure creativity in those with 
ADHD. As previously described, the RAT in particular relies heavily upon verbal 
intelligence, vocabulary, and less on creativity. It could be that inhibitory control 
is needed in order to complete the RAT, so that incorrect solutions and constructs 
can be inhibited. If this is the case, it may circuitously explain why the ADHD 
group did not perform as well on this task. Accordingly, it has been found that 
performance on DT tasks by those with ADHD is significantly better than 
convergent thinking task performance (Merkt et al., 2013). 
In a comparison of an ADHD group, a group with conduct disorder, and a control 
group, it was found that those with ADHD were more likely to overcome the 
limitations of previously activated knowledge in the production of ideas for a new 
toy (the participants were shown three examples of toys before being asked to 
create their own: Abraham, Windmann, Siefen, Daum, & Gunturkun, 2006). This 
meant that they were more mentally flexible, and were able to break away from 
what others perceived as constraints on their ideas. This was mediated by a habit 
of producing impractical ideas, compared to the other two groups who focused 
on practicality. It was proposed that the ability to think beyond the previously 
activated ‘constraints’ was due to poor attention, in that those with ADHD did not 
concentrate on the exemplars for long enough for them to have a restricting effect 
(Abraham et al., 2006). 
When gifted children with symptoms of ADHD were matched to gifted children 
without symptoms, it was determined that the ADHD group produced more 
creative responses in tasks from the TTCT, despite having poorer working 
memory abilities (Fugate, Zentall, & Gentry, 2013). It was concluded that in the 
face of the educational difficulties encountered by individuals with ADHD, a 
combination of inattentiveness and impulsivity, as indicative of ADHD, positively 
influences creativity.  
Russell Barkley (e.g., 2011), one of the world’s leading experts in ADHD, has 
frequently and repeatedly stated that ADHD is not a gift, and that there is no 
research evidencing a benefit to having the disorder. Despite this, the studies 
presented support the positive link between creativity and ADHD. In fact, 
evidence has been found that highly creative people and those with ADHD have 
very similar characteristics. 
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3.2.2 Similarities between Creative Individuals and those with ADHD 
Due to the similarities between those with ADHD and those with high levels of 
creativity, it has been suggested that highly creative children may exhibit 
cognitive deficits similar to those with ADHD (Healey, 2014; Healey & Rucklidge, 
2006; Lee & Olenchak, 2014; Mullet & Rinn, 2015). Guenther (1995) explicitly 
argued that the traits of those with ADHD are also found in creative people. For 
example, Dawson (1997) recorded teacher descriptions of creative children as 
“make up the rules as they go along; impulsive; non-conformist; and emotional” 
(as cited in Healey, 2014, p.236), with similar descriptions having been applied 
to children with ADHD. Cramond (1995) pointed out however, that these traits are 
negatively reported in discussions of ADHD (e.g., those with ADHD are 
inattentive, so they are frequently distracted leading to their failure to complete 
tasks before starting another), but positively reported in discussions of creative 
individuals (e.g., creative individuals have many ideas, and tend to play with 
several ideas at once) (see also Armstrong, 2012).  
Direct comparisons led to the finding that 40% (as opposed to a predicted 9%) of 
the highly creative children tested (n=89) presented significant levels of ADHD 
symptoms that were within a clinical diagnosis range (Healey & Rucklidge, 2006; 
26% from Cramond, 1994a; 1994b). It is worth noting however, that only figural 
divergent thinking was measured (TTCT, Figural Form A; Torrance, 1998). It was 
also found that creative individuals with ADHD performed slightly less well on 
tasks involving reaction time and processing speed than creative individuals 
without ADHD (Healey & Rucklidge, 2006). This may be indicative of the cognitive 
distinction between these two groups: performance on cognitive tasks. 
Taken together, these studies could suggest that creative individuals, and those 
with ADHD, have similar attentional profiles, in that they process more irrelevant 
information than is useful to the task in hand. The difference may be that those 
without ADHD can cope with their ‘leaky filter’, and use it to make unique 
combinations, which leads to creative ideas, products, or solutions, but the results 
so far are few. 
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3.3 Conclusions 
The role of attention in creativity has had mixed results (Benedek, Franz, Heene, 
& Neubauer, 2012), and attention has been related to creativity in a variety of 
ways. Autobiographical and anecdotal evidence from creators, such as creative 
scientists and writers, provided the first indication of a relationship between 
attention levels and creativity, with successful inhibition of irrelevant stimuli being 
a commonly reported problem (Kasof, 1997). 
According to some of the literature on the topic, broad, diffused attention is 
beneficial for creativity, and narrow attention is not (Kasof, 1997). This is because 
the nature of distraction allows individuals to combine and generate solutions to 
problems that may be missed by those who focus solely on the task in hand 
(Abraham & Windmann, 2007; Carson et al., 2003; Vartanian et al., 2007). 
However, the opposing argument within the literature is that narrow attention is 
also required to enable the development and refining of creative solutions 
(Martindale, 1999; Wallas, 1926). The strongest argument seems to be that an 
attentional switch is required, and that both broad and narrow attention are 
important for creativity. 
The relationship between creativity and ADHD has been explored, with results 
tending to find a benefit of having the disorder to creativity. Yet, it may be the 
case that there is a key difference between creative individuals with and without 
ADHD, in that those without can successfully manage their leaky attentional filters 
for cognitive tasks, and those with, cannot. 
Overall, the various forms of evidence showing that broad attention is related to 
and necessary for creativity are plentiful. However, each study has used a 
different method for measuring both creativity and attention, making the exact 
relationship unclear. The majority of the work relating creativity to attention has 
focused on selective attention and response inhibition. The research presented 
in this thesis will expand on this by measuring the relationship between aspects 
of creativity and self-report attention, ADHD, attentional control, sustained 
attention, divided attention, as well as selective attention.  
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3.4 Thesis Overview 
Having reviewed the literature in the fields of creativity, attention, and the link 
between the two, there are some unanswered questions: 
1. Are the processes of creativity and attention related?  
2. If so, what is the nature of this relationship? 
3. Will broad and narrow attention both be related to aspects of creativity? 
4. Is ADHD beneficial for creativity? 
5. Can creativity be improved? 
This thesis contains four studies that aimed to answer these questions. 
The first study (chapter 5) examined the relationship between creativity and 
attention within 100 participants. Multiple measures were used in order to analyse 
the outcomes in detail. Creativity was measured by self-report, past creative 
achievement, verbal and figural DT, and the production of a collage. Attention 
was assessed with a self-report questionnaire, as well as measures of focused, 
sustained, selective, and divided attention.  
The second study (chapter 6) was a replication of the first study, but this time 
used a sample of 50 participants with ADHD, in order to understand the 
relationship between deficits in attention and creativity. Between-group 
differences were examined using the data from the first study to compare 
performance on each measure.  
The third study (chapter 7) was the first to consider methods of improving 
creativity, by enhancing visual stimulation in the testing environment. Eye-
tracking methods were employed, and a group of 15 control participants were 
compared to a group of 15 participants who had ADHD. Creativity was measured 
using verbal and figural DT tasks, and self-report, sustained and selective 
attention were measured.  
The fourth study (chapter 8) also attempted to improve creativity. This time, the 
effects of aspects of attention on a period of incubation were investigated. 
Creativity was measured with a verbal DT task, and sustained, selective, and 
divided attention were measured, along with self-report questionnaires.  
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This chapter provides an overview of the methods adopted in the four studies 
presented in this thesis. Details of the specific methods used in each study are 
reported in the corresponding chapter.  
 
4.1 Ethics 
Each study was granted ethical approval by the Faculty of Health, Life, and Social 
Sciences Research Integrity Approvals Group at Edinburgh Napier University. 
Participants were provided with information sheets, consent forms, and debrief 
sheets for each study. Each individual provided their informed consent to take 
part. The information sheets stipulated that they were free to withdraw at any 
time, their data would be anonymous and kept securely, and the researcher’s 
contact details were provided for any follow up questions, or for participants to 
extract their data from the study. Each participant was assigned a number, and 
each measure (both paper- and computer-based) was coded with that number. 
This would allow for the simple deletion of their data should they wish, but no 
participant has made this request. Although the experimental conditions and 
participant groups were not blind to the researcher, each task was coded and the 
scoring carried out in bulk after the completion of data collection, meaning that 
individuals could not be identified.  
 
4.2 Participants 
The participants who took part in this research were students at Edinburgh Napier 
University or members of the general public, all aged 18 years or older. 
Participants were recruited using an opportunity sampling framework by the use 
of university wide research recruitment emails, advertising on social media and 
community websites, posters and leaflets, as well as word-of-mouth from one 
participant to their friends. Specific details regarding the participant groups are 
provided with each study. 
Of the 315 participants who took part in the studies, 65 had or strongly believed 
they had ADHD. As an adult, it is very difficult to receive a diagnosis of ADHD if 
it was not identified in childhood. This is why not every participant within the 
ADHD groups was specifically diagnosed, but through conversation the 
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researcher was able to ascertain that the participants believed they had the 
disorder, as each one volunteered anecdotes and details that contributed to their 
belief. This was supported with the use of an ADHD checklist questionnaire. 
Furthermore, the recruitment advertisements were very clear that only 
participants with diagnosed or strongly suspected ADHD were required, and it 
was also made clear within the testing appointment arrangement conversations 
that the researcher would not and could not provide a diagnosis. An Edinburgh 
based support group for adults with ADHD, called Addressing the Balance, 
supported the research carried out here and aided in the recruitment process.  
 
4.3 Materials 
All testing took place in a small room within the psychology department at 
Edinburgh Napier University. The room was equipped with one Windows 
computer with a QWERTY keyboard and a mouse, a desk area, two chairs, and 
a larger separate desk. This was suited to the requirements of the research as 
the space was adequate, the blank walls limited the opportunity for distraction, 
and its location within the laboratories ensured that the proximate area was quiet 
and free from interruptions. 
In total, 14 tasks are detailed here: six measured aspects of creativity, eight 
tested aspects of attention, and all were common to at least two of the four main 
studies.  
 
4.3.1 Self-Report Measures of Creativity and Attention 
Details of five self-report measures are provided in this section: The Preliminary 
Questionnaire covered aspects of both creativity and attention; the Creative 
Achievement Questionnaire contained creativity-related items; the self-report 
ADHD scale, the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire, and the Daydreaming 
Frequency Scale all measured attentional factors. 
Preliminary Questionnaire. Questions regarding an individual’s gender, age, 
creative self-efficacy, and general distractibility were combined into one 13-item 
questionnaire for the purpose of this study, called the Preliminary Questionnaire. 
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This was carried out at the beginning of the sessions for the first two studies 
without a time-limit, although completion rarely exceeded two minutes. 
Creative self-efficacy is someone’s own self-belief and judgements about their 
own creativity (Kaufman et al., 2008; Tierney & Farmer, 2002). This is important 
here as those with high self-efficacy are more likely to gear their behaviour 
towards fulfilling a specific goal as they believe they can achieve this, whereas 
those with low self-efficacy are likely to envisage failing to achieve, and will 
therefore place obstacles in their way (Bandura, 1993). By measuring self-
efficacy, it is possible to determine an individual’s attitude towards creativity. It 
has been stipulated that strong self-efficacy in this context is essential for creative 
production, motivation, and the ability to behave creatively (Bandura, 1997; 
Tierney & Farmer, 2002). 
Creative self-efficacy was measured in this questionnaire by combining the items 
from two established questionnaires, by Beghetto (2006) and Jaussi, Randel, and 
Dionne (2007; see appendix 1). The three questions from Beghetto (2006) allude 
to the act of being creative, in relation to the production of ideas. Alternatively, 
the four questions by Jaussi and colleagues (2007) refer to the effect that 
creativity has on the individual, in terms of who they are as a person, and how 
important creativity is to them. The two questionnaires were combined as they 
each measured creative self-efficacy in a different way.  
Altogether there were seven self-efficacy statements: ‘1) I am good at coming up 
with new ideas’, 2) ‘I have a lot of good ideas’, 3) ‘I have a good imagination’ 
(Beghetto, 2006), and 4) ‘In general, creativity is an important part of my self 
image’, 5) ‘My creativity is an important part of who I am’, 6) ‘Overall, my creativity 
has little to do with who I am’ (reversed scoring), and 7) ‘My ability to be creative 
is an important reflection of who I am’ (Jaussi et al., 2007). The statements were 
answered with a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (one point) 
to ‘strongly agree’ (five points), with a ‘neither agree nor disagree’ (three points) 
option included.  
The attention items within the Preliminary Questionnaire were created by the 
researcher and were included so that the participants had the opportunity to show 
how they judged their own abilities in concentrating and focusing on tasks. The 
questions asked the individual to judge some of their own attentional abilities. The 
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questions were 1) ‘I am easily distracted’ (reversed scoring), 2) ‘I am good at 
focusing my attention on one thing at a time’, 3) ‘I can easily concentrate on one 
task until it is finished’, and 4) ‘I struggle to fully focus my attention on one task’ 
(reversed scoring). These items used the same five-point Likert scale and were 
designed by the researcher to be simple, and similar in style and language to the 
creative self-efficacy items.  
From the Preliminary Questionnaire, two scores were calculated: a creative self-
efficacy total score, and a self-report attention total score.  
In addition to the creativity score taken from the Preliminary Questionnaire, a 
second self-report creativity measure used was the Creative Achievement 
Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al., 2005: appendix 2). 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire. The CAQ provided individuals with the 
opportunity to disclose their achievements in ten domains: visual arts, music, 
dance, architectural design, creative writing, humour, inventions, scientific 
discovery, theatre and film, and the culinary arts. Space was also available for 
participants to provide further examples of their creativity that did not fall within 
the set fields. The CAQ makes it easy for researchers to compare individual or 
group differences in past creative achievement, and allows for a distinction to be 
made between those who are creative in one domain and those who are creative 
across many (Carson et al., 2005; White & Shah, 2011). Again this task did not 
have a time limit but generally took between one and five minutes to complete. 
 
For each creative domain, participants were asked to select from eight 
statements, those that applied to their achievements. The first statement was 
always ‘I have no training or recognised talent in this area’, which scored zero 
points. The statements then progressed from ‘I have taken lessons in this area’ 
scoring one point, to ‘my work has been critiqued in national publications’, which 
scored seven points (Carson et al., 2005). The exact wording of the answer 
options for each domain varied slightly in order to be appropriate to the field. 
When the seven-point statement was suitable, the participant was also asked to 
indicate the number of times this had occurred, and extra points were added 
accordingly. The scores were added to make a single, total CAQ score for each 
participant. 
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The CAQ has been found to be valid and reliable with test-retest scores of r = 
.81, p < .001, and an internal consistency score of Cronbach’s alpha = .96 
(Carson et al., 2005). Carson et al. (2005) also determined that performance on 
this measure was related to higher creativity scores for an artistic item produced 
by participants (r = .59, p < .001), and to divergent thinking scores (r = .47, p < 
.001). 
The Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS-v1.1). The ASRS-v1.1 Symptom 
Checklist (Kessler et al., 2005: appendix 3) was developed in cooperation with 
the World Health Organisation and has been found to be a reliable and valid 
measurement of the symptoms of ADHD (Adler et al., 2006; Kessler et al., 2007; 
Reuter, Kirsch, & Hennig, 2006). The questionnaire generally takes about three 
minutes to complete and consists of 18 items that have been found to be 
internally consistent, concurrently valid when compared to the ratings of others, 
and strongly correlated with clinician diagnosis (Adler et al., 2006; Kessler et al., 
2005). An example item is ‘How often do you have difficulty keeping your attention 
when you are doing boring or repetitive work?’ The participant has five answer 
options: never, rarely, sometimes, often, and very often. The first six items have 
been found to be reliable within themselves (Cronbach’s alpha = .63 to .72; 
Kessler et al., 2007), and four or more answers in the ‘often’ or ‘very often’ boxes 
here is thought to indicate the existence of ADHD (Kessler et al., 2005). The 
remaining 12 items are there to indicate where individuals may have specific 
problems, and were included in this study in order to compare the scores with 
those from the other attention tasks involved in the study. One point is awarded 
for each answer in the shaded boxes (see appendix 3), and these points are 
totalled to provide an overall ASRS score. 
The Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS). The DDFS (appendix 4: Giambra, 
1993) consists of 12 multiple choice questions taken from the Imaginal Processes 
Inventory (by Singer & Antrobus, 1970). The DDFS is the most commonly used 
measure of self-report daydreaming and mind-wandering (Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2012) and has been found to be related to 
probing measures of daydreaming (Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; 
Stawarczyk et al., 2012). Internal reliability has been measured with typically high 
Cronbach’s alpha values, for example 0.91, and test-retest has shown a 
Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.76 with one year between tests (both values from 
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Giambra, 1993). Each question has a five-point answer scale indicative of varying 
frequencies of daydreaming and participants are asked to tick the box 
corresponding to the most appropriate description of their daydreaming habits 
(answer options vary according to the question). The DDFS instructions contain 
an explanation of what daydreaming is and how it differs from purposeful thinking. 
The answers are scored from zero to four, with the sum of all responses taken as 
a total DDFS score (ranging from 0-48), as per the instructions provided by 
Giambra (1993). 
Mind-Wandering Questionnaire. The final self-report attention measure was the 
Mind-wandering Questionnaire (MWQ: appendix 5). This was developed by 
Mrazek, Phillips, Franklin, Broadway, and Schooler (2013) and has been shown 
to hold internal consistency, face validity, and convergent validity with other 
measures (Mrazek et al., 2013). The newly designed questionnaire has yet to be 
cited in other publications. There are five items: 1) ‘I have difficulty maintaining 
focus on simple or repetitive work’, 2) ‘While reading, I find I haven’t been thinking 
about the text and must therefore read it again’, 3) ‘I do things without paying full 
attention’, 4) ‘I find myself listening with one ear, thinking about something else 
at the same time’, and 5) ‘I mind-wander during lectures or presentations’. Each 
item has six answer options (scored 1-6 respectively) of: ‘Almost Never’, ‘Very 
Infrequently’, ‘Somewhat Infrequently’, ‘Somewhat Frequently’, ‘Very Frequently’, 
and ‘Almost Always’. The higher the score, the more likely the individual is to 
mind-wander frequently. The questionnaire does not have a time limit, but 
generally took two minutes or less for the participant to complete. 
 
4.3.2 Measures of Creative Performance  
Of the remaining four creativity tasks used in this thesis, three were divergent 
thinking tasks from the Torrance Test for Creative Thinking (TTCT) battery 
(Torrance, 1966, 1990; Torrance, Ball, & Safter, 1992). Divergent thinking (DT) 
tasks are popular measures of creativity and creative problem-solving in previous 
research, as they require multiple responses or ideas to one question or problem 
(see section 1.2.2). Two of the tasks used in the present study tested verbal DT 
which is the production of written responses, and the third tested figural DT, which 
required drawn responses. The original DT tasks set by Torrance lasted ten 
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minutes each; however, in this study, all three had a five-minute time limit, as it 
has been found that five minutes was an optimal time for this type of task, and 
that there was no benefit to having more time (Snyder et al., 2004). 
 
Verbal Divergent Thinking: Unusual Uses Tasks (UUT; Torrance et al., 1992). 
Verbal DT was measured by the Unusual Uses Tasks, where participants were 
required to list as many ideas as possible for unusual uses of everyday objects. 
The first task featured a tin can (UUT-TC, appendix 6), and the second a 
cardboard box (UUT-CB: appendix 7). The administration of the TTCT has 
undergone extensive investigation, with results showing that explicit instructions 
emphasising the importance of originality in the production of the ideas is 
important. For example, an instruction such as ‘think of ideas that other people 
might not think of’ (Torrance et al., 1992) helps to raise creativity scores as it 
encourages participants to avoid listing menial, ‘normal’ ideas. This was therefore 
implemented and specified in each of the sets of instructions. 
 
In order to score the unusual uses tasks, Torrance (1990) has provided an 
extensive guide. There were three measures taken from each verbal DT task: 
fluency, flexibility, and originality. Fluency was scored by counting the number of 
responses, excluding duplicate ideas. To score flexibility, the number of types or 
categories of ideas, a table of 28 categories that many responses could fall into 
was provided in the guide. This was to make it simpler for scorers to quantify the 
flexibility or diversity of the participants’ ideas. If any ideas did not fit into the given 
categories, it was acceptable to create a new category. For the scoring of 
originality, a checklist was provided by Torrance (1990) that lists common 
responses or ideas that should not score a point for originality. In the case of both 
the cardboard box and the tin can for example, to use them to store or carry things 
in, or as animal houses were popular answers and therefore were not deemed to 
be unique, creative, or original. Suggestions such as using these items as 
protection (e.g., as a shield or armour), or to make tools, were statistically less 
common, and therefore each scored a point for originality (Torrance et al., 1992). 
When both UUTs were used within one study, the fluency, flexibility, and 
originality scores from each were added together, to create one verbal divergent 
thinking task score per participant. 
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Figural Divergent Thinking: Circles Task. To measure figural DT, the Circles task 
was used. Participants were given an A4 sheet of paper with rows of small, simple 
circles on the front and back (60 circles total, each with a 2.5cm diameter: 
appendix 8). The instructions were to draw as many different objects or pictures 
incorporating the circles as possible, using only a pen. Fluency and originality 
scores were allocated in the same way as described above. Responses such as 
faces and fruit (apple/orange) were among the ideas that were not considered to 
be creative or original by Torrance and others (1992), with items such as cell 
depictions or bicycles being significantly less frequent, and therefore each 
scoring an originality point. Flexibility was not accounted for in this task, as ideas 
are limited to the shape of the circle. Instead, points were awarded for elaboration 
(according to the instructions by Torrance et al., 1992), such as the joining of 
more than one circle for one idea, or by adding details. Participants were also 
asked to title each response to allow the researcher to identify unique pictures. 
The titles were not scored. 
Creative Production: Collage Task. The final task for measuring creativity was the 
production of a collage. Participants were provided with a piece of A3 white card, 
scissors, PVA glue, and a selection of arts and crafts materials (a detailed list of 
all the materials used can be found in appendix 9). Every participant had identical 
craft items available to them, to avoid the possibility of a variance in available 
materials determining what was created and ultimately scored. The task lasted 
ten minutes and the instructions (appendix 10) were to be as creative as possible, 
and to produce something that others may not think of. Participants were also 
asked to title their collage on completion. This has been used extensively in 
previous research to assess creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1982, 1983; Amabile, 
Hennessey, & Grossman, 1986) 
The lack of a scientific consensus of a definition for creativity, and perhaps the 
reluctance by some to pursue one, is problematic when it comes to analysing and 
scoring real-life creative products produced within experimental settings. The 
scoring of such products by the researcher could lead (intentionally or 
unintentionally) to biased results, especially if s/he is a novice in the field, and/or 
if the study was not blind. This led to the method of having creative products 
scored by field experts. 
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Having expert judges complete a checklist when they score products would limit 
generalisability and would inhibit the personal input of the judge. To counter this, 
Amabile (1982) developed the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) that 
allows judges (usually experts in the relevant field, although not exclusively) to 
use their own subjective definitions and opinions of what is creative, to assign a 
mark out of five or ten to each product. Reliability ratings between judges and 
across tests using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient have been found to be high, with 
scores typically ranging from .7 to .9 (Kaufman et al., 2008). The collages 
produced in this study were therefore scored using the CAT, which is thought to 
be ecologically valid as it is similar to the method by which art is judged in real 
life, by critics.  
Eight participants with expertise in an area of visual art or design volunteered to 
be the judges, and scored 150 collages altogether (from the first two studies). Six 
were recruited from the School of Creative Industries at Edinburgh Napier 
University, and two were artists and interior designers known to the researcher. 
The collages were presented to the judges anonymously, and they did not know 
of any experimental conditions featuring within the study, but they were debriefed 
afterwards. The judges worked independently and were shown the exact 
materials that the participants had had on offer to make their collages. Each 
collage was scored out of ten by each of the eight judges, the scores were 
combined, and the mean determined, which acted as an overall collage score 
(Kaufman et al., 2008). Reliability analysis provided a Cronbach’s alpha score of 
.588 with the inclusion of all eight judges. However, with the removal of judge 
number eight, whose scores were particularly low, alpha increased to a more 
reliable .693. The removal of these scores did not create a significant difference 
between the mean collage scores, therefore the remaining analysis was based 
on the scores by judges one to seven.  
 
4.3.3 Measures of Attention Performance 
In this thesis, four tasks were employed to evaluate different aspects of attention: 
attentional control (the attentional blink task), sustained attention (the continuous 
performance task), selective attention and response inhibition (the Stroop task), 
and divided attention (dual-tasking). 
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Focused Attention/Attentional Control: Attentional Blink - Rapid Serial Visual 
Presentation (RSVP) task. In order to measure attentional control, the attentional 
blink paradigm was adopted. An attentional blink occurs when the identification 
of a second pre-specified target (T2) is unknowingly missed by the participant if 
it appeared within 500ms of the first known target (T1) (Di Lollo et al., 2005; 
Shapiro et al., 1997; Vogel & Luck, 2002). If T1 is still being processed when T2 
is displayed, there may not be enough processing capacity left to deal with it, so 
it will be missed by the participant. A contrasting view is that the attentional blink 
is caused by a brief break in visual control after viewing T1, whilst attention 
switches strategy to prepare for the processing of T2 (Di Lollo et al., 2005). This 
task therefore measures the participant’s ability to switch and control attention. 
In the present research, an attentional blink rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP) computer task was used, which was designed by Shapiro, Raymond, and 
Arnell (1994) and required the use of software E-Prime 1.0. 
On-screen instructions (appendix 11) were presented to the participants and any 
questions were answered by the researcher if necessary. The task consisted of 
32 trials, each containing a rapid sequence of 24 uppercase black letters (‘courier 
new’ font, size 18) presented in the middle of a grey screen. The stream of letters 
lasted between 2 and 2.4 seconds, and each letter was presented for 15ms 
followed by a 75ms blank pause. The task was to detect the one white letter within 
the sequence, which the participants knew would be a B, G, or S (T1). The white 
letter was the cue to look for T2, a black letter X, which was presented on 50% of 
trials. Of the 50% of trials where T2 appeared, its position in the sequence varied 
equally from being one to eight letters (i.e., 90 to 720ms) after T1. Each T2 
position was presented twice, for example T2 appeared twice after 90 
milliseconds, twice after 180 milliseconds (figure 2), and so on, in a random order.  
 
450ms90ms
A P G Q X K R D
Figure 2: Illustration of rapid serial visual presentation task sequence. 
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Following each sequence, the task required the participants to indicate whether 
they had seen a B, G, or S in white, which they answered by pressing the 
corresponding key on the computer’s keyboard. Immediately after this, the 
question ‘was the letter X present following the presentation of the target B, G, or 
S’ was presented on screen, and participants pressed the 1 key for ‘yes’, or 2 for 
‘no’. The measures gained from this task were T1 and T2 identification accuracy 
as a percentage, and accuracy at each of the T2 lag positions, post T1. The time 
taken to answer the questions was not important, so reaction time was not 
measured. 
Sustained Attention: Continuous Performance Task (CPT). CPTs are a measure 
of sustained attention, as participants are asked to maintain concentration for a 
relatively long period of time, to a mundane, repetitive task. The visual CPT as 
described by Shalev, Ben-Simon, Mevorach, Cohen, and Tsal (2011) was used 
in the present study. Shalev and colleagues (2011) reported high levels of internal 
consistency, a high test-retest reliability score (r = .83), and that performance on 
the CPT was in line with expectations and comparisons with previous versions of 
sustained performance tasks.  
The computer software programme E-Prime 2.0 was used to create this task that 
comprised one block of 15 practice trials followed by one block of 320 measured 
trials. The stimuli consisted of a continuous stream of 16 coloured shapes, made 
up of all possible combinations of four shapes (square, triangle, circle, and star) 
and four colours (red, blue, green, and yellow). The shapes were approximately 
1.5-1.8cm in size and were displayed one at a time, in the centre of an all-black 
computer screen for 100 milliseconds each. Each shape was followed by an inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) of either 1000, 1500, 2000, or 2500 milliseconds, during 
which time a blank, black screen was displayed. The presentation of the stimuli 
and the ISIs was randomised, see figure 3 for an example.  
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Instructions for the participants were displayed on screen before the task began 
(appendix 12), after the practice trials (appendix 13), and a ‘thank you’ message 
appeared at the end. The task for participants was to react only to the red square 
stimulus (target) by pressing the spacebar, whilst ignoring all other stimuli. The 
instructions were precise and the participants were given the opportunity to ask 
the researcher questions, before continuing on to the recorded trials. 
Of the 320 timed trial presentations, the target was presented 96 times (30% of 
trials), the other red shapes were used 19 times each (17.5%), and the other 
coloured squares were also shown 19 times each (17.5%). These were the 
distracter stimuli, as these items are more likely to be accidentally considered the 
target by the participant for their red colour or square shape (Shalev et al., 2011). 
The remaining stimuli (e.g., yellow triangle, green star, etc.) were shown 12 times 
each (35% of overall trials). The whole CPT lasted approximately 12 minutes, 
therefore measuring the participant’s ability to remain attentive to one repetitive 
task over a reasonably long period of time. 
The main score for this task was mean RT across the length of the task, and this 
was used in analysis of sustained attention. To look closer at the pattern of 
sustained attention (particularly in chapters five and six), the 320 trials were split 
into five blocks of 64 trials, although this was not apparent to the participant as 
they ran smoothly from one to the other. This decision was made by the 
researcher as it enabled the calculation of a mean reaction time (in milliseconds) 
for each block, for each participant, which was thought to be sufficient to show 
ISI 
(1000ms)
ISI 
(2500ms)
ISI 
(1500ms)
ISI 
(2000ms)
Trial 
Events 
distracter 
(100ms)
distracter 
(100ms)
target 
(100ms)
distracter 
(100ms)
distracter 
(100ms)
Figure 3: Illustration of CPT sequence. 
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the pattern of response speed and accuracy over the course of the task. The 
number of omissions (red squares missed by participant) and commissions (an 
alternative stimuli mistakenly being identified as the target) were also extracted 
for analysis. Specifically, omission errors (missing the targets) are thought to be 
indicative of inattention, and commission errors (responding to non-targets) are 
said to be representative of impulsivity (e.g., Marchetta, Hurks, De Sonneville, 
Krabbendam, & Jolles, 2007). 
Selective Attention and Response Inhibition: Stroop Task. In order to measure 
the participants’ ability to select relevant information and ignore the irrelevant 
(selective attention; see section 2.1.3), they performed the Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935). The task used CogLab 3.0, a software programme containing various 
psychology related tests. Participants were shown the instructions (appendix 14) 
and the researcher clarified with the participant that they knew what to do.  
The computer screen was black, and the word ‘red’, ‘green’, or ‘blue’ (‘arial’ font, 
size 18) appeared one at a time in the centre, just above a small fixation dot. The 
words either appeared in their congruent colour (i.e., the word green written in 
green) or an incongruent colour (i.e., the word green written in red). Participants 
had to identify the colour of the font only, whilst ignoring the word itself, by 
pressing the suitable key. The correct keys were ‘h’ if the colour was red, ‘j’ for 
green, and ‘k’ for blue. These keys were preferable as they are adjacent to each 
other on the keyboard, making it easy to switch from one to the next. The word 
remained on screen until a response was made by the participant, and reaction 
times were measured. The space bar was pressed after each trial when the 
participant was ready to continue onto the next. As previous studies have shown, 
it is likely that the mean RT for incongruent trials would be higher than for 
congruent trials (Kane & Engle, 2003; see section 2.1.3), due to the conflicting 
information presented on screen, thus taking the participant longer to process. 
In total there were 45 trials, 15 of which were congruent, and 30 of which were 
incongruent. If the individual answered incorrectly or too slowly, then this trial was 
discounted and was later repeated. This ensured that all of the trials were 
eventually completed correctly. The final scores were a mean reaction time (RT) 
for congruent trials and a mean RT for incongruent trials. This was changed in to 
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a difference score for analysis, with the congruent RT being subtracted from the 
incongruent RT to determine the extent of the difference between the conditions.  
Divided Attention: Dual-Tasking. The dual-tasking measure explored the 
participant’s ability to carry out two tasks simultaneously, which measures divided 
attention and attentional control (Della Sala, Foley, Beschin, Allerhand, & Logie, 
2010; see section 2.1.4). In the present study, participants completed a paper 
and pencil based task, as described by Della Sala and colleagues (2010), where 
they were required to repeat lists of numbers back to the researcher, whilst 
tracing a simple maze with a pen (number lists at appendix 15, and an illustration 
of the maze at figure 4). Test-retest correlational analysis for this task have 
recorded medium to high values of r = .59 to .73 (p < .001; Della Sala, Foley, 
Beschin, et al., 2010). There were four parts to the dual-task measure:  
Part one: Digit Span Determination 
Part two: List Memory (single task) 
Part three: Tracking (single task) 
Part four: List Memory + Tracking (dual-task) 
The four parts were carried out sequentially to ensure that the participants 
understood how to complete each task. In part one, each participant’s individual 
digit span, the number of digits they could hold in working memory and repeat 
back in order, was determined in order to tailor the rest of the task to their specific 
abilities, and to ensure the participants were working to capacity. Number lists 
were read aloud by the researcher at an approximate rate of two digits per 
second. These lists gradually increased in length from two to a maximum of ten 
digits; six trials of each list length were used. When a participant could no longer 
repeat all of the digits back to the researcher in the correct sequential order, their 
digit span was recorded as the number of digits they could previously state 
confidently. For example, if a participant was able to recall a list of six digits 
sequentially, but could not do so for lists of seven digits, then their digit span was 
recorded as six.  
Part two of this exercise involved the single task of the researcher reading aloud 
different lists of digits according to the participant’s digit span, determined in the 
previous phase. Participants were required to immediately repeat the digits back 
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in order, as the researcher manually recorded their accuracy. This task lasted 90 
seconds. The participant’s accuracy for each digit string was transformed into a 
percentage (e.g., a score of 3 correct from 6 is 50%), and the mean percentage 
for the total amount of digit strings completed was calculated, therefore acting as 
the participants overall score for this section. This measured the participant’s 
ability to carry out this task on their own.  
The third part of the paradigm also featured a single task, which involved the 
participant using a pen to trace a maze-like line, intercepting circles as required 
(Della Sala et al., 2010; see figure 4). The circles were approximately 1.5 
centimetres apart from each other along the line, and the participant’s score was 
the number of circles passed through in 90 seconds. A smaller, untimed version 
of this task was provided before the main task began to allow the participant to 
practice, and to ensure their understanding of the task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section four was the dual-task phase where the participants were required to 
carry out part two and part three at the same time. This time, the digit lists were 
different from previous lists, but were still at span capacity. Section four also 
lasted for 90 seconds, and two scores were obtained: list memory accuracy 
(mean percentage) and the tracking score (number of circles crossed through).  
Figure 4: Illustration of the dual-task tracking maze. The maze was A4 size for the task. 
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Altogether, four raw scores per participant were obtained for this task: single-task 
digit list accuracy, dual-task digit list accuracy, single-task tracking score, and 
dual-task tracking score. Using the formulae provided by Della Sala et al. (2010; 
figure 5), it was possible to create one score representing the proportion of 
accuracy across the single- and dual-task conditions for the digit list task, and a 
single score representing proportional performance across the two conditions in 
the maze tracking task. With these new scores, a measure of proportional 
performance was calculated that combined the scores form both tasks.  
 
Proportional performance in digit recall (Pm) was calculated by measuring the 
change in digit recall between single- (msingle) and dual-task (mdual) conditions, 
where m is the proportion of digits recalled accurately, and using: 
 
Pm = 100 − (msingle − mdual) × 100 
                    msingle 
 
Proportional performance in tracking (Pt) was calculated by measuring the change 
in tracking between single- (tsingle) and dual-task (tdual) conditions, where t is the 
number of circles drawn through, and using: 
 
Pt = 100 − (tsingle − tdual) × 100 
   tsingle 
 
Proportional performance in both tasks combined (μ) was calculated by using: 
 
μ = Pm + Pt 
       2 
 
 
With this calculation, a score of 100 would indicate no effect of the dual-task 
condition, above 100 would highlight a performance improvement in the dual-task 
condition, and below 100 shows a performance deficit in the dual-task condition. 
This final proportional performance score was used in subsequent analysis of the 
dual-task. 
 
Figure 5: Excerpt from Della Sala, Foley, Beschin, Allerhand, and Logie (2010, p.412), which 
explains the calculation process of determining a single proportional performance score for 
the dual-task. 
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4.4 Procedure 
Each participant was tested individually. Upon entering the testing room, each 
participant read an information sheet (specific to each study, see appendices 
16.1, 16.2, and 16.3) and signed a consent form (appendix 17). After any 
questions had been answered, a selection of relevant questionnaires were 
completed. These were provided at the beginning of the session to avoid the 
participants own feelings about their performance during the testing to affect how 
they answered the questions. 
In order to allow participants to habituate to the testing environment, a three 
minute warm-up task was supplied (appendix 18). Using a warm-up task in 
creativity research has been found to help participants relax, and therefore enrich 
their responses (Kim, 2006; Kaufman, Plucker, & Baer, 2008). In this case, a 
picture construction task was used (from Torrance, Ball, & Safter, 1992), where 
participants were provided with a sheet of paper showing a simple curved line on 
it. The instructions were that they should convert this into an interesting picture 
using the coloured felt-tip pens provided, and to give it a title. This would normally 
be scored as a test of figural creativity, for originality and elaboration as per the 
instructions of Torrance and colleagues (1992); however, for this study it acted 
as an acclimatisation task only, and was not scored. Participants were not aware 
at the time that it would not be scored, which was meant to encourage full effort 
to be made. 
The order of the remaining tasks was pseudo-randomised to reduce order effects. 
There were varying orders to the tasks and this was predetermined by the 
researcher to ensure that any sequence was not overly repeated. Breaks were 
offered to participants in between each task, although these were generally 
rejected. If an individual did break, it was for one or two minutes. 
A game-like approach (a casual setting and unrestricted timings) to creativity 
testing, as used by Wallach and Kogan (1965) was not adopted by Torrance, Ball, 
and Safter (1992) as it was viewed as being impractical when testing a large 
number of participants, and was therefore not implemented for this study. Instead 
each session was structured and time limits were imposed when practical and 
necessary.  
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Overall, the testing session lasted between 80 and 90 minutes for first two 
studies, and 50-55 minutes for the third and fourth studies within this thesis. At 
the end of the session, participants were encouraged to ask any questions they 
had, thanked, and were given a debrief sheet (see appendices 19.1, 19.2, 19.3), 
to take away with them. 
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 20, including correlational 
analyses, t-tests, ANOVA, ANCOVA, and regression analyses. The most 
appropriate tests were used throughout according to the guidance of Field (2013), 
with consideration of data type, data suitability, and the research aims. For 
significant t-tests, Cohen’s d effect size was calculated, with scores of .2 
indicating a small effect, .5 a medium effect, and .8 a large effect. For significant 
ANOVA/ANCOVA tests, effect size was calculated in the form of partial eta 
squared (Ƞ²p), with scores of .01 indicating a small effect, .06 a medium effect, 
and .14 a large effect size.  
 
  
Chapter 5 - The Relationship between Creativity and Attention 
 
104 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 - The Relationship between 
Creativity and Attention  
 
 
  
Chapter 5 - The Relationship between Creativity and Attention 
 
105 
 
5.1 Introduction and Research Aims 
The research aim was to determine whether or not there are relationships 
between specific aspects of creativity (i.e., past creative achievement, divergent 
thinking, and the production of a creative product) and specific aspects of 
attention (i.e., attentional control, abilities in sustaining attention, ignoring 
irrelevant stimuli, and dual-tasking), as past research has suggested. 
It was therefore hypothesised that a relationship would exist between several 
aspects of creativity and attention, in that as creativity scores increase, attention 
scores decrease (e.g., Carson et al., 2003; Finke et al., 1992; Kasof, 1997; 
Memmert, 2011; Vartanian, Martindale, & Kwiatkowski, 2007).   
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Design 
A correlational approach was used, and each participant took part in all of the 
tasks. This allowed for within group analyses to be carried out to determine if 
relationships existed between creativity and attention.  
There were several dependent variables (DVs), with some single measures 
having as many as seven scores or outcomes: however, on a simpler level, the 
main DVs were creativity and attention scores. The measures are specified in the 
Materials section (5.2.3). 
 
5.2.2 Participants 
The group consisted of 100 participants, most of whom were staff or students at 
Edinburgh Napier University, although members of the general public were also 
tested. There were 79 females and 21 males within the group, with ages ranging 
from 18 to 80 years (only one was aged over 59 years old). The mean age was 
26.9 years, with a standard deviation (SD) of 11.4 years. 
Individuals were invited to take part in the study if they were over the age of 18 
years and were fluent in English, prerequisites that were stipulated on the 
information sheet (appendix 16.1) given to participants prior to testing.  
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In particular relevance to the Torrance creativity tests, gender differences in the 
responses of participants are seldom found and if they are, they are rarely 
replicated (Kaufman et al., 2008). Furthermore, the tests have been found to be 
fair in relation to race, culture, and socioeconomic status (Kim, 2006). Although 
some gender differences in attention tasks have been found (e.g., Giambra & 
Quilter, 1989; Merritt et al., 2007; Robinson & Kertzman, 1990), others have not 
supported this case (e.g., MacLeod, 1991; Spelke, 2005) or are cautious of 
studies that do (e.g., Halpern, 2013). These differences are not considered 
further.  
 
5.2.3 Materials 
There were six tests of creativity and five tests of attention used in this study, 
each are fully described in section 4.3. 
The warm-up task (4.4) was provided. The creativity measures used were the 
Preliminary Questionnaire (creativity items), the CAQ, all three divergent thinking 
tasks (both UUTs and the Circles task), and collage production (see sections 
4.3.1 and 4.3.2). 
The attention measures used were the Preliminary Questionnaire (attention 
items: 4.3.1), the RSVP task, the CPT, the Stroop task, and the dual-task (see 
section 4.3.3).  
 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Upon entering the testing room, participants were given the information sheet 
(appendices 16.1) and consent form (appendix 17). After any questions had been 
answered, the Preliminary Questionnaire and then the CAQ were completed. It 
was decided that these tasks would be provided at the beginning of the session 
to avoid the participants’ own feelings about their performance on the other tasks 
affecting how they answered the questions.  
The warm-up task was then carried out, followed by the remaining creativity and 
attention tasks, which were presented in a quasi-random order. This was 
determined before data collection commenced, and ensured that the running 
order changed as many times as possible to minimise order effects. 
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Overall, the testing session lasted between 80 and 90 minutes. At the end of the 
session, participants were given a debrief sheet to take away with them, and they 
were provided with a £10 high street gift voucher in appreciation. 
The possibility of using factor analysis (specifically principal component analysis: 
PCA) to simplify the creativity and the attention data at a preliminary stage was 
thoroughly explored. If successful, this would extract and group variables that 
appear to measure the same construct. Ideally, this would mean that the scores 
from the multiple tests used to measure creativity and attention could be reduced 
to fewer factors. However, the literature indicates that a sample size of N = 100 
is too small to meet the assumptions of this type of analysis. For example, 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2012) suggest that a suitable sample size for factor 
analysis should be at least 300; Comrey and Lee (1992) regarded a sample size 
of 100 as poor, 300 as good, and 1000 as excellent.  Guadagnoli and Velicer 
(1988, cited in Field, 2013) stated that sample size did not matter if factors had 
four or more loadings above .6. Furthermore, in order to be suitable for factor 
analysis, there should be medium sized (between .3 and .8; Field, 2013) 
relationships between the variables, and variables that did not fit with this 
assumption should not be included in the analysis. Correlational analysis 
indicated that most of the variables fell outwith these criteria as the correlation 
coefficients were mostly very low (correlational analyses are presented in the 
following section). In order to objectively justify the exclusion of factor analysis 
from this thesis, a PCA was conducted (despite the limitations in sample size), 
as doing so provides statistics on the suitability of the data, in the form of a Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value and anti-image correlations. PCA was considered the 
most appropriate form of factor analysis to use, according to the guidance of Field 
(2013). 
A PCA was performed on the 11 creativity items, and separately on the eight 
attention items, with oblique rotation (direct oblimin). The KMO values of .545 
(creativity measures) and .509 (attention measures) indicated that the sample 
was not adequate for PCA (deemed ‘miserable’ (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) 
and ‘barely acceptable’ (Kaiser, 1974; both cited in Field, 2013). KMO values for 
each variable were also calculated (anti-image correlations). Field (2013) states 
that the KMOs for the individual variables should be above .5 as a bare minimum, 
in order to be suitable for PCA, and should be removed if they fall below .5. This 
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would lead to five of the 11 creativity measures being removed (KMO < .5 for 
CAQ, Circle fluency, Circle originality, and UUT and Circle percentage of original 
ideas) and four of the eight attention measures being removed (KMO < .5 for self-
report attention, and CPT RT, omission errors, and commission errors – 
additionally, the RSVP T2 and Stroop measures had KMOs of only .55). As a final 
check, although some factor loadings were above the .6 requirement, there were 
only a maximum of three variables on each factor, and not the four necessary to 
disregard sample size as an issue (Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988, as cited in Field, 
2013). 
Taken together then, the inadequate sample size, insufficient correlations, poor 
KMO scores, and the literature lead to the confident conclusion that the data 
collected did not meet the assumptions for factor analysis, and so this did not 
proceed further.  
As the main aim of this study was to identify relationships between the variables, 
the most appropriate inferential statistics consist of correlational analyses (Field, 
2013). 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Creativity Measures 
The Preliminary Questionnaire resulted in two scores per participant, one for 
creative self-efficacy (min. score = 7, max. = 35) and one for attention (min. = 4, 
max. = 20). The mean creative self-efficacy score across the group was 24.47 
(SD = 5.02), and the mean attention score was 12.86 (SD = 3.49). These scores 
were not significantly related (r = .139, p = 167). The creative self-efficacy scale 
had a Cronbach’s alpha of .874, and the self-report attention scale had an alpha 
of .847, showing that each measure had high inter-item reliability. 
The CAQ returned one total score per participant. The mean score was 11.08 
(SD = 12.56), the lowest score was zero, and the highest was 64. Reliability 
analysis was conducted for the CAQ and Cronbach’s alpha returned as .186, 
which is a low score for inter-item reliability. 
Mean UUT fluency (min. = 2, max. = 60), flexibility (min. = 2, max. = 35), and 
originality (min. = 0, max. = 31) scores were calculated for each participant. The 
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mean percentage of original ideas ((total originality / total fluency) * 100) was also 
calculated (min. = 0, max. = 100%). See table one for the means and standard 
deviations for both tasks combined (cardboard box and tin can, as detailed in 
section 4.3.2). 
 
Table 1: Mean verbal divergent thinking scores with standard deviations, as measured by two 
Unusual Uses tasks. 
    Mean SD 
Unusual Uses Task 
Total Fluency 24.27 10.08 
Total Flexibility 16.84 5.89 
Total Originality 8.88 2.94 
Percentage of Original Ideas 36.27% 15.14% 
 
The Circles task measured figural divergent thinking. Each participant’s 
responses were scored for fluency, originality, and elaboration. The lowest scores 
were zero for each of the three aspects, and the highest scores were 25, 10, and 
10 for fluency, originality, and elaboration respectively. The mean percentage of 
original ideas ((total originality / total fluency) * 100) was also calculated (min. = 
0, max. = 100%). The means are displayed in table two.  
 
Table 2: Mean figural divergent thinking scores with standard deviations, as measured by the 
Circles task. 
    Mean SD 
Circles Task 
Fluency 8.62 4.54 
Originality 3.49 2.21 
Elaboration 3.51 2.23 
Percentage of Original Ideas 43.71% 24.73% 
 
The CAT was used to score the collages produced by the participants. The mean 
collage score was 5.06 (SD = 1.06), with the lowest score being 2.71, and the 
highest 7.71 out of ten. This indicates that none of the participants were awarded 
high scores for their work, even though the judges should have been rating the 
collages relative to the others.  
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5.3.2 Attention Measures 
Analysis of the means and standard deviations indicates that the group performed 
as expected on the measures of attention.  
The RSVP task measured attentional control and the attentional blink. Scores for 
identifying the second target (M = 65.41%, SD = 11.09%) were lower than for the 
first target (M = 93.25%, SD = 9.33%). A paired-sample t-test found that this 
difference was significant (t(99) = 23.767, p < .001, d = 2.717: large effect size) 
and shows the effect of the attentional blink: that processing of the first target 
inhibits the recognition of the second.  
The CPT measured sustained attention. The group mean reaction time (RT) for 
the CPT was 441ms (SD = 45.54ms). RTs to the target in the CPT gradually 
increased from a mean of 415ms to 455ms as the task progressed. Mean RTs 
were calculated for each of the five time blocks (figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6: Mean RTs during the continuous performance task.  
**indicates significance at 99% confidence level. Scale starts at 400ms in order to clearly 
illustrate between-block differences. 
 
A significant within-subjects ANOVA (F(2.42, 396.0) = 19.329, p = .001, Ƞ²p = 
.163: large effect size) confirmed that the differences in RT with increasing time 
** 
** 
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were significant. The significant Bonferroni pairwise comparisons are shown by 
brackets (figure 6). 
Omission and commission errors were also calculated for the CPT. As the target 
was presented on 96 of the 320 trials, there were 96 opportunities for each 
participant to make omission errors, and 224 (320-96, non-target trials) 
opportunities for the participants to make commission errors. The mean omission 
rate was .71 (SD = 1.67) and the mean commission rate was .30 (SD = .92).  
To measure selective attention, the Stroop task was used. Two mean RTs per 
participant were obtained: one for congruent trials (M = 840ms, SD = 330ms), 
and the other for incongruent trials (M = 923ms, SD = 287ms). As explained in 
section 4.3.3, the mean congruent RT was subtracted from the mean incongruent 
RT for each participant, in order to analyse the extent of the difference between 
the two conditions. The mean difference score was 83.95ms (SD = 198.47ms). 
As this value is positive, it indicates that the participants were generally slower to 
respond in the incongruent condition. 
The dual-task measured divided attention. In total, four scores were recorded per 
participant for the dual-task measure, two single task scores (digit list and maze 
tracking scores when carried out separately), and two dual-task scores (digit and 
maze scores when tasks are combined). As explained in section 4.3.3, these 
scores were transformed according to the instructions by Della Sala and 
colleagues (2010) to result in one score representing proportional performance 
across each task and each condition. A score of 100 would indicate no effect of 
the dual-task condition, above 100 would highlight a performance improvement 
in the dual-task condition, and below 100 shows a performance deficit in the dual-
task condition. The mean dual-task score across the sample was 97.55 (SD = 
11.39), indicating that the participants performed better in the single task 
condition compared to the dual-task condition.  
In order to test for relationships between the creativity measures and the attention 
measures, multiple correlations were carried out. The Pearson correlations are 
listed in table three (the CAQ produced non-parametric data, therefore Spearman 
correlations are reported for the CAQ variable only). As a large number of 
correlations were calculated, the probability of reporting a type I error increased. 
Chapter 5 - The Relationship between Creativity and Attention 
 
112 
 
For this reason, only correlations with a probability value of less than .01 were 
further considered in the discussion, following the recommendation by Howell 
(2007). Although this decreases the likelihood of reporting a type I error, it does 
not eradicate the risk completely, so the results are treated with caution. 
There was one significant relationship between creativity and attention. This was 
between figural divergent thinking originality (measured by the Circles task) and 
self-report attention (measured from the preliminary questionnaire), where higher 
originality scores were related to higher levels of concentration. There were no 
other significant correlations, as shown in table three.
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Table 3: Pearson correlations between the creativity and attention measures 
 
* indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01. † = Correlation supports the hypothesis (i.e., poorer attention score related to better creativity score). a Indicates that Spearman 
correlations were reported for the CAQ task as the data were non-parametric. 
 
  
Measure T2 Elaboration
Attention .14
CAQa .40** .14
T1 - .03 .09 .04
T2 - .05 - .10 - .00 .35**
Mean RT .00 - .11 .03 - .17 - .10
Omission Errors - .11 - .03 - .08 - .15 - .10 .12
Comission Errors - .05 - .13 - .01 .04 .01 - .22* .36**
Stroop Score - .09 .04 - .25* .02 .19 - .15 - .15 - .05
Dual-Task Score .10 .10 - .04 .22* .28** - .11 .09 .15 .09
UUT: Total Fluency .02 - .05 .14 - .06 - .07 - .12 - .09 - .01 - .05 .02
UUT: Total Flexibility .00 - .00 .10 .02 - .08 - .04 - .09 - .07 - .03 .10 .91**
UUT: Total Originality .03 .03 .18 - .02 - .22*† - .16 - .18 - .04 - .06 .12 .83** .81**
UUT: % Original Ideas .10 .14 .15 .05 - .24*† - .12 - .22* - .11 - .02 .12 .05 .13 .51**
Circle Fluency .09 .22* .10 .11 .13 - .22* - .16 - .05 - .04 .17 .37** .36** .29** .00
Circle Originality .19 .27** .22* .13 - .07 - .24* - .18 - .02 - .10 .00 .23* .21* .27** .13 .62**
Circle Elaboration .21* .22* .07 .14 .02 - .24* - .10 .08 - .02 .10 .31** .29** .24* - .04 .51** .54**
Circle % Original .17 .08 .09 - .07 - .23*† - .05 - .06 - .04 .02 - .23*† - .13 - .14 - .04 .01 - .25* .46** .10
Collage Score .18 .00 .03 - .21*† - .16 - .01 .00 .06 .04 - .10 .18 .18 .19 .09 .03 - .01 .13 - .03
Fluency Originality
% Original 
Ideas
Total 
Flexibility
Total 
Originality
% Original 
Ideas
Dual-Task 
Score
Total 
Fluency
Circles Task
Creativity Attention CAQa T1
Mean 
RT
Omission 
Errors
Comission 
Errors
Stroop 
Score
Self-Report Questionnaires RSVP Task CPT Stroop Task Dual-Task Unusual Uses Task
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5.4 Discussion 
It was hypothesised that there would be a relationship between creativity and 
attention, and that creativity scores would increase as attention scores 
decreased. Ultimately, this hypothesis has not been supported in any way. There 
was one significant relationship (p < .01) found between measures of creativity 
and attention, as figural DT originality was positively related to self-report 
concentration levels (as measured by the Preliminary Questionnaire), the 
opposite of what was expected. This study, therefore, does not show support for 
the literature previously reported, which has found a link between creativity and 
poorer attentional control (Vartanian et al., 2007), selective attention (Ansburg & 
Hill, 2003; Dykes & McGhie, 1976; Kasof, 1997; Necka, 1999), and divided 
attention (Rawlings, 1985).  
The significant correlation does not corroborate with the theory that poor attention 
is beneficial for creativity, but is in support of the claim that narrow attention could 
be best for creativity (e.g., Zabelina et al., 2015). However, as only one significant 
correlation was found, and as the correlation coefficient is weak at only .27, the 
value and wider application of this finding is fundamentally limited.  
The unexpected lack of findings here suggests that past researchers may have 
been optimistic in their claims of finding a relationship between the two complex 
constructs of creativity and attention, having only measured them with one test 
each. In support of this, an examination of the correlations presented in table 3 
determines that the two self-report measures of creativity are related, and the 
verbal and figural DT scores are related, but there are no relationships across the 
self-report, divergent thinking, and collage measures. This shows that each test 
may be measuring a different aspect of creativity, and that the results from one 
test cannot be generalised to represent creativity as a whole. Similarly, there is 
only one relationship between the attention measures (RSVP T2 accuracy and 
Dual-Task score), again indicating that the tests were not all measuring the same 
thing, but different facets of attention. This was a thorough study that aimed to 
clarify and strengthen previous findings by using a comprehensive set of tests 
representing the multifaceted nature of each construct. Unfortunately, it can only 
be determined here, that within this group of participants, and with the measures 
used, creativity and attention are not related to each other.    
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It was considered important to compare performance on creativity and attention 
measures in participants with and without ADHD, and this led to the creation of 
the next study of this thesis. This would allow for the examination of a relationship 
between these variables in a group that, as explained in the literature review, 
should have higher creativity scores and lower attention scores than a control 
group. It would enable the exploration of pattern differences in the correlational 
analyses, to test if the relationship exists in a group with attention disorder. It 
would also allow for between-group differences to be calculated, which would 
enhance the strength of this study.  
For these reasons, the discussion of this study remains short in order to reduce 
repetition, as further ideas, limitations, and suggestions for future research are 
collated and presented following the details of an expansion of this study, with a 
sample of adults with ADHD. The ADHD group study is presented in the following 
chapter. 
 
5.4.1 Limitations 
A potentially important feature that was missing from the current study was a 
measure of ADHD. If the group was representative of the general population, then 
between 2-5% of the participants would have the condition, perhaps without 
knowing so. If a measure of this nature had been included, scores could have 
tested this, and could have led to further analysis of those with high and low 
scores. Accordingly, the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale – v1.1 was utilised in all 
future studies contained in this thesis.  
Further limitations are discussed in the following chapter. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The study presented in this chapter was an exploration of the relationship 
between creativity and attention. Many measures were used with the aim of 
solving the shortfall of previous studies. No consistent relationship between these 
constructs was found, with the one significant relationship highlighting the figural 
DT originality was weakly, positively related to higher levels of self-report 
concentration abilities.  
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This interim conclusion can suggest that the relationship between these 
constructs is not supported. In order to clarify the results and to further explore 
the area in more detail, another study was carried out using participants with 
ADHD as a comparison group.  
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6.1 Introduction and Research Aims 
The study reported in the previous chapter was repeated on a sample of adults 
who had been diagnosed with, or strongly believed they had, ADHD. 
The aims of this study were: 
1: To determine whether or not there are relationships between specific aspects 
of creativity (i.e., past creative achievement, divergent thinking, and the 
production of a creative product) and specific aspects of attention (i.e., attentional 
control, abilities in sustaining attention, ignoring irrelevant stimuli, and dual-
tasking) in those with ADHD, as past research has suggested (see chapter three). 
2: To compare performances on creativity and attention tasks between those with 
and without ADHD. 
3: To determine if a relationship exists between creativity and attention in those 
with ADHD, compared to the control group where it does not.  
The hypotheses (H) were as follows: 
H1: There will be a relationship between creativity and attention within the ADHD 
group. Specifically, as originality scores increase, attention scores will decrease. 
H2: There will be significant differences between the groups in performance on 
creativity and attention measures. Specifically, the ADHD group will have better 
scores in the creativity measures (e.g., Abraham et al., 2006; Armstrong, 2012; 
Fugate et al., 2013; Healey & Rucklidge, 2006; White & Shah, 2006, 2011), and 
the control group will have better scores in the attention measures (as indicative 
if the symptoms of ADHD). 
 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Design 
A correlational design was used, and each participant completed all of the 
creativity and attention tasks. Independent samples also featured in the analysis 
stages, as the results from this study formed a comparison group for the results 
of the previous study. Between-group differences were therefore calculated in 
accordance with the hypotheses. 
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The DVs were the creativity and attention scores gained from each measure 
used, as detailed in the previous chapter.  
 
6.2.2 Participants 
The ADHD group consisted of 50 participants who had been diagnosed with, or 
who strongly believed they had ADHD (see section 4.2 for details). Those taking 
part were either Edinburgh Napier University staff or students or members of the 
Addressing the Balance Adult ADHD support group in Edinburgh. Within this test 
group there were 26 males and 24 females, with ages ranging from 18 to 59 
years. The mean age was 32.56 years (SD = 12.40). 
Participant recruitment involved the methods previously discussed in section 4.2, 
with additional emails sent to members of the Addressing the Balance support 
group. The recruitment statements explicitly stated that volunteers should have, 
or strongly believe they have, ADHD.  
 
6.2.3 Materials 
The same materials as used in the previous study (section 5.2.3) were used here. 
The ADHD group also completed the ASRS-v1.1, as detailed in section 4.3.1. 
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
This study repeated the procedure explained in the previous chapter (section 
5.2.4). The ASRS-v1.1 was completed after the Preliminary Questionnaire and 
the CAQ. 
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 ADHD Group: Creativity Measures 
The following results are based on data from all 50 participants in the ADHD 
group, unless otherwise stated.  
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Each ADHD group member completed the Preliminary Questionnaire. The mean 
score for creative self-efficacy was 28.48 (SD = 4.20), and the mean attention 
score was 7.72 (SD = 2.53).  
The CAQ returned a group mean score of 16.74 (SD = 21.99). The lowest score 
was one, and the highest was 71. 
Mean UUT fluency (min. = 9, max. = 59), flexibility (min. = 9, max. = 28), and 
originality (min. = 4, max. = 30) scores were calculated for each participant. The 
mean percentage of original ideas was also calculated (min. = 25.49%, max. = 
92.31%). See table four for the means and standard deviations for both tasks 
combined (cardboard box and tin can, as detailed in section 4.3.2). 
 
Table 4: Mean verbal divergent thinking scores with standard deviations, as measured by two 
Unusual Uses tasks. 
    Mean SD 
Unusual Uses Task 
Total Fluency 25.80 10.42 
Total Flexibility 18.10 5.09 
Total Originality 13.02 6.10 
Percentage of Original Ideas 51.05% 12.76% 
 
Fluency, originality, and elaboration scores were determined from the 
participant’s responses to the Circles task, with the lowest score being zero for 
each, and the highest scores being 20, 12, and 9 respectively. The percentage 
of original responses was also calculated. The means and SDs for the ADHD 
group are shown in table five. 
 
Table 5: Mean scores with standard deviations for the Circles task for the ADHD group. 
    Mean SD 
Circles 
Fluency 7.92 4.34 
Originality 4.30 2.67 
Elaboration 3.16 2.52 
Percentage of Original Ideas 54.22% 25.87% 
 
The ADHD group scored a mean of 5.29 (SD = 1.16) for their collages. The lowest 
score was 3.0 and the highest was 7.86.  
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6.3.2 ADHD Group: Attention Measures 
Forty-eight members of the ADHD group completed the ASRS in addition to the 
tasks the control group participated in, with two choosing not to. The minimum 
possible score was 0, and the maximum score was 18. The mean score for the 
group was 13.96 (SD = 2.83). To provide context, the mean score of a non-clinical 
group outwith this study (n = 100, participants featured in chapter eight of this 
thesis) was 7.04 (SD = 4.79). An independent-samples t-test found that the 
difference between these groups was significant: t(146) = -9.259, p = .001, d = 
1.631: large effect size. 
The RSVP task was carried out by 47 participants, with three not completing the 
task correctly as they pressed the incorrect response keys. The mean accuracy 
score for T2 (M = 66.09%, SD = 11.59%) was lower than for T1 (M = 90.04%, SD 
= 11.25%). This difference was significant (t(46) = 15.475, p < .001, d = 2.097: 
large effect size) according to a paired-samples t-test. 
Reaction times during the CPT were analysed in the same way as previously 
described. These results are based on the scores of 16 participants due to 
missing data. The overall mean RT was 462ms (SD = 88ms). The mean RT 
increased from 443ms in time block one to 475ms in block five, however there 
was a decrease in RT in the centre time block (figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Mean reaction times during the continuous performance task. 
Scale starts at 400ms in order to clearly illustrate between-block differences. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA returned a non-significant result for between-block 
differences in RT (F(2.384, 35.765) = 1.560, p = .222). From a possible maximum 
score of 96, the mean rate of omission errors within the ADHD group was 4.31 
(SD = 8.36). From a possible maximum score of 224, the mean rate of 
commission errors was 1.38 (SD = 1.54).  
The Stroop task measured selective attention. The mean difference score was 
128.39ms (SD = 216.84ms). As this value is positive, it indicates that the 
participants were generally slower to respond in the incongruent condition.   
The mean dual-task score across the ADHD group was 96.63 (SD = 9.78), 
indicating that the participants performed better in the single task condition 
compared to the dual-task condition. 
Correlations were calculated to test for relationships between the creativity 
measures and the attention measures within the ADHD group, as shown in table 
six. Again, as a large number of correlations were calculated, the probability of 
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reporting a type I error increased. Therefore, only correlations with a probability 
value of less than .01 were further considered in the discussion.  
With this restriction in place, no significant relationships were found to exist 
between the creativity and attention measures within the ADHD group.   
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Table 6: Pearson correlations between the creativity and attention measures within the ADHD group. 
 
* indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01. † = Correlation supports the hypothesis (i.e., poorer attention score related to better creativity score). a Indicates that Spearman 
correlations were reported for the CAQ task as the data were non-parametric. 
Measure ASRS T2 Elaboration
Attention .23
ASRS .27 - .07
CAQa .40** .01 .21
T1 .23 .01 .04 .02
T2 - .01 - .02 .02 .04 .58**
Mean RT .06 - .07 .17 .14 - .43 - .55
Omission Errors - .23 - .21 .39 .27 - .23 - .30 .60*
Comission Errors - .17 - .30 .14 .04 - .13 - .22 - .43 .14
Stroop Score - .12 .19 - .06 .04 - .35* - .24 .38 .30 - .06
Dual-Task Score - .20 .02 - .17 - .30*† .16 .08 .01 - .35 - .26 - .29*
UUT: Total Fluency .50** .20 .14 .01 .23 .20 .09 .05 - .22 - .18 .01
UUT: Total Flexibility .49** .22 .11 - .01 .27 .19 .11 .02 - .30 - .16 .02 .90**
UUT: Total Originality .52** .32* .02 .03 .26 .07 - .24 - .18 .03 - .30* .03 .79** .78**
UUT: % Original Ideas .16 .16 - .06 - .04 .09 - .08 - .40 - .28 .33 - .32* .12 - .12 - .06 .46**
Circle Fluency .16 .15 .12 .19 - .05 .03 .37 .06 - .03 - .03 .06 .27 .18 .26 .10
Circle Originality .21 .09 .02 .21 - .01 .00 .18 .07 .16 - .07 .09 .30* .27 .38** .23 .85**
Circle Elaboration - .02 .21 .07 .13 - .09 - .04 .09 - .11 .13 - .11 .02 .12 .16 - .03 - .17 .38** .54**
Circle % Original .07 .15 - .12 - .04 .04 - .11 - .09 .01 .13 - .06 .15 .11 .21 .30* .29* .01 .43** .20
Collage Score .13 .01 - .16 .08 - .27 .19 .08 .03 .07 - .28* .11 .21 .20 .22 .23 .35* .34* .13 - .03
% Original 
Ideas
Total 
Fluency
Total 
Flexibility
Total 
Originality
% Original 
Ideas
Fluency Originality
Circles Task
Creativity Attention CAQa T1
Mean 
RT
Omission 
Errors
Comission 
Errors
Stroop 
Score
Dual-Task 
Score
Self-Report Questionnaires RSVP Task CPT Stroop Task Dual-Task Unusual Uses Task
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6.3.3 Between-Group Differences 
In order to test for differences in performance between the two groups, multiple 
independent samples t-tests were conducted, as they were deemed most 
appropriate. The possibility of using MANOVA to identify overall between-group 
differences was explored, however the data did not fit the assumptions required 
for this test due to unequal and low sample sizes (Field, 2013). The t-test results 
are shown in table seven below, with the significant findings accompanied by 
effect sizes. There were significant between-group differences in self-reported 
creative self-efficacy and attention, CPT commissions, originality and the 
percentage of original ideas in the UUT, and the percentage of original ideas in 
the Circles task. 
 
Table 7: Independent-sample t-tests showing between-group differences across attention and 
creativity measures
 
* indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01.  
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 The Relationship between Creativity and Attention in the ADHD Group 
It was hypothesised that there would be a relationship between creativity and 
attention within the ADHD group, that is, as creativity scores increased, attention 
scores would decrease. This hypothesis was not upheld, as no significant 
relationships were found to exist that link performance on creativity tasks to 
Mean (SD ) Mean (SD ) df d effect
Creative Self-Efficacy 24.47 (5.02) 28.48 (4.20) - 4.861 148 < .001** 0.84 large
Self-Report Attention 12.86 (3.49) 7.72 (2.53) 10.284 128.73 < .001** 1.61 large
Total CAQ Score 11.08 (12.56) 14.46 (13.40) - 1.519 148 .131
RSVP: T1 Accuracy 93.25 (9.33) 90.04 (11.25) 1.832 146 .069
RSVP: T2 Accuracy 65.41 (11.09) 66.09 (11.59) - .343 145 .732
CPT: RT 441.32 (45.54) 461.80 (87.81) - .913 16.31 .374
CPT: Omissions 0.71 (1.67) 4.31 (8.36) - 1.717 15.19 .106
CPT: Comissions 0.30 (0.92) 1.38 (1.54) - 2.710 16.73 .015* 2.68 large
Stroop Task 83.95 (198.47) 128.39 (216.54) - 1.245 147 .215
Dual Task 97.55 (11.39) 96.63 (9.78) .491 148 .624
UUT Fluency 24.27 (10.08) 25.80 (10.42) - .867 148 .387
UUT Flexibility 16.84 (5.89) 18.10 (5.09) - 1.290 148 .199
UUT Originality 8.88 (5.58) 13.02 (6.10) - 4.154 148 < .001** 0.72 medium/large
UUT Percentage of Original Ideas 36.27 (15.14) 51.05 (12.76) - 5.925 148 < .001** 1.03 large
Circles Fluency 8.62 (4.54) 7.92 (4.34) .903 148 .368
Circles Originality 3.49 (2.21) 4.30 (2.67) - 1.971 148 .051
Circles Elaborations 3.51 (2.23) 3.16 (2.52) .867 148 .387
Circles Percentage of Original Ideas 43.71 (24.73) 54.22 (25.87) - 2.418 148 .017* 0.42 small/medium
Collage 5.06 (1.06) 5.29 (1.16) - 1.228 148 .222
Control Group ADHD Group
t p
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performance on attention measures. Within the control group, a significant 
correlation was found between higher levels of self-reported concentration, and 
higher figural DT originality scores, however the same finding was not shown in 
the analysis of the ADHD groups’ performance. Taken together, these two studies 
do not corroborate the findings of previous research that have related the two 
constructs. 
The second hypothesis predicted that the ADHD group would score higher than 
the control group on each of the creativity tasks, and lower on the measures of 
attention. This was generally found to be the case, however not all of the 
between-group differences were significant. The ADHD group were significantly 
better in creative self-efficacy, and aspects of verbal and figural DT originality. 
The control group had significantly better scores in self-report attention and CPT 
commission errors.  
 
6.4.2 Self-Report Measures: Between-Group Differences and Relationships 
Preliminary Questionnaire. It was expected that in the Preliminary Questionnaire, 
the control group would have a higher self-report attention score, and the ADHD 
group would have a higher creative self-efficacy score. This was found to be the 
case, and the between-group differences were significant. This means that the 
control group thought themselves to be good at focusing on one thing at a time, 
and could avoid being distracted. As the ADHD group participants knew, or 
strongly believed they had the disorder, this finding was likely. The ADHD group 
had significantly higher scores in creative self-efficacy. These findings were 
expected having reviewed the literature, but the pattern did not extend to all of 
the performance (non-self-report) measures of creativity and attention. The high 
Cronbach’s alpha scores indicated that the questions in each scale were reliably 
measuring the same construct. 
Higher scores for creative self-efficacy were moderately, positively related to 
CAQ score within both groups, and verbal DT fluency, flexibility, and originality 
scores within the ADHD group (see table 6). This could show that the ADHD 
group have a good understanding of their ability to produce creative ideas, where 
the control group may not.  
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There were no relationships between self-reported attention and any other 
measure of attention within either group. It is possible that there were no 
correlations in this case due to a poor understanding one one’s own abilities, or 
a disparity in how an individual would rate their own attention (i.e., the ability to 
listen in lectures, or their propensity to mind-wandering) and how psychological 
tests measure attention. The participants may perceive their attention to be worse 
than it actually is. Future research could explore why self-report attention does 
not reflect attention task performance, and the use of ecologically valid measures, 
such as diary records, or self-report throughout the length of a working day, could 
yield more precise results.  
Creative Achievement Questionnaire. The CAQ measured past creative 
achievement across the lifetime, by means of self-report. There were no between-
group differences in scores. A positive relationship was found between creative 
self-efficacy and the CAQ within both groups, which was foreseeable, as each is 
a self-report measure covering the same topic. Having said that, the creative self-
efficacy questionnaire measures the self-perception of creativity, and the CAQ 
measures objective achievements. This may indicate that the creative self-
efficacy questionnaire is also representative, or can at least relate to, real life 
creative outputs. However, it is worth noting that the results were highly variable, 
as the mean scores for each group had large standard deviations, and ranged 
from zero to 71.  
Some potential flaws with the CAQ were noted. It appeared that it is easy for 
exaggerations to be made by participants, some of the statements could be open 
to interpretation by the individual, and answers may not have equal meanings 
across participants. For example, most fields ask if lessons or training had been 
completed. It is possible that most individuals carried out compulsory music and 
art lessons at school, qualifying their answer selection. However, this does not 
match with an individual who took lessons in the pursuit of enjoyment and in order 
to improve on their craft.  
Given the inconsistency and variability in scores, this research does not support 
the use of the CAQ as a valid measure of creativity. The only reliability statistics 
available in the literature (to the author’s best knowledge) come from the authors 
of the questionnaire themselves (i.e., Carson et al., 2005), who can be said to 
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have an invested interest in supporting its reliability. It was also reported that CAQ 
scores were related to DT performance and the production of creative items 
(Carson et al., 2005), yet neither of these findings were replicated here. 
Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale – v1.1. The ASRS-v1.1 was used with the ADHD 
group as a measure of symptoms of the disorder. The control group can be 
assumed to have been ‘neurotypical’, given the recruitment criteria and the 
consent they provided having read the information sheet, but they did not 
complete the ASRS-v1.1 so this cannot be statistically supported. The researcher 
learnt from this, and included the measure in all other studies for both control and 
ADHD participants.  
When the scores on the ASRS-v1.1 were related to the scores of 100 control 
participants from a later study (chapter eight) however, there was a significant 
difference, indicating that the ADHD group had higher scores than those without 
the disorder. ASRS-v1.1 scores have been found to be related to the ratings of 
others and with clinician diagnosis (Adler et al., 2006; Kessler et al., 2005), 
though the present study did not have the capacity to test this. Scores on the 
ASRS-v1.1 were not related to any measure of creativity or attention. This could 
show that it measures aspects that are unique to the questionnaire that are not 
measured by other tasks. However, future research could investigate why self-
reported attentional deficits are not related to performance on tests measuring 
attention. Again, it is possible that this is due to an overestimation on behalf of 
the participants of how poor their attention is. 
 
6.4.3 Creativity Measures: Between-Group Differences 
The ADHD group was predicted to perform consistently and significantly better 
on the measures of creativity, as broad, unfocused attention and distractedness 
(ADHD symptoms) were thought to be of benefit to the production of new and 
original ideas (Abraham et al., 2006; Healey & Rucklidge, 2006; Kasof, 1997; 
White & Shah, 2006, 2011). This benefit was not seen unanimously across each 
creativity task as only the differences between creative self-efficacy, UUT 
originality and percentage of original ideas, and Circle percentage of original 
ideas were statistically significant. An examination of the mean scores 
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established that the ADHD group outperformed the control group on all of the 
creativity measures, apart from figural DT fluency and elaboration scores. 
Perhaps a larger ADHD group would lead to more significant differences. 
Divergent Thinking. The UUT-TC and the UUT-CB were used to measure verbal 
DT (combined to produce an overall verbal DT score), and the Circles task was 
used to measure figural DT. The ADHD group scored significantly higher than the 
control group in verbal DT originality, and in the percentage of original ideas 
scores for both verbal and figural DT, which can support the findings of previous 
studies (e.g., Abraham et al., 2006; White & Shah, 2006; 2011). However, the 
key issue with this assertion is that the other measures of creativity did not show 
significant between group differences, meaning there is a limited scope for 
applying this result to creativity in general. It is worth considering though, the 
value of originality as a definitive function of creativity, and that these findings 
may be more important than differences in fluency alone, for example. 
Originality is at the core of the definition of creativity. Asking participants to 
produce novel and original ideas is what separates a creative measure from a 
regular memory, recall, or problem solving task. It could be argued that the other 
DT measures (fluency, flexibility, and elaboration) are easier to score highly on, 
without engaging is creative behaviour at all, as an individual could list many uses 
for a tin can, covering various categories and adding detail, but these ideas might 
not necessarily be original or imaginative. Fluency does remain a crucial factor 
within DT tasks, as ideas are required in the first place in order for them to be 
original. However, the concepts of originality, novelty, or unusualness should be 
important aspects taken in to consideration in creativity research, potentially over 
and above the other scores.  
Fluency and originality are often statistically correlated, and were in these studies, 
yet the significant between-group differences found for originality did not appear 
for fluency. It could be that high fluency scores require focus, organisation, and 
the use of strategies, whereas high originality scores are based on the 
combination of unusual ideas found in diffused and broad attentional states. This 
study can therefore determine that, in support of the literature discussed, those 
with ADHD had a greater proportion of original ideas in a verbal and a figural DT 
task than those without.  
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This interim conclusion can add to the field of creativity and adult ADHD, and 
could potentially be useful in educational or work settings. Further research could 
be conducted to refine this idea, and could also consider the effects of the work 
environment on creativity in those with ADHD. For example, scores may improve 
in a stimulating or cue-rich environment, compared to the bare laboratory room 
used within this study. It has been found that environmental stimulation can raise 
the cognitive arousal level in those with ADHD, thus enhancing their stimulation 
and therefore their concentration (Cooley & Morris, 1990; Zentall & Zentall, 1983). 
This idea was developed in the third study detailed in this thesis.  
Collage Production. It was found that scores on the collage task were not related 
to any other creativity or attention measure within each group. There were no 
significant differences in the scores of the collages between the ADHD group and 
the control group. It was observed (although not statistically) that within the ADHD 
group, more participants complained of running out of time, and there were more 
collages that may be thought of as incomplete, compared to the control group. 
This may demonstrate a deficit in the EFs of planning and time management, as 
is frequently found in those with ADHD. This is conjecture on the part of the 
researcher, but it may be possible that the incompleteness influenced the judges’ 
scores. However, it is more likely that between-group differences just do not exist 
for this measure.  
Given that creativity is a socially judged concept in the real world, it may be that 
the production of a collage is the purest measure of creativity utilised in this study. 
The other tasks used (i.e., self-report, DT tasks) may rely more upon EFs such 
as attention or working memory than this task, meaning that they may not 
measure creativity alone. It could be the case that attention can be narrow or 
broad, and neither state would affect the production of a collage.  
These findings indicate that the creative act of producing a collage is 
fundamentally different to the creative act of producing ideas. It may be that DT 
can relate to cognitive processes such as attention, given that the production of 
ideas requires targeted, purposeful thinking, whereas collage production is 
arguably less restricted. That is, perhaps the processes involved in DT are more 
similar to the processes required for attention, or indeed other EFs.  
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To the author’s best knowledge, there are no existing studies that have compared 
ADHD and control group performance on the creation of a product. This study 
can conclude that as there were no between-group differences, the production of 
a collage is not a task that need be included in further research specifically 
investigating group differences.  
However, the production of creative items could be studied with fewer time 
constraints, and with a broader range of measures. For example, the creation of 
short stories, poetry, paintings, or drawings could inform the field on differences 
in scores on alternative creative products. Furthermore, these types of tasks may 
leave the participant with more freedom of what to create. Although the current 
study provided each participant with numerous materials to make their collages, 
they were arguably still limited in what they could create based on what was 
available.  
One last consideration in relation to the collages is that none of the participants 
were awarded the lowest score (the minimum score awarded was 2.71 across 
the groups) or the highest score for their work (maximum score was 7.86 across 
the groups), even though the judges should have been rating the collages relative 
to the others. The judges should have scored the collages that they thought to be 
the most creative with ten points, and the least creative with one point. This may 
have been due to a misunderstanding by the judges. The lack of variety within 
the scores may therefore explain the lack of significant differences.  
 
6.4.4 Attention Measures: Between-Group Differences 
Selective Attention. The RSVP task measured attentional control and the 
attentional blink. The longer it takes for the individual’s processing to recover 
capacity and re-engage, the more likely they are to miss the second target. As 
expected, there was a significant decrease in target identification accuracy from 
T1 to T2 for both groups, and there was no significant between-group 
performance difference (see Di Lollo et al., 2005; Dux & Marois, 2009; Shapiro et 
al., 1997; Vogel & Luck, 2002). This highlights that the limited cognitive capacities 
in both time and space for processing a secondary target soon after the 
presentation of the first is common to both groups, and that attentional control 
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and the AB are not factors that, according to this study, separates the 
performance of those with ADHD from those without. It is worth noting however 
that there were high SDs indicating that there was a large variance in the scores 
in both groups.  
In previous studies (section 2.5), mixed results have been reported on the 
differences between those with and without ADHD on RSVP task performance. 
Some reported that those with ADHD had poorer recovery times (Armstrong & 
Munoz, 2003a; Li et al., 2005; López et al., 2008), but no clear significant 
difference was found by Mason, Humphreys and Kent (2005). To the author’s 
best knowledge, only Armstrong and Munoz (2003a) studied the AB paradigm in 
adults with ADHD. This study can conclude that performance on the RSVP task 
used here had highly variable scores for both groups, and that there are no 
significant differences between adults with and without ADHD. This means that 
there is not a clear deficit in attention recovery time that is unique to those with 
the disorder.  
The identification of T1 itself does not measure attentional control nor the 
attentional blink, therefore only relationships between creativity measures and T2 
are discussed further. There were no significant relationships between T2 
accuracy and any of the creativity measures within the ADHD group. T2 accuracy 
was weakly, negatively correlated with verbal DT originality within the control 
group. This indicates that as accuracy scores increased, originality scores 
decreased. This finding supports the limited existing research stipulating that 
focused attention is generally beneficial for creativity (e.g., Zabelina et al., 2015), 
as opposed to broad, dispersed attention.  
Sustained Attention. The CPT was used to measure sustained attention. It could 
be postulated that RTs during the CPT would get slower as the task progressed 
due to boredom and/or fatigue (Helton & Warm, 2008). Furthermore, due to the 
nature of ADHD, it has been found that the RT pattern across the duration of the 
task differs between-groups (e.g., Advokat et al., 2007; Börger et al., 1999; 
Epstein et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2007; Marchetta et al., 2007; Rodriguez-
Jimenez et al., 2006; Tucha et al., 2009; van der Meere, et al.,1995). Those in 
the control group had a significant vigilance decrement, as RT significantly 
increased over the course of the task, as has been found before in control 
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samples (Shalev et al., 2011; Unsworth et al., 2010). However, the ADHD group 
did not have a significant vigilance decrement, and their RTs did not follow the 
traditional pattern of decline (figure 8). There was not a between-group difference 
in mean RT for the CPT. 
 
Figure 8: Mean RTs during the CPT for both groups. 
 
Although RT did increase within the ADHD group from the beginning to the end 
of the task, there was a slight (non-significant) improvement in the central time 
block. As the ADHD group did not have a vigilance decrement, this indicates that 
the ADHD group managed to sustain and maintain their attention across the task, 
with more consistency and a lesser decline in performance than the control group. 
The slight decrease in RT in the middle of the task may be indicative of a 
conscious effort by the participants, knowing that they have ADHD, to pay 
attention to the task. Alternatively, this pattern could reflect the nature of their 
processing, in that they habitually drop in and out of concentration. However the 
variance within this group is large, which may explain the result. A longer CPT 
could be used in future research to investigate fluctuations in RT in those with 
ADHD over time.  
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It had also been suggested previously that the ADHD group would be more likely 
to make omission errors due to the symptom of inattention, and more commission 
errors due to impulsivity (Marchetta et al., 2007). Accordingly, there was a 
significant difference in commission errors between the two groups in this study, 
but not for omission errors.  
Selective Attention. The Stroop task is known to reliably test selective attention 
and response inhibition, by consistently invoking slower RTs for incongruent trials 
compared to congruent trials (Ben-David et al., 2014; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2011; 
Kane & Engle, 2003; MacLeod, 1991). Given the EF deficits apparent in ADHD, 
as presented in section 2.3, it was unexpected that there would be no significant 
difference between performances on the Stroop task between the two groups. 
This may be due to the very high but similar standard deviations for both groups, 
which were around 200ms. Selective attention was not related to any other 
creativity or attention measure within either group.  
Divided Attention. The divided attention dual-task should show a lapse in 
accuracy (digit list) and pace (tracking maze) when the tasks are combined, as 
opposed to when they are completed separately (Della Sala et al., 2010). An 
examination of the scores determined that this was the case, meaning that the 
participants performed as expected. There were no between-group differences in 
performance.  
It may be expected that those with ADHD would be worse performers of dual-
tasking compared to those without. However the lack of difference here may be 
because those with the disorder are accustomed to dealing with multiple stimuli 
at once (even if their processing of this is not always effective), so they could 
thrive in a dual-task condition, where both tasks are relatively simple and use 
difference cognitive resources (e.g., Hartmann, 1993; Zentall & Zentall, 1983).  
As stated in the literature review of this thesis and as supported by the results of 
this study, performance on tests of attention by those with ADHD are not as poor 
as would be expected after exploring the definition and symptoms of the disorder. 
Existing research has focused on children with ADHD, and this study can 
contribute to the field results from adult participants. To summarise the between-
group attention findings, there were significant differences in self-report attention 
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and commission errors, as those with ADHD had lower scores and a higher error 
rate. There were no significant differences in performance in measures of 
attentional control, sustained attention, selective attention, and divided attention.  
It is important to remember that the quantity of statistical tests that have been 
carried out for this study is very high. This could mean that false positive results 
have been found, and some significant findings could have occurred through 
chance.  
 
6.4.5 General Discussion 
One of the overarching research aims for this study was to determine whether or 
not there were correlations between measures of creativity and measures of 
attention within the ADHD group. No significant relationships were found, 
showing that previous studies that have linked creativity to attention, having used 
just one or two measures, may be premature in their conclusions. By using 
multiple measures in this study, it has been determined that there is not a broad, 
all-encompassing link between the two constructs. Other researchers should 
therefore be cautious of using just one measure of creativity and one of attention 
to draw generalisations about the constructs as a whole.  
There were only four significant differences between the control group and the 
ADHD group on creativity measures (self-report, UUT originality and percentage 
of original ideas, and Circles percentage of original ideas). The ADHD group 
outperformed the control group on each of these aspects. The importance of 
originality as the key criterion of creativity has been highlighted, and the present 
study shows that those with ADHD may not produce quantitatively more ideas, 
but that their ideas are of a better quality in relation to originality and creativity.  
There were only two significant differences between the control and ADHD 
groups on attention measures (self-report and CPT commissions). Since, by 
definition, the ADHD group should have difficulties with attention tasks, this was 
unexpected. There are three reasons proposed as to why this may have been 
the case, each of which could have been a contributing factor. Firstly, the ADHD 
group is half the size of the control group. Furthermore, there were high levels of 
variance in scores amongst the ADHD group, meaning there was inconsistency 
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within the group and overlap across the groups. As the descriptive statistics 
indicated that the control group outperformed the ADHD group in most measures 
of attention, with an improvement in the ADHD group sample size, the trends 
seen may have extended and led to significant results.  
Secondly, the participants were particularly interested in the study as they had 
volunteered to take part. In particular reference to the ADHD participants, this 
interest, or the novel environment, may have increased their cognitive arousal to 
a functional level, which allowed them to perform the tasks at a more successful 
rate that does not reflect the typical extent of their distractedness (e.g., Antrop, 
Roeyers, Van Oost, & Buysse, 2000; Cooley & Morris, 1990; Zentall & Zentall, 
1983). Environmental stimulation was further explored in relation to this point, 
and is detailed in the following chapter.  
Thirdly, it is possible that the tasks used within this study were not vulnerable to 
the symptoms of ADHD. For example, the CPT is a 12 minute task requiring 
sustained attention, but as it is easy, it may allow the participant’s mind to wander, 
thus inhibiting the effect of distraction on RTs. ADHD becomes a problem when 
the symptoms inhibit the individual from focusing and achieving goals. Within this 
study, the short duration of the tasks may mean that focus was more easily 
maintained, than if the tasks had been much longer. It may also be the case that 
the participants were focused on acclimatising to the requirements of the task, 
which aided concentration. This may be the most plausible explanation for the 
absence of between-group differences in attention measures, as others have 
documented that measuring ADHD in laboratory settings can be difficult (e.g., 
Nichols & Waschbusch, 2004), and specifically in terms of ecological validity 
(Barkley, 1991). 
Overall, it was thought that an individual’s ability to think quickly could be 
advantageous in the creativity tasks. Accordingly, studies have found positive 
relationships between processing speed and creativity (see Rindermann & 
Neubauer, 2004, Preckel et al., 2006). If attentional skills in particular are 
transferable, then individuals may be able to select their best responses more 
quickly, allowing them to speedily move on to consider further ideas. Secondly, 
when an idea is thought of, attention may need to switch from being broad and 
diffused, to being narrow and focused in order to develop and articulate the idea 
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(Martindale & Hines, 1975; Vartanian et al., 2007; Wallas, 1926). This switch in 
attention may be very difficult to do for those with ADHD, meaning that ideas are 
not recorded efficiently, contributing to the low number of significantly better 
creativity scores in those with ADHD compared to those without. Conversely, 
participants may overcompensate for their ADHD by consciously trying to focus 
on fewer ideas. This could be investigated with research in to attentional 
switching abilities in those with ADHD, and perhaps a measure of creative insight 
could help clarify how easy it is for those with ADHD to go from broad to narrow 
attention when the solution is reached. Thirdly, as those with ADHD are naturally 
distracted, they may have struggled to stay on task, which may have limited their 
production of ideas. These considerations may have contributed to the lack of 
significant findings. 
This research project is not without limitations, and these will be presented next.  
 
6.4.6 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
There are three key limitations within this study that may have affected the 
results. These are ecological validity, restrictions on creative freedom, and 
participant bias, and each will be discussed in turn. 
Ecological validity is arguably a prominent problem in all studies that use 
laboratory based experiments to test human behaviour and cognitive processes. 
Creativity in particular may not naturally occur in a laboratory setting, and 
attention tasks may not reflect the manner by which we pay attention in real life. 
Furthermore, differences between control and ADHD groups in attention tasks 
may not be found due to task demands, participant bias, and motivation (Brown, 
2013; Houghton et al., 1999; Sergeant, 2005). However, it would be near 
impossible to measure natural creativity and attention, and to complete a broad 
range of tasks in an ordinary environment would lead to large differences in 
confounding variables. Distraction would also be a problem that would directly 
affect the results of the attention tasks, making laboratory testing the most 
appropriate option. This study is in line with previous studies in the field, although 
perhaps more consideration needs to be made in the future for the use of 
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ecologically valid measures of creativity and attention in order to improve 
generalisability.  
This may be particularly useful in work or educational establishments, where both 
creativity and attention should be valued and encouraged. Studies of this nature 
could start by looking at individuals in creative occupations, such as writers or 
graphic designers. For example, if attention is recorded through the 
measurement of eye-movements, or intermittent self-report throughout a working 
day, this could be related to productivity and the creativity of a piece of work 
produced by the individual. This need not be an intrusive procedure, could be 
longitudinal, and may reflect real life creativity and how it may be affected by 
fluctuations in attention.  
Within this study, there were restrictions within each task on how creative the 
participants could be. As discussed with consideration of the collage task, the 
materials available may have limited what the participants could design. 
Furthermore, the tasks used may not have provided participants with the 
opportunity to demonstrate their skills in a creative area where they may excel. It 
can be argued that collage design is not a common craft. Some participants 
commented that they had never made a collage before, or that they had not done 
so since they were young children. This may indicate that the task is not 
appropriate for use with adults, and it may not be representative of creativity in 
adults. On the other hand, a lack of experience with collage making should allow 
the separation of those who are willing to produce a creative piece compared to 
a non-creative, unimaginative image. It is a relatively low-level task that does not 
require specialist skill, and it has been used successfully in the past with different 
groups of participants.  
In relation to the idea that creative freedom was limited, future research could 
investigate the effect of attention on creativity in those established within creative 
fields. For example, rather than comparing performance across groups differing 
in attentional behaviour (i.e., control group and ADHD group), a highly creative 
group could be compared to a group lower in creativity: different types of creative 
people could be studied. Existing organisations or groups could be utilised, and 
differences between creative fields could be examined. For example, a group of 
interior designers could have different creative strategies and attentional 
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processes compared to a group of inventors within the field of technology, and 
musicians may be different to chefs. Studies of this nature may help to further 
examine the relationship between creativity and attention in real life.  
The above suggestion for future research may help to resolve the participant bias 
limitation too. The materials used in the recruitment process of this research 
advertised a study investigating creativity and attention, and specified that 
participants ‘need not be particularly creative to take part’. Accordingly, a score 
of 14 or less on the creative self-efficacy questionnaire would indicate that an 
individual had no interest in, or had no desire to be creative. Only two of the 150 
participants in this study scored below 14. It was therefore the case that the 
participants regarded themselves as creative people. It is possible that the 
disparate results could be related to a bias within the participant pool. Only 
randomly selecting participants would solve this problem, a process that was not 
available to the researcher.  
Throughout the discussion, other suggestions for future research have been 
made and reasons for these have been provided. These were to investigate the 
discord between self-report attention and performance on attention tasks, to use 
longer CPTs to study the fluctuation in RT in those with ADHD, and to use 
different methods of measuring creative production instead of collages. One of 
the main ideas, however, has been to assess the effect of the environment on 
creativity and attention in those with and without ADHD. 
As mentioned, it could have been the case, that as the participants were in a 
novel situation that they may not be accustomed to, their performance could have 
been improved due to an increase in cognitive arousal (Antrop et al., 2000; 
Cooley & Morris, 1990; Zentall & Zentall, 1983). This could be studied further by 
manipulating the testing environment and the effect on creativity and attention 
scores. A study of this nature was carried out by the researcher and is presented 
in the following chapter. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
This study investigated the relationship between creativity and attention. By using 
multiple measures to do this, the research improved on limited methodologies 
used in past studies. It was found that there is no evidence for a relationship 
between these two constructs, and it is not as simple as previously reported.  
The study also aimed to establish the differences between those with and without 
ADHD. The groups performed differently at face value, but there were few 
statistically significant findings to fully support the hypotheses. Potential reasons 
for this have been explained, and limitations suggested.  
It could be that the expected differences between those with and without ADHD 
were not found due to the changing nature of ADHD, in that intermittent focus 
and persistent distractedness make it difficult for any relationships to be fully 
clarified and understood. In order to investigate the effect of the environment in 
attentiveness, focus, and creativity in those with and without ADHD, an eye 
tracking study was developed, and is presented in the next chapter. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Although distractibility is a core diagnostic criterion of ADHD, there has been little 
research on just how distractible those with the disorder are, and research that 
has been carried out in this area has yielded conflicting results (Pelham et al., 
2011; Radosh & Gittleman, 1981; Rosenthal & Allen, 1980; Söderlund, Sikström, 
& Smart, 2007; van Mourik, Oosterlaan, Heslenfeld, Konig, & Sergeant, 2007).  
This third study of the thesis aimed to compare eye movement behaviour in those 
with and without ADHD, while carrying out tests of sustained and selective 
attention, as well as verbal and figural DT tasks. It has long been understood that 
the location of eye-fixations represent where attention is focused, and eye-
movements coincide with shifts in attention (e.g., Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; 
Leigh & Zee, 2015; Remington, 1980; Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986). This 
time, the testing environment was visually stimulating as opposed to the plain 
room used during the studies investigating the relationship between creativity and 
attention. The aim of this study was twofold. Firstly, do visually stimulating 
surroundings affect creativity and attention scores? Secondly, in this setting, do 
adults with ADHD move their eyes differently compared to those without? 
 
7.2 Literature Review 
The theories described here offer explanations of distractibility and hyperactive 
behaviour, using examples from those with and without ADHD, from a biological 
and environmental point of view. 
 
7.2.1 Overflow Theory 
One of the first theories that attempted to explain hyperactive behaviour was the 
overflow theory, initially offered by Strauss and Lehtinen (1947, as cited in Zentall 
& Zentall, 1983). This theory stipulated that hyperactivity is a natural response to 
the cognitive overflow experienced as the amount of environmental stimulation 
reaches and surpasses the available processing capacity. Therefore, hyperactive 
and inattentive behaviour in children was a result of a high level of sensory stimuli 
in the immediate environment, and was thought to increase as sensory inputs 
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increased. By this stance, hyperactivity is an uninhibited response that initially 
cannot be controlled.  
The overflow theory for inattentive and hyperactive behaviour received 
widespread support, which led to recommendations that children with such 
symptoms should live and work in environments that are free from extraneous 
visual and auditory stimuli (e.g., Cruickshank, Bentzen, Ratzeberg, & 
Tannhauser, 1961). This involved a separation from fellow pupils in classroom 
settings, as well as the concealment or removal of wall decorations, bright 
colours, excess equipment, and windows.  
However, it has since been suggested that a certain level of noise may instead 
be advantageous for the execution of cognitive tasks in those with ADHD, a 
counterintuitive phenomenon that is called stochastic resonance (Söderlund et 
al., 2007; Söderlund, Sikström, Loftesnes, & Sonuga-Barke, 2010). One 
particular study investigated the effect of background white noise on cognitive 
performance, and directly compared children with ADHD to children without 
(Söderlund et al., 2007). Each participant carried out two memory tasks, while 
white noise was presented during the encoding stage to those in the appropriate 
conditions. It was found that the noise had a beneficial effect on the ADHD group, 
as they remembered significantly more sentences in the noise condition 
compared to the silent condition. In contrast, the performance of the control group 
significantly decreased in the noise condition when compared to the silent 
condition.  
These results were replicated by Söderlund et al. (2010), when it was determined 
that background white noise improved the memory performance of those classed 
as ‘inattentive’ by their teacher, and led to a deterioration in performance of those 
classed as ‘attentive’. Furthermore, a positive correlation was found between 
inattentiveness and noise, with the relationship and the effect of noise getting 
stronger as inattention scores increased (Söderlund et al., 2010). It has also been 
found that the presentation of a novel sound (i.e., environmental sounds, such as 
a dog barking) during the completion of a visual choice task led to those with 
ADHD committing fewer errors, compared to the presentation of a normal sound, 
or no sound at all (van Mourik et al., 2007). The novel sound, which should be 
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distracting, therefore seemed to act as a prompt for the individual to maintain 
alertness and concentration.  
At this point, it is clear that the method of isolating children with ADHD that 
stemmed from the overflow theory would be counter intuitive, and would serve to 
worsen the behavioural symptoms of the disorder (see also Armstrong, 2012). 
More recent advice based on research for teachers working with pupils with 
ADHD includes the utilisation of frequent praise and rewards, immediate and 
powerful consequences for misbehaviour, clear and concise rules and 
instructions, and even the use of an infrequent auditory tone to cue a self-
evaluation by the pupil of whether they were on task or not (Barkley, 2008). 
Zentall and Zentall (1983) carried out a review and found that there was little 
supporting evidence for the overflow theory, and alternatively put forward their 
optimal stimulation theory (OST). This has been an influential paper in the field 
and is still frequently accepted and cited in behavioural explanations of ADHD 
(e.g., Antrop et al., 2000; Claesdotter-Hybbinette, Safdarzadeh-Haghighi, 
Råstam, & Lindvall, 2015; McAvinue et al., 2012; Oja et al., 2015; Sarver, 
Rapport, Kofler, Raiker, & Friedman, 2015). 
 
7.2.2 Optimal Stimulation Theory 
The OST maintains that environmental stimuli input affects behaviour output, but 
suggests that the mechanism by which this occurs is more complex than 
described by the overflow theory. The first postulation of the OST is that every 
person has an optimal level of stimulation, and that this is defined biologically 
(Zentall & Zentall, 1983). When the optimal level of stimulation is not available 
(i.e., stimulation is too low or too high), activity acts as a means to achieve 
homeostasis. So, when stimulation is too low, the individual implements 
stimulation-seeking behaviour (see also Antrop et al., 2000), and when it is too 
high, the individual would withdraw from activity and suppress or avoid 
stimulation. An optimal level of cognitive arousal is therefore necessary for 
concentration and response inhibition (see also Cooley & Morris, 1990). 
In their paper outlining the OST, Zentall and Zentall (1983) provided an overview 
of research investigating responses to very low or high sensory stimulation. In 
Chapter 7 - The effect of extraneous visual stimuli on the performance of 
creativity and attention tasks: An eye tracking study. 
 
145 
 
participants classed as ‘normal’, exposure to high levels of sensory input has 
been found to lead to conduct such as disorganised behaviour and thinking, 
repetitive and ritualistic behaviour, social withdrawal, and poor attention. 
Individuals with Autistic Spectrum Disorder were used as a clinical example of 
this type of behaviour by the authors. Autistic individuals often show distress to 
loud and novel stimuli, and a preference for controlled patterns, tones, and beats. 
It can be argued that those with autism consistently suffer from high levels of 
sensory input, leading to some of their stimulation-reducing symptoms, such as 
social withdrawal, gaze avoidance, strict behavioural routines, and suppressed 
reactions to stimuli in the environment (Zentall & Zentall, 1983). Although this 
idea relates to the observed behaviour of those with autism, it is not the only 
theory, and is included here for illustrative purposes only.  
‘Normal’ responses to very low levels of sensory input, in studies where 
stimulation-seeking behaviour was permitted, included increased attention 
(shown by improved focus and concentration), and a general increase in physical 
activity. In studies where stimulus-seeking behaviour was not permitted (e.g., 
when participants could not move), it was reported that there was a deterioration 
in intellectual and writing abilities, poor concentration levels, physiological 
changes (such as slower EEG alpha frequencies and increased galvanic skin 
response), disorganised thoughts, and deficient visual-motor functioning (as per 
the review by Zentall & Zentall, 1983). The authors likened this type of behaviour 
to hyperactivity, suggesting that a normal amount of environmental sensory input 
is inadequate for those displaying symptoms of ADHD (note: these authors do 
not directly refer to the disorder by name, but they do describe the same 
symptoms; see also Antrop et al., 2000). The persistently low stimulation level, 
or underarousal, and consequent behavioural output such as inattentiveness, 
hyperactivity, physical movement, and disruption, is in polar contrast to the 
overarousal of those with autism, although both demonstrate how the OST 
operates.  
Further support for the OST has been published outwith the work and review of 
Zentall and Zentall. In those without ADHD, and in corroboration with the literature 
presented in the previous section, past research has indicated that background 
noise (e.g., novel sounds, conversations) can have a detrimental effect on 
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cognitive performance, due to the inferred interference with both working memory 
(Baddeley, 2007; Dobbs, Furnham, & McClelland, 2010) and attention 
(Broadbent, 1958; Söderlund et al., 2007; Treisman, 1969) systems. This concept 
corroborates with the OST in a non-clinical population, as the additional 
stimulation created by the noise would likely create an imbalance in cognitive 
arousal, causing a distraction.  
An investigation of the effect of background noise compared the impact that 
music, speech, or silence had on arithmetic performance in children with and 
without ADHD. In contrast, the results of this study showed that the non-ADHD 
group performed consistently across the conditions, with accuracy being 
unaffected by background sound. The ADHD group on the other hand, performed 
significantly better with higher accuracy scores under the music condition, 
compared to both speech and silent conditions (Abikoff, Courtney, Szeibel, & 
Koplewicz, 1996). It is likely that the speech condition interfered with their 
productivity due to the irrelevant speech effect (Beaman, Bridges, & Scott, 2007; 
Dige, Maahr, & Backenroth-Ohsako, 2009), leaving the participants more 
distracted than the music condition.  
Furthermore, an experiment compared children with and without ADHD in a 
waiting situation with either a video for stimulation or no stimulation at all (Antrop 
et al., 2000). The children were required to wait for the experimenter for 15 
minutes. Through the analysis of video recordings, it was found that those with 
ADHD displayed more physical movements, and benefitted from this physical 
form of stimulation seeking behaviour. The OST as well as the delay-aversion 
theory (section 2.6.4) were postulated to explain this outcome. 
Zentall and Zentall (1983) effectively illustrated and provided comprehensive 
support for their theory through their review of studies using both control and 
clinical samples, and explained how their theory could be applied to other 
populations such as sensation seekers and deviant adults. They acknowledged 
that there are many other factors that can affect behaviour, for example, 
physiological needs (hunger, thirst), motivation, and task requirements, however 
the OST can coexist with these factors. The OST is therefore compelling, yet it is 
incomplete. The authors thoroughly explain the effects of under- or over-
stimulation, but as it is a cognitive theory, they do not provide the biological details 
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of how stimulation may operate, and what causes these imbalances in cognitive 
arousal.   
 
7.2.3 Moderate Brain Arousal Model 
A newer theory called the Moderate Brain Arousal Model (MBAM) of ADHD and 
dopamine has been proposed by Söderlund, Sikström, and Smart (2007) that 
could fill this shortfall in the OST. The MBAM was created to explain the finding 
that those with ADHD, contrary to the overflow theory and models of working 
memory and attention, could have their performance improved in the presence of 
what would seem to be distracting stimuli (Söderlund et al., 2007). They posited 
that environmental sounds create noise in the neural system that can amend the 
low level of cognitive arousal and the hypofunctional dopamine system found in 
ADHD (Söderlund et al., 2007). 
The amount of noise required to produce an ideal performance, or stimulation 
homeostasis, is controlled by levels of dopamine. Specifically, consistently having 
too little dopamine reflects the ‘under-stimulated’ state described by the OST, as 
seen in those with ADHD. Having too much dopamine matches the symptoms of 
‘over-stimulation’, as observed in those with autism. Dopamine has been directly 
related to the regulation of attention (Nieoullon, 2002). Consequently, as those 
with ADHD have lower dopamine levels (Volkow et al., 2009) and therefore 
naturally seek higher levels of stimulation than those with a regular amount, it 
stands that the extra noise described in the above experiments, raised arousal to 
a manageable, optimal level, aiding with the performance of cognitive tasks.  
With the addition of this explanation of the role of dopamine, and how imbalances 
in the neurotransmitter match with the conditions described in the OST, it is clear 
that the OST and the MBAM can coexist. The apparent gap in the OST is 
therefore arguably and effectively filled. States of low stimulation may originally 
be caused by low levels of dopamine, which leads to sensation-seeking, 
distraction, and hyperactive behaviour. States of high stimulation may be caused 
by high levels of dopamine, which leads to avoidance behaviour and withdrawal. 
Individuals in both of these groups behave as they do in order to seek a 
manageable, comfortable, stimulation equilibrium.  
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Given that cognitive stimulation has been discussed in relation to attention, the 
effects of external stimulation on creativity will be briefly summarised and 
presented below.  
 
7.2.4 Creativity and Stimulation from the Environment 
Many publications highlight the importance of an environment that enhances 
creative thinking in terms of structure and support. For example, it has been 
stated that in education, an environment conducive to creativity should include 
the following: allowance for risk and mistakes, open-mindedness, time to be and 
praise for being creative (Sternberg & Williams, 1996), the production of multiple 
hypotheses (divergent thinking), searching for problems, and thinking broadly 
(Starko, 1995). Other aspects thought to affect creativity in schools particularly, 
include social relationships, socioeconomic status, and student-teacher 
dynamics (de Souza Fleith, 2000; Dudek, Strobel, & Runco, 1993). Many of these 
factors are also considered important for workplace creativity, as well as 
leadership style and support (Rego, Sousa, Marques, Pina e Cunha, 2012; Zhou 
& Hoever, 2014), perceptions of both the ability to be creative and the 
requirement to be creative (Robinson-Morral, Reiter-Palmon, & Kaufman, 2013), 
moderate time pressure, routine, and job control (Ohly, Sonnentag, & Pluntke, 
2006), and motivation style (Amabile, 2012; Sacramento, Fay, & West, 2013). 
In terms of the physical environment in which creativity takes place, studies have 
focused on work psychology, and creativity in the workplace. It has been 
frequently argued that the immediate environment can affect cognitive load (e.g., 
Choi, Van Merrienboer, & Paas, 2014) and that creativity can be improved in work 
settings that are designed to stimulate cognition and perception (Amabile, 1996; 
Ceylan, Dul, & Aytac, 2008; Martens, 2008). Experienced designers have been 
found to create opportunities from the stimuli available in their environment in 
creative problem solving tasks (Goldschmidt & Smolkov, 2006). Specifically, 
evidence has shown that having certain features in the immediate environment, 
such as plants and windows (Shibata & Suzuki, 2002, 2004), scenic posters 
(Stone & English, 1998), warm and bright light (Knez, 1995), as well as books 
and a computer (Ceylan et al., 2008), can all enhance mood, productivity, and 
creative performance.  
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Ceylan, Dul, and Aytac (2008) found that offices with low visual complexity and 
cool colours were rated as environments most likely to enhance creativity. This 
was based on the ratings of managers in manufacturing companies, but the 
creativity of the participants was not measured in the study. In contrast, 
environments that have complex visual detail, external views, use natural 
materials, and with warm colours were judged as being more stimulating for 
creativity by a group of 60 participants (McCoy & Evans, 2002). On the other 
hand, rooms were rated poorly for creative potential if they did not have windows, 
had manufactured materials, and if they had cool colours in the décor. In a second 
study, McCoy and Evans (2002) directly compared creative performance, as 
measured by the TTCT and collage making, within the two environments. It was 
found that the visually stimulating environment significantly improved collage 
creativity, but the TTCT DT test scores were not affected by the environment. 
Although interesting, each participant repeated the creativity tests twice, once in 
each environment (although this was counterbalanced). However, there is an 
indication here that the perceived potential for an environment to induce creative 
thinking can correlate with creative performance.  
In a separate study, design students were asked to create both a drinking fountain 
and candy packaging whilst in either a visually rich (photos, artwork, models in 
sight), moderate (a small selection of sketches in sight), or a bare environment 
(Goldschmidt & Smolkov, 2006). It was found that nine designs were regarded 
as creative, six of which were produced in the rich environment, and three in the 
moderate condition. No creative ideas were produced in the visually bare 
environment. Studies comparing environments are limited (to the author’s best 
knowledge), with most papers considering perceptions of an environment rather 
than experimentally testing the differences between them. 
There are discrepancies between the effects of a visually busy and a visually bare 
environment, and which is more conducive to creative thinking. In the majority of 
the publications in this area, the importance of a stimulating environment is 
emphasised. With consideration of the OST and others previously discussed, it 
can be conjectured that a stimulating environment increases cognitive arousal. In 
those with ADHD, this could lead to an enhancement in concentration and 
productivity, which could allow them to perform on par with a control group on 
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tasks requiring focus, such as attention tasks. It is unclear how a visually 
stimulating environment would affect creativity performance in those with ADHD, 
but in a control group it has been found to improve creativity. 
A discussion of eye-tracking technology and previous studies will now be 
discussed, as the location of fixations can inform what is being attended to, and 
what is not. 
 
7.2.5 Eye Tracking 
In order to focus on a stimulus in the visual field, the eyes move to that point so 
that we can clearly see what is at the centre of the gaze. With this, attention also 
shifts to the point being focused on, allowing the individual to concentrate on it 
(Duchowski, 2007; Henderson & Ferreira, 2012; Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999). 
It is therefore commonly assumed that tracking and recording an individual’s eye 
movements can lead to an analysis of the distribution of visual attention, the 
stimuli that are prioritised for processing, and the time and location of fixations 
(Karatekin, 2007; Rosa et al., 2015). 
Most commonly, fixations, saccades, and scan paths are analysed in the 
examination of visual attention. Fixations are relatively stable eye gazes that last 
for at least 80ms, and take up around 90% of all looking behaviour (Irwin, 1992). 
They are thought to innately coincide with an individual’s focus on the stimulus of 
interest (Duchowski, 2007). A saccade is a single movement of the eyes, and a 
scan path is a map of fixations and saccades.1 
It is generally accepted within the field of eye tracking research in relation to 
ADHD that those with ADHD have abnormalities in their ability to fixate 
(Armstrong & Munoz, 2003b), the length of their fixations (Munoz, Hampton, 
Moore, & Goldring, 1999), in their RT to visual stimuli (Matsuo et al., 2015), and 
in the inhibition of superfluous eye movements (Munoz, Armstrong, Hampton, & 
Moore, 2003). It is commonly reported that those with ADHD do not have 
abnormalities in oculomotor tasks or working memory, but that they do in 
                                            
1 As the technology used within this study was not sensitive enough to measure saccades and 
scan paths accurately, only fixations were measured. Only fixations are discussed further. 
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response inhibition (see Castellanos et al., 2000; Jacobsen et al., 1996; Ross, 
Harris, Olincy, & Radant, 2000a; Ross, Olincy, Harris, Sullivan, & Radant., 2000b; 
Ross, Hommer, Breiger, Varley, & Radant, 1994). Findings supporting these 
contentions have focused on comparisons with control groups and/or individuals 
with schizophrenia, as both disorders have attention and inhibition deficits (Ross 
et al., 2000b), and have measured differences in eye movements.  
When compared to control individuals, those with ADHD have difficulty in 
maintaining fixations on-target, and in inhibiting unnecessary saccades (Munoz 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, it has been found that voluntarily stopping an eye 
movement is particularly difficult for those with ADHD, especially with the 
appearance of a new stimulus outwith the focus of vision (Armstrong & Munoz, 
2003b). 
Children with ADHD have been found to have significantly shorter fixation lengths 
than those without, leading to poorer performance in change detection and 
sustained attention exercises (Türkan, Amado, Ercan, & Perçinel, 2016). In 
examination of the differences between control and ADHD children on their ability 
to fixate on one point for 21 seconds, it has been found that the ADHD group 
looked away from the target significantly more often than the control group did 
(Gould, Bastain, Isreal, Hommer, & Castellanos, 2001). This study was carried 
out in a completely dark room, without stimulation beyond the target, leading the 
authors to conclude that the faults within the ADHD group were not caused by 
distraction, but were due to a fundamental inability of the participants to fixate. It 
is argued here that this may not be the case, but rather the individuals were 
operating stimulation seeking behaviour.  
The eye movement differences between ADHD and other groups are so 
frequently found that new research has advocated the use of eye tracking 
methods in the diagnosis of the disorder (e.g., Dosaj, Overlin, & Turnage, 2015; 
Matsuo et al., 2015; Tseng, Cameron, Munoz, & Itti, 2014). 
To the writer’s best knowledge, no eye tracking studies have been published that 
consider creativity, or the measurement of any aspect of creativity. This would be 
interesting to study in order to determine how focused or distracted individuals 
are, where they look, and what may inspire solutions during the completion of 
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creativity tasks. It is assumed that this lack of existing research is due to the fixed 
nature of past eye tracking equipment, and the necessity of participants to keep 
their heads still whilst focusing on a computer screen. It would be very difficult to 
measure creativity in this way, as individuals would, at the very least, have to look 
at a keyboard to type responses.  
However, the techniques for measuring eye movements have become more 
accurate whilst being less invasive. From measuring electrical changes on the 
skin around the eye area, and from contact lenses with wires attached 
(Duchowski, 2007), methods these days include the use of mobile eye tracking 
glasses that are connected to a remodelled mobile phone or laptop.  
 
7.2.6 Current Study 
Most of the research described has used extraneous sound stimuli to test the 
OST and MBAM theories. The research into the effects of the physical 
environment on creativity has so far focused on visual stimuli. Therefore the 
present study changed the testing surrounding visually, to determine if the same 
effects would be found for both creativity and attention. Contrary to the first two 
studies in this thesis, where the testing room was very bare, with nothing on the 
walls, and only the necessary testing items on the tables, the present study room 
was designed to look like a typical office. The aim was to create a visually 
stimulating environment (see Amabile, 1996; Ceylan, Dul, & Aytac, 2008; 
Martens, 2008), to determine if that enriched or impaired performance on 
creativity and attention tasks, as the OST would suggest. For the ADHD group, it 
was thought that the participants would move their eyes away from the target 
more often than the control group, in an attempt to seek extra stimulation during 
both the creativity and attention tasks.  
A simple approach was taken in this eye tracking study, by measuring the number 
of fixations on-target during the completion of verbal and figural divergent thinking 
tasks measuring creativity, and sustained and selective attention tasks. This was 
thought to be the clearest way of determining if differences in attention allocation 
and distraction exist between a control group and an ADHD group. 
In consideration of the literature reviewed, the hypotheses were: 
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H1: The ADHD group will have significantly fewer fixations on-target than the 
control group, across the tasks. 
H2: There will be a difference in fixation behaviour between the creativity and 
attention tasks, across both groups. 
This hypothesis is included to support the assumption that the creativity and 
attention tasks are fundamentally different from each other, and are therefore 
processed and managed differently. Attention tasks should require more on-
target fixations for their successful completion than the creativity tasks. Tracking 
eye movements can help with this clarification, as it can show us if the participant 
focuses their concentration on the task, or if they have diffused their attention. 
H3: The visually stimulating testing environment in the present study will lead to 
an improvement in creativity and attention scores within both the control and the 
ADHD group, when compared to the results of tests carried out in a plain 
environment (as featured in chapters five and six).  
The visually stimulating environment was implemented in this study to test the 
OST using a method other than sound, and to measure the effect that an office 
environment might have on the performance of creativity and attention tasks. As 
previous studies have shown, control group performance should either be 
unaffected or improved. The first two studies of this thesis investigating the 
relationship between creativity and attention used the same measures that 
feature in this study. This allowed for a direct comparison between performance 
in a visually plain environment, and a visually busy environment. 
 
7.3 Methods 
7.3.1 Design 
An independent-samples design was used for this study, in order to test for 
differences in the number of fixations between a control group, and a group of 
people with ADHD. These were measured using eye tracking glasses during the 
performance of creativity and attention tasks. The independent variable was the 
group (i.e., control or ADHD), and the dependent variables were, for each task, 
the mean number and duration of fixations on-target. 
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7.3.2 Participants 
Thirty participants took part in this study, 15 in the control group, and 15 in the 
ADHD group. Within the control group, there were four males and 11 females, 
aged between 18 and 40 years (M = 27.40, SD = 5.42 years). The ADHD group 
consisted of nine males and six females, aged between 20 and 60 years (M = 
29.47, SD = 11.30 years). In keeping with the explanation in section 4.2, the 
ADHD group consisted of people who had, or strongly believed they had the 
disorder.  
The environment comparison groups consist of the participants in the control 
group and the ADHD group, both described in chapters five and six.  
 
7.3.3 Materials 
Throughout the testing session, participants wore mobile eye tracking glasses by 
SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI; weighed 68g, sampling rate 60Hz binocular, 
typical accuracy to 0.5°). These are worn like a pair of large spectacles, and are 
connected to a laptop by a USB cable (see figure 9). Infrared cameras track the 
movement of the pupils, and a front facing camera above the nose records the 
direction in which the participant is looking. The video and the frame-by-frame 
pupil position are transposed together, resulting in a video with each fixation 
mapped on to it, so that the researcher can analyse gaze location.  
When the glasses are put on, a simple, automated calibration is required. The 
participants were instructed to look at a small symbol at the top of the computer 
monitor. When the software identified the pupils, the tracking point (viewable only 
by the researcher) matches to the same symbol on the laptop screen. One click 
on the symbol then confirmed that the tracking point was in the correct place. It 
was necessary to recalibrate after each task the participants completed to ensure 
the analysis would be as accurate as possible. 
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The participants completed seven tasks altogether. In order to measure creativity, 
the UUT-CB testing verbal DT, and the Circles task measuring figural DT as 
detailed in section 4.3.2 were used. To measure attention, the ASRS-v1.1 (adult 
ADHD self-report scale), MWQ (mind-wandering questionnaire), DDFS 
(daydreaming frequency scale) each described in section 4.3.1, and the CPT 
(sustained attention test), and the Stroop (selective attention measure) tasks 
were all used, as described in section 4.3.3. The reliability of the MWQ and the 
DDFS within this study was calculated2. The MWQ returned a Cronbach’s alpha 
score of .827, and the DDFS scored .943. These are high scores indicating strong 
inter-item reliability.  
 
                                            
2 The scoring of the ASRS does not allow for reliability analysis in this study, but this has been 
previously researched by others. See section 4.3.1 for details. 
Figure 9: Photograph of the SMI eye tracking glasses on a participant, plugged in to the laptop. 
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7.3.4 Procedure 
Each participant was welcomed in to the ‘office’ laboratory room at Edinburgh 
Napier University. To create a visually stimulating environment, there were 
notebooks, books, folders, a mug, and stationery on the table, and a calendar, 
spreadsheets, and lists on the wall behind the computer screen. A selection of 
collages (produced by participants in the previous study) were also displayed. 
First, participants were presented with an information sheet and consent form to 
complete (appendices 16.2 and 17). The participant sat in front of the computer, 
with table space in front of them for the paperwork. After any questions had been 
answered by the researcher, the participant completed the ASRS-v1.1, the 
DDFS, and the MWQ in the order the participant chose to complete them in. The 
eye tracking glasses were then put on and the calibration procedure took place.  
Once the glasses were in place, the participant carried out the CPT, Stroop test, 
UUT-CB, and the Circles task in a pseudo-random order that was predetermined 
by the researcher to limit order effects. Short breaks of two to three minutes were 
made available to each participant between the tasks, although these were 
generally refused. When all of the tasks were complete, the glasses were 
removed, a debrief sheet was provided (appendix 19.2), and the individual was 
thanked for their time with a £10 High Street gift voucher.  
The paper data were scored manually and analysed using SPSS. The eye-
tracking data were analysed using the SMI BeGaze software (version 3.4). Each 
fixation (>80ms gaze) was recorded, and later mapped by the researcher on to a 
reference view (i.e., a photo of the task; see figure 10). The accuracy level quoted 
from the manufacturer was .05°, however it was visibly clear that there was a 
greater degree of error. When participants reported that they were looking on-
target, the fixation mark on the software was frequently not in the correct place, 
so calibration seemed to shift after some time. For this reason, Areas of Interest 
(AOIs) were drawn around the target of each task, each with a 3cm radius. This 
area was a limit that was imposed by the researcher as most fixations were within 
this space, and it allowed for error in the accuracy of the glasses. A fixation is 
therefore deemed to be ‘on-target’ if it appears within this AOI, and ‘off-target’ if 
it appears outwith the AOI. Once the fixations were mapped, focus and heat maps 
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of where the participant fixated, as well as statistics for fixation counts (amongst 
many others) become available.  
 
Figure 10: An example of the BeGaze analysis software. The participant’s video and fixations 
are on the right, the fixation mapping template is on the left. 
 
The inferential statistics procedures used follow the recommendations from Field 
(2013), given the type of data and the research aims. Independent samples t-
tests (or Mann-Whitney U tests when the data were nonparametric) were 
conducted for each task to look for differences between the groups in fixation 
count and the percentage of fixations on-target. These were also carried out to 
look for performance differences within each group but between the original 
studies of this thesis investigating the relationship between creativity and 
attention, to test for an effect of the visually stimulating environment. Paired-
sample t-tests (or Wilcoxon signed ranks tests with nonparametric data) were 
calculated to study the differences in eye movement behaviour within each group, 
across the creativity and attention measures (i.e., to examine if creativity tasks 
yielded more fixations than attention tasks, or vice versa).  
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7.4 Results 
It should be noted here that the results of this study are low on statistical power 
given the small sample size. This is further discussed in section 7.5.4 as a 
limitation.  
The results are split in to three sections: between-group performance differences, 
eye-movement differences, and differences between the two environments. 
Where the data distributions are not normal (as determined by Shapiro-Wilk test 
of normality), nonparametric tests were carried out. 
 
7.4.1 Between-Group Differences in Creativity and Attention Tasks 
Figure 11 shows the scores from the three self-report questionnaires measuring 
aspects of attention and focus, ordered by group. The possible score range for 
the ASRS-v1.1 was from zero to six, for the DDFS it was from zero to 48, and for 
the MWQ it was from five to 30. 
 
Figure 11: Control and ADHD group scores on self-report measures of attention. 
 ** indicates significant difference at the 99% confidence level. 
 
** 
** 
** 
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The ADHD group scored consistently higher than the control group on the 
measures of ADHD symptomology (control mean: 2.53 (SD = 1.46), ADHD mean: 
5.33 (SD = .82)), daydreaming frequency (control mean: 25.13 (SD = 6.48), 
ADHD mean: 35.33 (SD = 9.66)), and mind-wandering (control mean: 17.13 (SD 
= 2.07), ADHD mean: 23.40 (SD = 3.87)). The differences between the groups 
were significant for all three: ASRS-v1.1 (U = 7.50, p < .001), DDFS (U = 40.0, p 
= .003), and the MWQ (t(28) = -5. 534, p < .001, d = 2.242: large effect size), with 
the ADHD group having poorer scores than the control group. 
Figure 12 shows the scores for the creativity tasks, by group. Verbal DT was 
measured by the unusual uses for a cardboard box task, and figural DT was 
measured by the Circles task.  
 
Figure 12: Control and ADHD group scores on verbal and figural divergent thinking measures.  
* indicates significant difference at the 95% confidence level. 
 
The ADHD group consistently scored better on aspects of DT. The between-
group differences were significant for UUT-CB flexibility (t(28) = -2.380, p = .024, 
d = .872: large effect size), and originality (t(28) = -2.718, p = .011, d = .992: large 
* 
* 
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effect size), but not for fluency, although it was close: (t(28) = -2.028, p = .052). 
There were no between-group differences for Circles task fluency (t(28) = -.791, 
p = .436), originality (t(28) = -.257, p = .799), or elaboration (t(28) = -.835, p = 
.411). 
The mean RTs for the CPT measuring sustained attention demonstrated that the 
control group (M = 441.35ms, SD = 47.89ms) were slightly faster than the ADHD 
group (M = 468.39ms, SD = 58.11ms). An independent-samples t-test clarified 
that this difference was not significant: t(28) = -1.391, p = .175.  
The Stroop task measured selective attention. This time, the control group (M = 
64.81ms, SD = 139.68ms) were slower to respond in the incongruent condition 
than the ADHD group (M = 54.46ms, SD = 224.09ms). However the standard 
deviations here are very high, and an independent-samples t-test confirmed that 
there not a significant between-group difference in performance: t(28) = .152, p 
= .880. 
 
7.4.2 Eye Movement Results 
Figure 13 illustrates that the ADHD group consistently made more fixations in 
total over the duration of each of the creativity and attention tasks, when 
compared to the control group. 
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Figure 13: Between-group differences in the total number of fixations over the length of each 
measure used. 
* indicates significant difference at the 95% confidence level. 
 
 
Independent samples t-tests determined that the between-group differences in 
the total number of fixations were non-significant for the UUT-CB (t(28) = -1.765, 
p = .089), Circles task (t(28) = -1.341, p = .191), and the CPT (t(28) = -.486, p = 
.630), but the Stroop task difference was significant (t(28) = -2.694, p = .012, d = 
.984: large effect size). 
The number of each participant’s fixations that were on-target in each task was 
recorded. This was used in conjunction with the total number of fixations, and 
turned in to a percentage of on-target fixations (i.e., participant one had 884 
fixations in total during the UUT-CB, 615 of these were on-target. (615/884)*100 
= 69.57% of their fixations were on-target). The percentages of on-target 
fixations, per task and between-groups, are shown in figure 14.  
 
* 
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Figure 14: Between-group differences in the percentage of on-target fixations over the length of 
each measure used.  
* indicates significant difference at the 95% confidence level. ** indicates significant difference 
at the 99% confidence level. Scale starts at 60% in order to clearly illustrate the differences. 
 
 
Figure 14 shows that the control group spent a higher proportion of their fixations 
looking at the task target for the attention tasks, than the ADHD group did. Each 
task yielded non-parametric data in this case. Mann-Whitney U tests determined 
that there were significant differences between the groups in the percentage of 
on-target fixations for both the attention tasks: the CPT (U = 29.0, p = .001), and 
the Stroop test (U = 64.0, p = .044). The differences between on-target fixations 
in the creativity tasks (UUT-CB (U = 99.0, p = .576) and the Circles task (U = 
101.50, p = .648)) were not significant.  
Within the control group, there was a significant difference in percentage of on-
target fixations between the tasks, as shown by a Friedman non-parametric test: 
X2(3) = 19.966, p < .001. As required by Wilcoxon Signed Ranks post-hoc tests, 
the significance level was adjusted to .008 (normal significance level of .05, 
divided by the number of comparison tests carried out. .05 / 6 = .008): with these 
parameters, there were significantly fewer on-target fixations between the UUT 
** 
* 
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and the Circles task, the UUT-CB and the Stroop task, and the UUT-CB and the 
CPT, as shown in the figure 14 and table 8.  
The same analysis was conducted for the ADHD group. Significant differences 
were found between the tasks in the percentage of fixations that were on-target: 
X2(3) = 17.640, p = .001. Post-hoc comparisons showed that the UUT had 
significantly fewer on-target fixations than the Circle and Stroop tasks, and the 
Circles task had significantly more on-target fixations than the CPT and Stroop 
task, as shown in figure 14 and table 8. 
 
 
Table 8: Differences in the percentage of on-target fixations across tasks, within groups. 
    Control Group ADHD Group 
      Z p   Z p 
Unusual Uses 
Task 
Circles Task - 3.351 .001** - 3.351 .001** 
Continuous Performance Task - 3.408 .001** - 0.795 .427 
Stroop Task - 2.669 .008** - 1.761 .005** 
Circles Task 
Continuous Performance Task - 0.910 .363 - 2.840 .005** 
Stroop Task - 1.022 .307 - 2.953 .003** 
Continuous 
Performance Task 
Stroop Task - 1.287 .198 - 1.079 .281 
** indicates significance at 99% confidence level. 
 
 
The table above highlights that the differences in on-target fixations are not 
consistent between the creativity and attention measures. 
7.4.3 The Effect of the Visually Stimulating Environment 
To identify any effects the visually stimulating testing environment may have had 
on the performance on creativity and attention tasks, participant performance on 
the tasks that were common to both this study (visually stimulating environment) 
and those described in chapters five and six (visually plain environment) were 
compared. These tasks were the UUT-CB and the Circles task measuring verbal 
and figural DT respectively, and the CPT and the Stroop task measuring 
sustained and selective attention respectively. 
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Figure 15: Control group differences in verbal and figural divergent thinking scores in plain vs. 
stimulating environments. 
* indicates significance at 95% confidence level. 
 
Within the control group, the only significant difference was in figural DT 
elaboration, as shown by independent samples t-tests in table 9. 
 
 
* 
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Figure 16: ADHD group differences in verbal and figural divergent thinking scores in plain vs. 
stimulating environments. 
* indicates significance at 95% confidence level. 
 
 
Figure 16 shows that there were improvements in scores across the creativity 
measures within the ADHD group, but the only significant differences were in 
figural DT fluency and elaboration, as shown by independent samples t-tests in 
table 9. 
 
* 
* 
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Figure 17: Control group differences in sustained and selective attention scores in plain vs. 
stimulating environments. 
 
Figure 17 indicates there were only minimal differences in sustained and selective 
attention performance between the two environments, for the control groups. 
None of the differences were significant (see table 9). 
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Figure 18: ADHD group differences in sustained and selective attention scores in plain vs. 
stimulating environments. 
 
 
Although figure 18 shows that, compared to figure 17, there were slightly larger 
differences in scores between the environmental conditions for the ADHD groups, 
these differences were not significant, as shown in table 9. 
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Table 9: Between-study differences in performance across the tasks. 
    Control Group ADHD Group 
    t p t p 
Unusual Uses Task 
Fluency   1.179 .241 - 1.088 .281 
Flexibility   0.469 .640 - 1.284 .204 
Originality - 1.192 .236 - 1.005 .319 
Circles Task 
Fluency - 1.127 .262 - 2.508 .015* 
Originality - 1.805 .090 - 1.465 .148 
Elaboration - 2.129 .035* - 3.243 .017* 
Continuous Performance Task RT - 0.002 .998 - 0.226 .823 
Stroop Task RT Difference   0.360 .720   1.147 .256 
* indicates significance at 95% confidence level. df = 113.  
 
The t-test results in table 9 indicate that both the control and the ADHD groups in 
this study performed significantly better in figural DT elaboration, meaning that 
more details were added to their drawings in the visually stimulating environment. 
The ADHD group also produced significantly more ideas for the Circles task in 
the visually stimulating setting.  
 
7.5 Discussion 
7.5.1 Differences in Eye Movement Behaviour 
ADHD has been linked to a naturally under-stimulated state (Nieoullon, 2002), 
and according to the OST, poor levels of cognitive stimulation leads to 
inattentiveness, poorer concentration, and stimulation seeking behaviour (Zentall 
& Zentall, 1983). Consequently, those with ADHD characteristically struggle to 
focus on tasks. For the creativity tasks in this study, it was thought that the ADHD 
participants would be more likely to move their eyes away from the target in either 
an attempt to seek extra stimulation, or to consciously/non-consciously look for 
ideas. This was not found to be the case. 
In terms of the attention tasks, it was predicted that, as the CPT in particular is a 
long, monotonous task with very little stimulation, those with ADHD would be 
more likely to move their eyes in order to seek stimulation away from the task 
itself. Although the Stroop task requires a decision to made, stimulation from the 
task is still limited, so it was also thought that the ADHD group would move their 
eyes more during this task too. It was found that those with ADHD had more 
Chapter 7 - The effect of extraneous visual stimuli on the performance of 
creativity and attention tasks: An eye tracking study. 
 
169 
 
fixations across each task, meaning that they moved their eyes more, significantly 
so over the length of the Stroop task. Yet, the ADHD group looked at the task 
target significantly less than the control group for the CPT and the Stroop task. 
Having more fixations but less of them on-target shows that those with ADHD 
could have struggled to focus on the target, and that they could have been looking 
elsewhere as an activity aimed at increasing stimulation, as the OST would 
suggest.  
The first hypothesis predicted that the ADHD group would make significantly 
fewer fixations on-target than the control group, across the tasks. This hypothesis 
can be partially supported for the attention measures, but cannot be supported 
for the creativity measures. Furthermore, the second hypothesis stated that there 
would be a difference in fixation behaviour between the creativity and attention 
tasks, across both groups. It can therefore be concluded that those with ADHD 
have less focused fixation behaviour for tasks measuring sustained and selective 
attention, but are not more or less focused than a control group during divergent 
thinking tasks. Creativity and attention tasks here are shown to be processed 
differently in terms of the allocation of visual attention, and show that those with 
ADHD can maintain their focus on creativity tasks better than they can for 
attention tasks.  
It is possible that the absence of a between-group difference in fixation behaviour 
during creativity tasks may be because they require the participant to write and 
draw, which necessitates them to look directly at the page whilst they are doing 
so. It may also be the case that as the creativity tasks oblige the participants to 
actively think and produce multiple solutions, and could therefore be inherently 
more interesting, that this raises cognitive stimulation to a similar level to that of 
the control group participants. 
Interestingly, although the ADHD group spent significantly less time looking at the 
target in the attention tasks, they did not perform significantly worse. This 
indicates that their apparent distraction did not detract from their ability to sustain 
their attention and inhibit irrelevant responses. It could be the case that those with 
ADHD are generally good at timing their off-target fixations, as they are frequently 
in the habit of seeking stimulation from other sources, whilst attempting to pay 
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attention concurrently. It may also be the case that eye-tracking may not reveal 
functional problems in those with ADHD. 
 
7.5.2 The Effect of the Environment 
As the main four measures used within this study had been used previously 
(chapters five and six, investigating the relationship between creativity and 
attention in control and ADHD groups) in a plain testing environment, a 
comparison of the data collected there could be made with the data in this study, 
which used a visually stimulating office environment.  
Within the control group, performance decreased in the stimulating testing 
environment for verbal DT fluency and flexibility, but increased for verbal DT 
originality, and figural DT fluency, originality, and significantly increased for 
elaboration. This means that significantly more details were added to the circle 
drawings. For the ADHD group, performance increased in the stimulating test 
environment across each aspect of the divergent thinking tasks, significantly so 
for figural DT fluency and elaboration. This means that more Circle ideas were 
drawn, and with more detail, than in the plain environment condition. This shows 
that the environment seemed to benefit the creativity of those in the ADHD group 
most, and that a larger sample may lead to more significant differences.  
The attention measures were less affected by the change in environment. Within 
both groups, the differences were very small and non-significant. It can therefore 
be concluded that the stimulating office environment did not improve or diminish 
sustained and selective attention performance. The third hypothesis that the 
visually stimulating testing environment would lead to an improvement in 
creativity and attention scores across both groups therefore cannot be supported. 
According to the OST, the visually stimulating environment may help those with 
ADHD reach an optimum level of arousal. That is, the added stimuli may help to 
raise the individual’s stimulation level to a more manageable level than it would 
be in a blank, clear testing room. This would limit stimulation-seeking behaviour, 
and should help those with the disorder to focus on task. This would be shown 
by improvements in the attention measures from the plain environment study to 
the visually stimulating environment study, with a decrease in RTs. Alternatively, 
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the added stimuli may push stimulation levels above their optimal level, or may 
simply serve as a distraction, as detailed by the Overflow Theory (Strauss and 
Lehtinen, 1947, as cited in Zentall & Zentall, 1983), thus occupying cognitive 
resources and withdrawing attention from the task in hand. This would be shown 
by an increase in RTs during the attention tasks in the visually stimulating 
environment compared to the plain setting. Across both groups, it was found that 
the office environment had no effect, positive or negative, on the overall 
performance of attention tasks. This may be because the participants are 
habituated to working in an office, and as most of the participants were students, 
they may be used to working whilst surrounded by notebooks, folders, and 
stationery. It may also be because they were obliged to pay attention to the tasks 
they had volunteered to participate in. 
 
7.5.3 General Discussion 
A key finding of this study is that those with ADHD show different eye movement 
patterns compared to the control group, during tasks of sustained and selective 
attention. Specifically, they make more fixations but look at the target less. If it is 
assumed that a move of the eyes indicates a move of attention, then the ADHD 
group members could have been seeking visual stimulation during these 
monotonous, lengthy, and boring tasks. This corroborates with the optimal 
stimulation theory as described in the literature review.  
These findings cannot be applied to the creativity tasks however, creating a 
distinction between the two cognitive processes. It is therefore likely that the 
creativity tasks provide a suitable level of arousal, removing the necessity for 
stimulation seeking behaviour. This may be why, in the literature studied in 
chapter three and in the findings of this thesis, those with ADHD appear to 
perform well on measures of creativity.  
Previous studies have found that extraneous sounds have benefitted the 
cognitive performance of those with ADHD, and this study aimed to test this with 
visual stimuli. The visually stimulating testing environment appeared to induce 
significantly higher scores in aspects of figural DT. However, as these 
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improvements were inconsistent across the measures, it is unlikely that the 
environment had an effect on the participants’ performance.  
The finding that the ADHD group, when compared to the control group, made 
significantly more fixations during the Stroop task, and significantly fewer on-
target fixations for both the Stroop task and the CPT, may be a sign that 
individuals with ADHD can manage their urge to seek stimulation, by looking 
away from the target, to an extent that they can look back at it in time to perform 
successfully. This is in contrast to the control group who looked at the target for 
longer. Perhaps this is why there was no difference in divided attention 
performance between the groups in the second study: the ADHD group can 
manage the extra stimulation of completing two tasks at once. If this was the 
case, then in the right setting with the appropriate parameters, those with ADHD 
could actually be more economical with their cognitive resources than a control 
group. If individuals with an attention disorder can complete a task as successfully 
as a control group whilst not looking at the target as often, this could point to a 
difference in attentional strategy between the two groups, the details of which are 
still unclear.  
The literature review of this chapter summarised some research in to the effect 
of the physical environment on creativity. The presence of windows (Shibata & 
Suzuki, 2002, 2004) and natural fittings and furnishings (McCoy & Evans, 2002) 
have been found to be important in perceptions of the environment for creativity. 
Neither of these items were featured in the testing area for this study. However, 
the presence of books and a computer (Ceylan et al., 2008), cool coloured décor 
and complex visual detail (McCoy & Evans, 2002), and bright light (Knez, 1995) 
are also thought to be important, and all were used in the setting of this study. 
The findings from this research project do not support or negate any of these 
ideas, as no effects of the environment were found.  
 
7.5.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
As briefly noted in the results section, the statistical power of this study is low due 
to the small sample size (calculated using G*Power: Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). Post-hoc power analysis indicated that power ranged from .06 
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to .99, with mean power across the tests being .52. This is lower than the 
recommended .80 (Field, 2013). This makes it difficult to find true effects, and for 
the statistically significant results to show a true effect (e.g., Button et al., 2013). 
This is a weakness of this study, and adds to the fragility of the results. However, 
due to the large extent of data extraction analysis required for eye-tracking 
studies, and the time-consuming nature of this task, studies using this method 
are typically low on numbers. For example, a search of publications using eye 
tracking technology across multiple disciplines revealed that sample sizes have 
been as low as six (Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998), seven 
(Goldberg, Stimson, Lewenstein, Scott, & Wichansky, 2002), 18 (Cutrell & Guan, 
2007), and 26 (Granka, Joachims, & Gay, 2004). Jacob and Karn (2003) 
summarised sample sizes and key findings from 21 eye-tracking usability papers 
and found that the mean sample size was just 14.62 participants (SD = 10.15), 
with sample sizes ranging from three to 40 participants. The present study is 
therefore consistent with others in the field, but this does not counteract the low 
statistical power, meaning it should be acknowledged, and kept in mind in 
consideration of the results presented. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
include more participants in this study, as it was very difficult to recruit participants 
with ADHD, and there was limited time available for the data extraction and 
analysis. Future studies should factor in analysis time to their preliminary plans, 
so as to collect data from more participants.  
Another important limitation of this study is that the participants here wore eye-
tracking glasses, but the comparison participants from the two previous studies 
did not. This is a confounding variable, and meant that not only the environment 
was changed, but the glasses themselves could also have affected the results. It 
could be argued that the improvements in figural DT fluency (ADHD group only) 
and elaboration (both groups) could have been due to the glasses and not the 
environment. However, the glasses may have made the participants aware of 
where they were looking, meaning that they focused on-target more than they 
might normally. It is therefore suggested that the glasses and eye-tracking 
method could have led to the lack of significant differences between the two 
environmental conditions. An analysis of eye-movements in a plain environment 
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would be required to compare the two studies directly, and could contribute to our 
understanding of sensation seeking behaviour. 
The main aim of this study was to examine and compare fixation behaviour in 
those with and without ADHD during tasks of creativity and attention. Differences 
were found in sustained and selective attention, but are limited to the types of 
tasks used in this study. In consideration of sustained and selective attention 
specifically, future studies could investigate this further by using a variety of tasks 
at different lengths. It would also be suitable to use ‘real-life’ measurements of 
attention, to study how visual attention shifts and the effects on performance in 
tasks of this type. This would increase ecological validity. 
Furthermore, the study reported here measured creativity by verbal and figural 
DT tasks. However, as previously argued, creativity is a broad and complex 
construct that can be measured in many different ways. It may have been 
beneficial to include another measure of creativity, such as a picture completion 
or collage making task, to track eye movements during these tasks too. It could 
be that the environment has more of an influence during these free-reign type 
tasks compared to the DT tasks. Further analysis of exactly where the 
participants looked could support the theory that diffused attention is useful for 
creativity. 
The environment of the testing sessions of this study was used to determine if 
visual stimulation could improve creativity, which in this case, it did not. An 
interesting development of this study would be to use the mobile eye tracker to 
test the OST in environments outside the laboratory. This could help determine 
which setting is most suitable for raising low levels of cognitive stimulation for 
those with ADHD. More comparisons of extraneous visual stimuli in testing 
environments, and combinations of visual and auditory stimuli, could help the field 
understand the parameters of the OST, and focus and distractedness in ADHD.  
Other methods of improving creativity could be examined in future studies. The 
environment did not have an effect here, but manipulations of time and break 
periods may be of benefit to creativity. For example, a period of time spent away 
from the creativity task (incubation period) has been shown to lead to a more 
creative solution being produced on return to the task (e.g., Baird et al., 2012; 
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Gilhooly et al., 2013; Sio & Ormerod, 2009; Sio & Rudowicz, 2007; Snyder et al., 
2004; Wallas, 1926). The effect of variations in attention on the benefit of an 
incubation could be studied. This would be a new direction for the research, and 
it could help determine the most suitable conditions for creativity.  
 
7.6 Conclusions 
To the author’s best knowledge, this was the first study to examine eye 
movements in laboratory-based tasks of creativity. It can be concluded that 
fixations during a verbal DT task are less often on-target than in the completion 
of a figural DT task, sustained attention task, and a selective attention task. 
Further investigation with a variety of creativity measures will help to identify any 
consistent patterns and differences in fixation behaviour, and therefore the 
allocation of visual attention, during the act of being creative.  
Clear differences in target fixations were found for attention tasks between those 
with and without ADHD. Again, further analysis is required to fully understand the 
attentional strategies used by those with an attention disorder, and it is proposed 
here that these strategies may in fact be more efficient than strategies used by 
those without ADHD.  
A change in the visual stimulation available in the immediate environment did not 
affect performance across the tasks. Recommendations have been made for 
developments of this study, and ways to improve ecological validity and real-life 
application. There are still many questions to be answered in this area, and 
further study is required to extrapolate the ideas proposed here. 
Ultimately, this study has identified differences in the allocation of visual attention 
between those with and without ADHD, and has interestingly found that fewer 
target fixations did not lead to a decrease in performance compared to a control 
group.  
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8.1 Introduction  
Sir Paul McCartney has stated that the melody for one of the Beatles’ most 
famous songs, ‘Yesterday’, came to him not when he was attempting to write 
music, but when he was dreaming (in Ritter & Dijksterhuis, 2014). Poincaré, a 
mathematician, and Helmholtz, a scientist with interests in various fields, both 
reported that the answers to their problems usually came whilst they were not 
consciously focused on the task, but whilst they were walking or relaxing, having 
previously become familiar with the problem (in Gilhooly, 2002).  
It has been found that periods of time spent away from a problem can be 
beneficial to formulating the solution (Baird et al., 2012; Gilhooly et al., 2013; 
Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Wallas, 1926). This break is called incubation, and it 
is thought to allow non-conscious processing of the problem to continue, whilst 
conscious processing works on an alternative task (Gilhooly et al., 2013). 
Laboratory based studies have looked at incubation during a creative problem 
solving task, with most studies finding that in certain conditions, incubation 
improves the number and quality of solutions (Baird et al., 2012; Gilhooly et al., 
2013; Snyder et al., 2004). For example, it has become clear that the type of 
incubation task used, the cognitive effort required to complete it, and attentional 
control are all aspects that could affect the success of incubation (see Ritter & 
Dijksterhuis (2014) for a review). 
The cognitive processes involved in incubation are still unclear (Ritter & 
Dijksterhuis, 2014). Previous studies (e.g., Baird et al., 2012; Madjar & Shalley, 
2008) have alluded to the concept of attention and attentional control in their 
explanations of how incubation may work, but it has not been thoroughly 
measured. This study will make a unique contribution to the field as it will 
determine which aspects of attentional control may be important for incubation 
during a creative problem solving task. This will be achieved by measuring 
susceptibility to mind-wandering, self-rated attention, and sustained, selective, 
and divided attention.  
The theory of incubation and the role attention may play will be discussed along 
with empirical evidence from existing literature.  
Chapter 8 - Attentional Control and the Effectiveness of Incubation on Creative 
Problem Solving 
 
178 
 
8.2 Literature Review 
8.2.1 What is Incubation? 
For problems that are not easily solved, it has been proposed that a period of 
time spent away from the problem can be beneficial. This is known as an 
incubation period. One of the first to discuss periods of incubation was Wallas 
(1926) in his analysis of the creative process. This analysis was developed from 
anecdotal and introspective information from inventors and problem solvers who 
stated that solutions often came to them when they were not directly focused on 
the problem, as was the case for Poincaré and Helmholtz. Wallas (1926) 
suggested that there were four stages to the creative process: preparation 
(focusing on and exploring the problem in hand), incubation (the internalisation 
of the problem by the unconscious mind), illumination (when solutions come into 
conscious awareness), and revision (the solution is consciously analysed, 
developed, and made applicable) (Wallas, 1926; see also Gilhooly, 2002; 
Kristensen, 2004; Lubart, 2000-2001). As previously described in section 3.1.4, 
this demonstrates a switch between broad and narrow attention.  
More recently, incubation has been described as a temporary discontinuation of 
problem solving effort that allows the solution to surface, apparently without extra 
effort (e.g., Baird et al., 2012; Gilhooly et al., 2013; Snyder et al., 2004). For 
incubation to work, an initial period of contemplation or preparation is necessary 
in order to fully understand the problem in hand (Wallas, 1926). If the solution has 
not been reached consciously, it is proposed that an incubation period can allow 
for non-conscious problem solving processes to continue whilst conscious 
processing is distracted by an alternative, interpolated task (the task that occurs 
in the incubation period) (Baird et al., 2012; Gilhooly et al., 2013; Sio & Ormerod, 
2009; Sio & Rudowicz, 2007; Snyder et al., 2004; Wallas, 1926). 
Historically, creativity and incubation research has been focused on single 
solution problem solving (convergent thinking), and insight (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 
2006; Snyder et al., 2004). This type of task requires the production of one correct 
answer or solution to a problem, and has been used in studies so often because 
it replicates the ‘Eureka’ moment of insight. This is said to arise during naturally 
occurring problem solving and creativity (as opposed to laboratory based problem 
solving and creativity), when the solution suddenly becomes clear (Dijksterhuis & 
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Meurs, 2006). However, the answers to this type of task are usually specific and 
difficult to find, which may have led to inconsistencies in the literature (Baird et 
al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006).  
There has since been a move in the literature from a focus on convergent thinking 
tasks to divergent thinking tasks, as these are less restrictive (Baird et al., 2012; 
Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006). As previously discussed, DT involves the production 
of multiple answers or solutions for one given problem. According to the definition 
of creativity presented, in order for a solution to be considered creative, it should 
be deemed original and applicable. Therefore, creativity in this study was the 
production of original, appropriate, and useful ideas by mode of DT. In order to 
be in line with the literature, this is frequently referred to as a creative problem 
solving task (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2013; Madjar & Shalley, 2008; Schmajuk, Azaz, 
& Bates, 2009).  
There are four main theories apparent in the literature that suggest how 
incubation may work. These are the relief of fatigue, the relief of 
mindset/beneficial forgetting, intermittent conscious work, and the non-conscious 
work theory theories. 
 
8.2.2 Theories of Incubation 
The relief of fatigue theory (e.g., Jett & George, 2003; Madjar & Shalley, 2008; 
Snyder et al., 2004; Wallas, 1926) states that the incubation period allows the 
mind to refresh, rest, and restore capacity, which in turn creates renewed space 
for problem solving. However, as testing usually finds that an incubation period 
spent resting is less effective than when a secondary task is carried out (see 
Baird et al., 2012), it is unlikely that this is a plausible theory. 
The second theory is the relief of mindset (Posner, 1973 in Snyder et al., 2004) 
or fixation breaking theory (e.g., Smith & Blankenship, 1991). These suggest that 
time spent in incubation allows for changes in misleading mental sets that may 
be inhibiting the solving of the problem. It is thought that the incubation period 
enables the forgetting of unhelpful strategies or assumptions, meaning that when 
individuals return to the problem, they have a fresh start (also see Segal, 2004, 
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who calls this theory ‘attention withdrawal’). However, paradigms have been used 
with an immediate incubation procedure, where successful incubation has 
followed from the presentation of only the instructions of the main problem solving 
task, eliminating the chance of developing an incorrect mindset in the first place 
(Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Gilhooly, Georgiou, Garrison, Reston, & Sirota, 
2012). 
It was further hypothesised by Gilhooly et al. (2013) that if the relief of mindset 
theory was accurate, then an incubation period spent completing an interpolated 
task of a similar modality to the problem solving task (e.g., both tasks requiring 
verbal processing, or both requiring spatial processing) would promote 
interference-based forgetting, thus breaking down the dominant response 
(unhelpful mindset) and enhancing the effect of incubation. This was not found, 
as when creativity scores were compared, there was a greater benefit of 
incubation when the interpolated task was dissimilar to the problem solving task 
(Gilhooly et al., 2013). The relief of mindset/fixation breaking theory was therefore 
not supported by the authors; however, there may be a more direct way to 
measure the theory, as discussed in section 8.3.4 in relation to the present study. 
The third theory of incubation is the intermittent conscious work theory (Seifert, 
Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995) that suggests small periods of 
conscious problem solving effort are performed by the participant during 
incubation, which later leads to the successful solution of the problem.  
Alternatively, the fourth theory is the non-conscious work theory (for a review, see 
Gilhooly et al., 2013, as this theory is the result of a collection of studies and is 
not assigned to one author) and there is empirical research to support it. It 
proposes that the incubation effect occurs due to the continuous processing of 
the problem non-consciously (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Gilhooly et al., 
2013). 
A method of comparing these last two theories is to contrast the performance of 
those in incubation experimental groups and a control group (i.e., no incubation 
period), on the interpolated task used during incubation. If conscious work is 
carried out on the problem solving task, then conscious effort on the interpolated 
task should be reduced, and thus there should be a poorer performance within 
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the incubation group (Gilhooly et al., 2012; 2013). This would support the 
intermittent conscious work theory. If, however, there is no performance deficit by 
those in the experimental groups, yet there is still a benefit of incubation to 
creativity task scores, this would support the non-conscious work theory.  
A study using this method (Gilhooly et al., 2012) found no difference in 
performance between-groups, showing that there was no deficit in effort assigned 
to the interpolated task by the incubation group, meaning that it was unlikely that 
they were consciously still thinking of solutions for the original task. Similarly, 
when participants were openly asked if they thought about the original task during 
their incubation period, there was no relationship between the rating of thoughts 
and interpolated task performance (Baird et al., 2012). These studies therefore 
do not support the intermittent conscious work theory, and support the non-
conscious work theory, as it implies that conscious efforts were being paid to the 
incubation task, and not the problem previously presented. 
Studies have also found a beneficial effect of incubation even when the 
participants were not aware that they would return to the original task (see Baird 
et al., 2012; Snyder et al., 2004). In these studies, the participants were under 
the impression that they had finished the problem solving task, and had no need 
to consciously think of further answers. On surprise return to the first task, an 
improvement in responses was found, consistent with the definition of incubation, 
and the non-conscious work theory.  
Baird and colleagues (2012) appear to have been the only researchers to 
examine the effect of incubation on new tasks. It is important to note here that 
incubation effects have only been found when participants return to the same 
task as before, and not when they have begun a new problem solving task (e.g., 
Baird et al., 2012). This indicates that incubation works for the task in hand, but 
is not transferrable and therefore does not improve problem solving ability in 
general. 
The non-conscious work theory is further supported by the investigation of the 
similarity or dissimilarity of an incubation task compared to the problem solving 
task, as previously mentioned. In more detail, Gilhooly et al. (2013) tested six 
groups of participants (two control groups with no incubation period) who were 
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provided with either a verbal or a spatial problem solving task. During the 
incubation period, half of those in the verbal task group and half of those in the 
spatial task group were provided with a verbal interpolated task, and the other 
half of each group a spatial interpolated task (equalling four experimental groups). 
Each group carried out the problem solving task for five minutes, followed by five 
minutes on the interpolated task, before a final five minutes revisiting the original 
problem solving task. Findings indicated that an incubation task that uses 
different cognitive resources to the problem solving task is more beneficial 
(measured by an increase in responses after incubation) than a task that uses 
the same resources (Gilhooly et al., 2013). It was proposed by the authors that 
similar tasks would interfere with one another, and that dissimilar tasks allowed 
for the non-conscious processing of the original task whilst conscious processing 
was occupied with a different, unrelated, and non-interfering task. 
This idea appears to be related to theories of divided attention, dual-tasking, and 
interference in memory. As previously discussed in section 2.1.4 (Divided 
Attention), carrying out two tasks simultaneously that use similar cognitive 
resources is more difficult than if the tasks are different, due to the limits on 
processing capacity (Bennett et al., 1998; Wickens, 2002). Furthermore, it has 
been well documented that processing multiple stimuli of a similar nature can lead 
to interference (Keppel & Underwood, 1962) or decay-based forgetting (Brown, 
1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959). Therefore, it stands that completing a 
dissimilar task during the incubation period would prevent a cognitive capacity 
overload, and thus should allow the processing of both tasks to occur at the same 
time. The distinction between the conscious processing of the incubation task 
and the non-conscious processing of the original task is supported as previously 
discussed, as performance on the interpolated activity is equal between those 
within and outwith incubation (Gilhooly et al., 2012; 2013). 
Having presented the leading theories of incubation, it is apparent that although 
these can help towards the understanding of why incubation may be beneficial, 
very little is reported on the cognitive processes that may be involved. It is 
proposed here that attentional control may be an important factor to consider. 
The existing data relating incubation to attention are therefore discussed next.  
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8.2.3 Incubation and Attention 
In relation to attention, for incubation to be most successful it should allow the 
individual’s attentional focus to be diffused so as to facilitate mind-wandering and 
unconscious work (Baird et al., 2012; Ritter & Dijksterhuis, 2014).  
Mind-wandering occurs when thoughts turn from the current task to become 
preoccupied with unrelated memories, fantasies, plans, feelings (Killingsworth & 
Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) and/or unsolved problems (Baird et 
al., 2012). It has been suggested that about 30-50% of an adult’s waking life is 
spent mind-wandering (Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). The relatively 
high frequency of these shifts of attention from external information to unrelated 
internal processes has led to the proposal that mind-wandering is beneficial for 
the cognitive processing of secondary tasks (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Van der Linden & D’Argembeau, 2012). Along these lines, 
if the primary task is cognitively demanding, it is unlikely that mind-wandering will 
occur, as there are very few resources available to accommodate it. Therefore, 
mind-wandering is more likely to take place during a task that does not burden 
cognitive processes; a simple, undemanding task (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006).  
Baird and colleagues (2012) compared the effects of two tasks on the success of 
incubation during a problem solving task. The first task was deemed to be 
cognitively undemanding, and the second cognitively demanding and they were 
carried out during the incubation period. The authors proposed that the 
undemanding task was less reliant on working memory and would therefore allow 
for mind-wandering, which in turn would be beneficial for the production of 
solutions to the problem task set. They also suggested that the cognitively 
demanding task would not allow for mind-wandering, and would therefore have a 
detrimental effect on problem solving ability after incubation. In support of this 
idea, it is established within attention research that if a task is well practised, or 
is easy, this should occupy less processing capacity than a difficult task 
(Kahneman, 1973). This would leave processing space for a secondary task, 
such as the problem needing solved.  
It was found that an undemanding task, which was presumed to enable 
unconscious processing and mind-wandering, better facilitated problem solving 
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than conditions using a demanding incubation task, a period of rest (conscious 
work), and no break from problem solving (Baird et al., 2012). However, the 
authors did not provide an explanation of how the cognitive demand level of each 
task was determined.  
Further evidence has shown that diffused attention, or a tendency towards mind-
wandering, is related to enhanced creativity and creative problem solving (see 
Kasof, 1997). After administering measures of attention and creativity, it has been 
shown that participants who are generally more distracted and more affected by 
irrelevant stimuli, performed better on tasks involving creativity than those who 
were not (e.g., Dykes & McGhie, 1976; Necka, 1999; Rawlings, 1985). In addition, 
individuals with ADHD have been shown to outperform control groups on self-
report measures (White & Shah, 2011) and laboratory based measures (White & 
Shah, 2006) of creativity.  
Within incubation research, Baird and colleagues (2012) and Madjar and Shalley 
(2008) are the only researchers (to the author’s best knowledge) to consider 
attention and focus explicitly. Baird and colleagues (2012) measured by 
questionnaire the participants’ susceptibility to mind-wandering. They found that 
those who were more likely to experience mind-wandering had higher 
uniqueness scores (central to creativity) on the problem solving task they used, 
compared to those less likely to mind-wander. Alternatively, Madjar and Shalley 
(2008) measured self-report focused attention in relation to the tasks the 
participants had just completed, and found that higher levels of attentional focus 
related to better creativity scores. However, they did stipulate that as this 
measure came after creative performance, the answers could have been skewed 
by the participants’ perception of how well they did (i.e., if they believed they had 
performed well, they would rate their attentional focus as higher). 
These did not measure attention performance, but used just self-report 
measures. It was proposed that selective attention or response inhibition could 
have accounted for the relationship between mind-wandering and creative 
performance (Baird et al., 2012), and that future research should further consider 
the effect of attention on incubation in creativity tasks (Madjar & Shalley, 2008). 
These findings indicate that individual differences in attentional control may be a 
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contributing factor to the effects of incubation, and this study aimed to develop 
this idea.  
The prominence of nonconscious work in theories explaining incubation could 
indicate that a core filtering process that controls what information transfers from 
the unconscious to consciousness could be in place. Csikszentmihalyi and 
Sawyer (1995) suggested that this was an internal social filter based on learnt 
assumptions and rules governing the domain or field of the original problem. 
However, perhaps an attentional filter is more plausible, given the importance of 
attention and mind-wandering. This is further explored in the present study, as 
explained in section 8.3.4. 
The methods used within the studies discussed have all been similar, in that there 
is a preferred model for measuring incubation in laboratories, as explained below.  
 
8.3.3 Measuring the Effect of Incubation 
Laboratory studies investigating incubation have typically used the same testing 
paradigm (see Baird et al., 2012; Gilhooly et al., 2013, Olton & Johnson, 1976; 
Patrick, 1986; Sio & Rudowicz, 2007; Snyder et al., 2004). Firstly, participants in 
test conditions carry out a problem solving task, followed by an incubation period, 
before returning to the original task, with each unit lasting for around five minutes. 
The problem solving tasks are usually scored for accuracy (convergent thinking 
tasks) or fluency and/or originality of ideas (if DT tasks are used), which become 
the scores by which pre- and post-incubation effects are measured. Studies 
featuring a control group who only complete the problem solving task without an 
incubation period have stronger validity; however, some studies have omitted this 
(e.g., Snyder et al., 2004). By not including a control group, the researchers 
cannot make inferences about their findings, as other variables such as the 
environment, the type of sample, or individual differences may have contributed 
to the results. 
When assessing the effect of incubation in creativity specifically, it is important to 
ensure that the task used does in fact require the production of creative 
responses. For a task to involve creativity it should instruct the participant to 
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produce novel and unique ideas. This appears to be an inconsistency in the 
literature, as the operational definitions are either different between studies, or 
not explained at all. For example, Ellwood, Pallier, Snyder, and Gallate (2009), 
and Snyder et al. (2004) have outlined the creative process by Wallas (1926) in 
the literature review of their papers, yet their tasks only requested ideas from 
memory, so the concepts of originality or novelty were not required or encouraged  
Within these studies, there was no instruction to think of original, novel, or unique 
ideas, factors that are central to the concept of creativity. When words such as 
these are missing from the instructions, they can become recall or memory tests 
that, by definition, do not contribute to the measurement of creative ability. 
Although this type of instruction may allow for the identification of participants 
who are more creative than others (i.e., those who are more willing and able to 
break the barrier and list unusual uses, rather than realistic or normal uses for 
the item in question), not having explicit instructions can lead to individual 
differences in their assumptions of the task requirements. For example, some 
may believe it is a memory-type task and hence will withhold any creative, 
unusual responses.  
In consideration of the literature, evidence, and paradigms discussed thus far, the 
research project being presented here is detailed below.  
 
8.3.4 Current Study 
As described, periods of incubation can be valuable for problem solving, and it 
has been suggested but not fully investigated in the existing literature that this 
could be due to attentional control. With reflection on the theories here discussed, 
several ideas were incorporated in to the present study.  
To test the relief of fatigue hypothesis, a rest period of incubation was included in 
this study. If there were better improvements in post-incubation problem solving 
for those in the rest group compared to the experimental groups, support for the 
theory would be found. However, this has not been the case in the past (e.g., 
Baird et al., 2012), and is not expected to be the case in this study. 
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Further, a direct method of testing the relief of mindset theory of incubation was 
considered in relation to DT, as a UUT was used as the main creative problem 
solving task. Unhelpful mental sets within a DT UUT would involve the fixation on 
one type or category of response, for example, the use of a tin can as a container, 
leading the participant to list all of the things a tin can could contain. Therefore, a 
direct method of testing this theory was designed by the researcher, and was 
adopted in the present study. This was to measure the flexibility (type of answer) 
of the participants’ responses to a UUT DT task before and after the incubation 
period. A change in the types of ideas produced could indicate that the mental 
set has shifted or broken down. Additionally, by taking a fluency score of the ideas 
before and after the incubation period and considering this in relation to the 
flexibility scores, it was also possible to determine if the number of categories of 
ideas had improved post-incubation. As far as the researcher is aware, this has 
not been done before. 
The intermittent conscious work theory was also tested by openly asking 
participants if they thought about the original problem during the incubation 
period. This has been carried out before, and when explicitly asked if they had 
thought about the problem solving task during incubation, it was found that the 
rate of intermittent deliberations was not related to the participants’ problem 
solving performance (Baird et al., 2012). It is expected that the present study will 
support this finding. This method could also indirectly test the non-conscious work 
hypothesis, as an increase in post-incubation creativity in the absence of reported 
conscious problem solving during the incubation period may indicate that the 
problem was processed non-consciously.  
Additionally, the present study controlled for and measured potential differences 
in attentional control. Including a mind-wandering questionnaire (as in Baird et 
al., 2012), the ASRS-v1.1 (Kessler et al., 2005), as well as tests of sustained, 
divided, and selective attention, could allude to the individual’s attentional control 
and their propensity to distraction. Investigating individual differences in 
attentional control and the effect of these on incubation and creativity has not 
been specifically studied, despite it being mentioned in the literature and 
discussions of previous research. This has left a gap in the research that this 
study will fill. Furthermore, if there are correlations between measures of attention 
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and successful incubation, a case could be made for the role of an attentional 
filter. 
In direct reference to the arguments presented in the previous section, the current 
experiment had clear instructions (based on those from Torrance, 1990) for the 
use of creativity in the production of solutions, ensuring that the test measured 
what it should. As a verbal DT test requires multiple solutions to be produced, this 
was used as it is optimal for measuring improvement in ideas before and after 
the incubation period, it is a common measure of creativity, and the present 
researcher had experience in using it. A convergent thinking task would not be 
appropriate, as once the solution is found, the task is over, and there is no room 
for idea improvement.  
With regard to the existing literature, the researcher’s own past research, and the 
aims discussed, the research question was: are aspects of attentional control 
(mind-wandering, response inhibition, sustained, and divided attention) related to 
incubation success? If so, which aspects and how? 
The hypotheses were: 
H1. There will be a difference in creativity (fluency, flexibility, originality), between 
the different incubation conditions. Specifically, those in the undemanding task 
group will have the best scores post-incubation, in correspondence with the 
previous research discussed (Baird et al., 2012).  
H2. Mind-wandering scores during the incubation periods will correlate positively 
with scores for fluency, flexibility, and originality. 
H3. Incubation will be more successful, based upon better scores in fluency, 
flexibility, and originality of ideas, for those with lower attention (broad attention) 
scores. 
The IV for this study was incubation type. The experiment therefore consisted of 
four conditions: 1) rest incubation - participants had an incubation period where 
they merely rested; 2) undemanding incubation - participants performed an 
undemanding task during incubation, 3) demanding incubation - participants 
performed a demanding task during incubation, and 4) control - no incubation. 
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Before the main study was carried out, a small pilot study was run in order to 
select cognitively undemanding and demanding tasks for the incubation period. 
This pilot study is described next. 
 
5.3 Pilot Study: Identifying the Cognitive Demand of Potential Incubation 
Tasks 
The main study on incubation required an undemanding task and a demanding 
task. Therefore, this pilot study was designed in order to determine the differences 
in perceived cognitive demand of the tasks used by Baird and others (2012), and 
a new additional task created by the researcher.  
Baird and colleagues provided a brief description of their undemanding and 
demanding tasks, and the tasks used in the present study were based on this. 
The stimuli used in the undemanding and demanding tasks were digits from one 
to nine. In the undemanding task, the targets were coloured digits, and the 
response was the ‘e’ key if it was an even number, and the ‘o’ key if it was an odd 
number (zero-back task). In the demanding task, the targets were coloured 
question marks, and the required response was to press the ‘e’ key if the 
preceding digit had been an even number, and the ‘o’ key if it had been an odd 
number (one-back task).  
It was observed that each task may be relatively difficult, as they both required 
fast reaction times and sustained attention. This led to uncertainty on the cognitive 
demand distinction between each task. An additional task was consequently 
created as a comparison, which was intended to be easier than both of the tasks 
used by Baird and colleagues (2012). This task required only a spacebar press in 
response to any coloured digit (target) as opposed to a black digit. Further details 
of these tasks are presented in the methods section below. 
For the purpose of this study, the task created by the researcher is named the 
‘spacebar’ task. The undemanding task as described by Baird and others (2012) 
will be referred to as the ‘zero-back’ task, and the demanding task will be called 
the ‘one-back’ task. The demand of each task increases respectively, and the 
hypotheses reflect this. 
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H1: The spacebar task will be rated easier and less demanding than the zero-
back and the one-back tasks.  
H2: The zero back task will be rated easier and less demanding than the one-
back task, in accordance with Baird and colleagues (2012). 
H3. The one-back task will be rated as more difficult and demanding than both of 
the other tasks. 
 
8.4 Methods 
8.4.1 Design 
A repeated measures design was used as each participant completed all three 
tasks. The order of task completion was counterbalanced to minimise order and 
practice effects. The independent variable was task type: the spacebar response, 
zero-back, and one-back tasks.  
The main DV was the demand/difficulty rating given by the participants to each 
task. Participants were also asked to rate all three tasks in order of cognitive 
demand. This was a secondary DV that was intended to support the findings from 
the first DV. Task performance was not considered as a dependent variable for 
this study, as the aim was only to measure participant’s perception on task 
demand/difficulty. 
 
8.4.2 Participants 
Thirty-four participants, 15 male and 19 female, with an age range of 18 to 82 
years (M = 27.4, SD = 11.6; only one over the age of 52), took part in this study. 
The participants were a collection of students from Edinburgh Napier University, 
as well as the researcher’s colleagues, friends, and family members. 
Convenience sampling was utilised, and calls for participants were advertised 
through participant pool emails and posters. The testing session took place in an 
office at Edinburgh Napier University.  
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8.4.3 Materials 
An information sheet and consent form were provided before the tasks began, 
and a debrief sheet was provided at the end of the session. 
Each incubation task was created using software program E-Prime 2.0 and 
required a computer and keyboard. All three tasks contained the same non-target 
stimuli, which were black digits from one to nine, in ‘Courier New’ font style, size 
18. The digits were displayed in a random order and were presented in the centre 
of a plain white computer screen for 1000ms each, followed by a fixation cross 
for 1500ms. Each task lasted for 4.5 minutes in total, with target stimuli presented 
in a random order on 20% of the trials, and non-target stimuli appearing for 80% 
of trials. It would be possible to record reaction time (in response to targets) and 
accuracy rates in terms of both omission and commission scores; however this 
function was not necessary at this stage.  
The target stimuli for the spacebar task were red digits, which were presented at 
the same pace and with the same properties as the non-targets. Participants were 
instructed to press the spacebar on the keyboard as soon as possible when a 
target appeared, and not to respond to any black digits (see figure 19). This was 
designed to be a very easy task that did not require much cognitive effort by the 
participant other than sustaining attention and distinguishing the colour red from 
black (the number was irrelevant in this case). Indeed, it is well documented that 
humans are very efficient at recognising colour, especially identifying one colour 
in amongst numerous stimuli of another colour, as this is an automatic, pre-
attentive process (Ansorge & Horstmann, 2007 (review); Eriksen, 1953) It was 
proposed that the ease of this task would be optimal for mind-wandering, which 
was the purpose of using an easy/undemanding task during part two of this study. 
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Figure 19: Illustration of the spacebar task and the zero-back task. 
 
For the zero-back task, the target stimuli were again red digits, appearing in the 
same manner as they did in the spacebar task (and also illustrated in figure 19). 
This time, the participants were required to determine whether the target was an 
even (by pressing the ‘e’ key) or odd (by pressing the ‘o’ key) number. The 
participants were again requested to respond as quickly as they could. Baird et 
al. (2012) called this their ‘undemanding task’ and determined that as it was 
undemanding, it would be easy for participants to allow their minds to wander. 
However, the quick decision-making nature of the task may not be undemanding, 
therefore limiting mind-wandering opportunities. Furthermore, Hines (1990) 
reported that identifying a number as odd takes more time than even numbers. 
This indicates that this is not an automatic task, as time and thought are required 
to make an accurate distinction.  
The one-back task followed the example of Baird and colleagues’ (2012) 
‘demanding task’, which was designed to be cognitively challenging. The targets 
were red question marks (?), red digits or black question marks did not appear 
(see figure 20). When a target was presented, the participants were instructed to 
determine whether the previously displayed number was even or odd, using the 
same response keys as described for the zero-back task. This meant that the 
participant had to pay attention to every number displayed, in case the target 
followed it. N-back tasks are frequently used in the exploration of working 
memory, attention, and cognitive load, with RT increasing and capacity 
decreasing as n increases (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier, 2010; Kane, 
Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 2007). As this task required continuous thinking and 
decision making, it was hypothesised that this task would not allow for mind-
wandering (as in Baird et al., 2012) and would be rated as difficult by the 
participants.  
+             
(1500ms)
+             
(1500ms)
+             
(1500ms)
+             
(1500ms)
nontarget 
(1000ms)
nontarget 
(1000ms)
target 
(1000ms)
nontarget 
(1000ms)
nontarget 
(1000ms)
Trial 
Events 
4 2 7 5 1
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Figure 20: Illustration of the one-back task. 
 
Following each task, the participants were given a post-task questionnaire in 
order to measure how difficult they found the task to be, and if they thought mind-
wandering would be possible during the completion of the tasks. There were three 
questions and each had five answer options as shown in figure 21. 
 
              
1. How difficult would you rate the task that you have just completed?     
  Very Easy Easy 
Neither Easy or 
Difficult 
Difficult Very Difficult 
  
              
              
2. 
How much of your concentration do you think was required in order to complete this task 
correctly?   
  
No 
concentration 
was required 
A little of my 
concentration 
was required 
Some of my 
concentration 
was required 
Most of my 
concentration 
was required 
All of my 
concentration 
was required   
              
              
3. It would be possible to complete this task whilst allowing my mind to wander/daydream:   
  Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree   
              
              
Figure 21: Post-Task Questionnaire 
 
 
Each answer option was scored from one to five, from left to right, and these 
scores were summed to make a total score per task. A score of three would 
indicate that a task was very easy, no concentration was required to complete it, 
and it was possible to mind-wander during completion, and a score of 15 would 
indicate the opposite result for each question.  
+             
(1500ms)
+             
(1500ms)
+             
(1500ms)
+             
(1500ms)
nontarget 
(1000ms)
nontarget 
(1000ms)
target 
(1000ms)
nontarget 
(1000ms)
nontarget 
(1000ms)
Trial 
Events 
4 2 ? 5 1
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After all of the three tasks and the corresponding post-task questionnaires had 
been completed, the final questionnaire was issued (see figure 22). 
 
                  
1. Gender:  Male   Female       
                  
2. Age:               
                  
3. Please rate the tasks in order of cognitive demand, from the least demanding (1) to 
the most demanding (3): 
  
    
    Task A: Spacebar response for red numbers   
    Task B: Even ('e') or Odd ('o') response for red numbers   
    Task C: Question mark Even ('e') or Odd ('o') response for previous number   
                  
4.  Do you have any comments about the demand level of the computer tasks?   
                  
5.  Do you have any further comments about the tasks in general?   
                  
                  
Figure 22: Final Questionnaire 
 
Questions one and two were included to gain demographic information. Question 
three was important for this study as it explicitly asks participants to compare the 
cognitive demand for each task to the others. Used in combination with the results 
from each post-task questionnaire, it was possible to distinguish the easiest task 
and hardest task according to the opinions of the participants. Questions four and 
five were asked in order for any comments to be made that might benefit the 
research in the next stage.  
 
8.4.4 Procedure 
The participants were provided with an information sheet, and informed consent 
was sought prior to the commencement of the experiment. The testing session 
consisted of a one-to-one format, which allowed the participant to ask the 
researcher any questions that they may have had. Before each task began, on 
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screen instructions were presented that explained how the test would work, how 
long it would last, and how the participant should respond. The instructions stayed 
on the screen for as long as they were required, which ensured that participants 
had sufficient time to read and understand them. Each task was followed by a 
post-task questionnaire in order to determine task difficulty, and to encourage the 
participants to provide feedback on each task that could be taken forward. When 
all three tasks were completed, the participants were provided with the final 
questionnaire and a debrief sheet, and were thanked for their time. 
 
8.5 Results 
The results are based on the responses given by the 34 participants. The DVs 
were the participants’ rating of demand/difficulty for the tasks, as determined by 
post-task questionnaires. Table 10 shows the descriptive statistics for each task.  
 
Table 10: Mean, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum scores for each task as 
measured by the post-task questionnaires. 
  Mean SD Min. Max. 
Spacebar task 5.97 1.49 3 9 
Zero-back task 9.79 1.30 7 12 
One-back task 10.26 1.71 6 13 
 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the differences between the scores 
were statistically significant: F(1.64,53.97) = 152.740, p < .001, Ƞ²p =.822: large 
effect size. To ascertain where exactly the differences were, Bonferroni pairwise 
comparisons were produced, as displayed in figure 23. 
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Figure 23: Significant differences in perceived task difficulty. 
** indicates significance at 99% confidence level. 
 
There were significant differences between the perceived difficulty scores of the 
first (spacebar and zero-back: p < .001) and second (spacebar and one-back: p 
< .001) comparisons. However, the difference in difficulty scores between the 
zero-back and the one-back tasks was not significant (p = .072). 
In reference to the final questionnaire, participants were asked to rank the tasks 
in order of cognitive demand, with ‘1’ being the least demanding, and ‘3’ being 
the most demanding.  
 
Table 11: Cognitive demand rankings by number of participants. 
  
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 
Spacebar task 33 1 0 
Zero-back task 1 27 6 
One-back task 0 6 28 
Rank 1 = least demanding, Rank 3 = most demanding. 
 
** 
** 
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Thirty-three participants indicated that they thought the spacebar task was the 
least demanding task, with one suggesting that this was the case for the zero-
back task. Twenty-seven participants thought that the zero-back task came 
second, meaning they thought it was more demanding than the spacebar task, 
and six participants rated it as the most demanding task. The one-back task was 
rated the most demanding task by 28 participants. 
A Friedman test determined that there was a statistically significant difference in 
the rankings of the three tasks: χ2 (2) = 55.824, p < .001. Post hoc analysis with 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied 
(Field, 2013), meaning the significance level was set at p = .017 (.05 divided by 
three, as three comparisons are made). The differences in rankings were found 
to be significant for each pair: the spacebar and zero-back tasks (Z = -5.202, p < 
.001), the spacebar and one-back tasks (Z = -5.427, p < .001), and the zero-back 
and one-back tasks (Z = -3.781, p < .001). 
There were no relevant extra comments made by any participants. 
 
8.6 Discussion 
The results indicate that all of the hypotheses can be supported, as the spacebar 
task was perceived as significantly easier than the zero-back and one-back tasks, 
and the one-back task had the highest difficulty score. In support of these mean 
scores, the spacebar task was ranked as the easiest by all but one of the 
participants, and the one-back task was rated the most difficult by 82.4% of the 
participants.  
The purpose of this short study was twofold. Firstly, the results would determine 
which two tasks, the easiest and the hardest, would be used in the larger 
incubation study. This first point could be answered easily. As the participants’ 
opinions were that the spacebar task was the easiest, and the one-back task was 
the hardest, they were both carried forward and used as incubation tasks in the 
next study.  
Secondly, the study was conducted to challenge the assumptions made by Baird 
and colleagues (2012) that their tasks differed in terms of cognitive demand, with 
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one being ‘undemanding’ (zero-back), and the other being ‘demanding’ (one-
back). The results show that indeed, the participants found the tasks by Baird and 
others (2012) to both be relatively difficult, and both were considered cognitively 
demanding. The difference between the mean difficulty scores for these two tasks 
was not significant. The argument that the ‘undemanding’ task allowed for mind-
wandering (Baird et al., 2012) is therefore called into question. This means that 
the differences that the authors reportedly found between the ‘demanding’ and 
‘undemanding’ incubation conditions may be due to another factor or variable that 
was not measured or considered. 
The results from the pilot study inform the main study. The spacebar and one-
back tasks were taken forward and used as the ‘undemanding’ and ‘demanding’ 
tasks respectively. 
 
8.7 The Role of Attentional Control in Incubation 
Following the successful completion of the pilot study, the main incubation study 
was carried out in consideration of the aims, hypotheses, and justifications 
discussed in the literature review of this chapter. 
 
8.8 Methods 
8.8.1 Design 
The study had a between-subjects design. The dependent variables were the 
fluency, flexibility, and originality scores of the ideas produced by the participants 
during an UUT-TC, according to the scoring guidelines provided by Torrance 
(1990). The independent variable was incubation type, which had four levels: 1. 
Rest, 2. Undemanding task, 3. Demanding task, and 4. No incubation. This 
allowed for the use of a between-subjects ANOVA in the statistical investigation. 
Correlational analyses and ANCOVAs were also performed to determine which 
measures of attention related to creative problem solving and incubation success. 
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8.8.2 Participants 
There were 101 participants in this study, who were students at Edinburgh Napier 
University or members of the general public. Eleven participants did not provide 
their gender and age information. Of the other 90 participants, there were 19 
males, 71 females, and the mean age of the sample was 27.4 years (min. = 18, 
max. = 82, SD = 11.08). The control group consisted of 26 participants, and each 
of the three other groups contained 25 participants.  
The participants were recruited with the use of posters, internet advertising on 
social media and Gumtree, and opportunity sampling. The Psychology 
department participant pool was also used during recruitment, which involved 
emailing students who had previously indicated their interest in taking part in 
psychological research.  
 
8.8.3 Materials 
An information sheet (appendix 16.3) and consent form (appendix 17) were 
provided before the test session, and a debrief sheet (appendix19.3) was 
provided afterwards. Overall, there were ten tasks for participants to complete.  
Questionnaires. Three questionnaires featured within the testing session as 
measures of self-report attentional control: the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale 
(ASRS-v1.1: Kessler et al., 2005), the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire (MWQ: 
Mrazek et al., 2013), and the Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS: Giambria, 
1993), as described in section 4.3.1. The responses to the MWQ and DDFS were 
analysed for reliability3. The MWQ returned a Cronbach’s alpha of .738, and the 
DDFS had a Cronbach’s alpha score of .928. These scores indicate strong inter-
item reliability. 
Attention Measures. There were three further tests of attention. The CPT 
measured sustained attention by recording spacebar responses to a red square 
target amongst distractors over a 12-minute period. Using a measure of sustained 
attention should indicate how well individuals remain focused by extracting 
                                            
3 The scoring of the ASRS does not allow for reliability analysis in this study, but this has been 
previously researched by others. See section 4.3.1 for details.  
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reaction times, and omission and commission rates. The Stroop task measured 
selective attention and response inhibition over congruent and incongruent 
word/colour trials. Measuring selective attention in an incubation study was 
suggested (but not carried out) by Baird and colleagues (2012) and should 
indicate the strength of an individual’s response inhibition and attentional control. 
Those with strong attentional control and who can focus well should have quicker 
reaction times, and a smaller difference between congruent and incongruent 
conditions than those who have less control and are more distracted in nature. 
The dual-task measured divided attention by comparing single and dual task 
performance on number list repetition and maze tracking. Divided attention is one 
of the most difficult cognitive processes (Bennett et al., 1998), and measuring 
dual-tasking ability allows further inferences to be made about how well 
individuals can control and manage their attentional resources. Each of these 
measures are described in full in section 4.3.3.  
Creativity Measure. To measure creative problem solving, the tin can version of 
the UUT (UUT-TC; section 4.3.2) was used. This was scored for fluency, 
flexibility, and originality according to the guidelines provided by Torrance (1990). 
A test of DT such as this has been found to be more suited to incubation than 
convergent thinking tasks as it allows for further responses to be added, and does 
not end with one correct answer (Baird et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; 
Snyder et al., 2004). This would cut short or prolong a testing session, depending 
on the participant’s ability to solve the problem. The UUT-TC was carried out for 
five minutes in total. Snyder and colleagues (2004) found that five minutes was 
an optimal time for a UUT-TC, and that there was no benefit to having more time. 
Additionally, by keeping to a five-minute completion time, comparisons could be 
made to the results of the same task in the researcher’s first study, which also 
lasted for five minutes, if required. 
Immediately after their incubation period, participants in the experimental 
conditions (rest, undemanding, and demanding task groups) were provided with 
a post-incubation questionnaire (PIQ) to complete (see figure 24). Those in the 
rest condition were presented with questions one and two only, with the words 
‘completing this task’ changed to ‘resting’. The completion of the PIQ took 
approximately 30 seconds (15 seconds for post-rest questionnaire). In reference 
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to the results of the pilot study, the spacebar task was used as the undemanding 
incubation task, and the one-back task was the demanding task, each lasting 4 
minutes and 30 seconds. The rest period lasted for 4 minutes and 45 seconds, 
meaning that each incubation period lasted for five minutes. 
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Think about the computer task you have just completed. 
Please answer the following questions honestly. Indicate your response to each statement by ticking 
the one box that best describes your answer.   
1. Did you day-dream/mind-wander whilst you were completing the task?   
  I don't know No, not at all 
Yes, but only a 
little 
Yes, for about 
half of the time 
Yes, throughout 
most of the task   
              
              
2. Did you try to think of more ideas for the Tin Can task whilst you were completing the task?   
  I don't know No, not at all 
Yes, but only a 
little 
Yes, for about 
half of the time 
Yes, throughout 
most of the task   
              
              
3. How difficult would you rate the task that you have just completed?     
  Very Easy Easy 
Neither Easy or 
Difficult 
Difficult Very Difficult 
  
              
              
4. 
How much of your concentration do you think was required in order to complete this task 
correctly?   
  
No concentration 
was required 
A little of my 
concentration 
was required 
Some of my 
concentration 
was required 
Most of my 
concentration 
was required 
All of my 
concentration 
was required   
              
              
5. It would be possible to complete this task whilst allowing my mind to wander/daydream:   
  Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree   
              
              
Figure 24: Post-Incubation Questionnaire 
 
These questions were asked in order to test the intermittent conscious work 
theory, and to look for relationships between the answers to the questions and 
idea originality. This questionnaire was presented after every completion of the 
undemanding/demanding tasks, even when they were not used in the incubation 
period (i.e., as part of the additional tasks, post-UUT-TC). This information was 
used to check if there were between-group differences in perceived task demand.  
 
8.8.4 Procedure 
Below (table 12) is a summary of the tasks the participants took part in, according 
to condition.  
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Table 12: Illustration of experimental procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Time                 
  ≈ 5mins 2.5mins 5mins   2.5mins ≈ 35mins           
Rest Questionnaires UUT Rest + PIQ UUT Undemanding task, demanding task, CPT, Stroop, dual-task. 
                  
Undemanding Task Questionnaires UUT Spacebar Task + PIQ UUT Demanding task, CPT, Stroop, dual-task. 
                 
Demanding Task Questionnaires UUT One-back Task + PIQ UUT Undemanding task, CPT, Stroop, dual-task. 
 ≈ 5mins 5mins  ≈ 35mins             
Control Questionnaires UUT Undemanding task, demanding task, CPT, Stroop, dual-task.     
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Each testing session lasted around 50 minutes, and took place in a computer 
laboratory at Edinburgh Napier University. The participants read an information 
sheet and signed their informed consent to take part in the study. Each session 
across all four conditions began with the completion of the ASRS-v1.1, DDFS, 
and MWQ. 
Instructions for the UUT-TC were given following the questionnaires and any 
questions the participants may have had about the task were answered. 
After 2.5 minutes on the UUT-TC, those in the experimental groups all had a five 
minute incubation period, before they returned to the task again for a further 2.5 
minutes. Incubation periods of three (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006), four (Gilhooly 
et al., 2012), five (Gilhooly et al., 2013), and 12 (Baird et al., 2012) minutes have 
featured in the studies that influenced this one, and it appears that there is little 
general consensus on how long an incubation period should be (Sio & Ormerod, 
2009). Responses pre-incubation were written on side one of the UUT-TC sheet, 
and responses post-incubation were written on side two: the instructions were 
displayed on both sides of the task sheet.  
The participants were aware from the instructions that there would be a break 
before they returned to the original task again. It has been argued that allowing 
participants this knowledge of return increases ecological validity, as in normal 
problem solving situations, individuals would be aware that they had not 
completed the task yet. Furthermore, if this instruction is not given overtly, it may 
lead to individual differences in expectation, as some may believe the task is over 
and some may not (Gilhooly et al., 2013). 
Those in the rest condition sat in silence, doing nothing, for the length of their 
4.75-minute incubation period, followed by the PIQ (15 seconds). The 
undemanding, demanding, CPT, Stroop, and dual tasks were provided to those 
in the rest and control groups after the UUT-TC, in a semi-random order, to study 
performance on these measures by all participants involved. These participants 
were explicitly told that they would not be returning to the UUT-TC. 
Individuals in the demanding and undemanding conditions followed the same 
pattern of events as those in the rest condition; however, the incubation periods 
were spent carrying out the undemanding task or the demanding task (4.5 
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minutes), followed by the PIQ (30 seconds), before returning to the UUT-TC. The 
task that was not used in their incubation period (i.e., the demanding task for the 
undemanding condition) was provided after the second phase of creative problem 
solving was complete, along with the Stroop task, the CPT, and the dual task, 
meaning that all of the participants completed every measure used. This allowed 
the researcher to ensure that performance on each task was consistent 
regardless of condition and to measure differences in attentional control across 
the sample. After the full completion of the UUT-TC, and before participants 
carried out any remaining attention measures, they were clearly informed that the 
creative problem solving task was finished and would not be returned to. 
The control group had no incubation break, meaning participants continued work 
on the UUT-TC for five minutes. They were however, asked to turn the page after 
2.5 minutes, and to continue the task on the opposite side.  
The raw data were scored according to the details provided in section 4.3. 
 
8.9 Results 
The results of this study are relatively high on statistical power given the small 
sample size of each experimental group. Post-hoc power analysis produced 
values ranging from .85 to .99 for the tests involving fluency, (M = .95, SD = .07), 
.60 to .99 for flexibility (M = .85, SD = .18), .05 to .16 for originality (M = .10, SD 
= .06), and .39 to .94 for the percentage original ideas tests (M = .73, SD = .26). 
With the exception of originality where the power values are particularly low, 
these values meet, or a very close to, the recommendation of .8 from Field (2013). 
This means that the chances of finding true significant results given the effect 
size are high (e.g., Button et al., 2013). However, there is still variability in the 
power scores, and the results for the dependent variable of originality in particular 
should be treated with caution.   
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8.9.1 The Incubation Effect: Results 
Hypothesis one was: there will be a difference in creativity (fluency, flexibility, 
originality), between the different incubation conditions. Specifically, those 
completing the undemanding task will have the best scores post-incubation.  
The means and SDs of the creativity scores, by group, are shown in table 13. 
 
Table 13: Mean scores with standard deviations for the creative problem solving task. 
    Pre-incubation Post-incubation 
    M SD M SD 
Fluency 
Rest 9.64 2.87 6.84 2.44 
Undemanding 9.76 4.75 6.48 3.07 
Demanding 9.56 4.10 7.08 3.79 
Control 9.96 3.50 6.19 3.11 
Flexibility 
Rest 6.88 2.09 4.69 2.05 
Undemanding 6.92 2.86 5.36 1.89 
Demanding 7.40 3.03 5.04 2.32 
Control 6.81 2.45 5.44 2.02 
Originality 
Rest 3.60 2.50 3.48 2.02 
Undemanding 3.56 2.86 3.44 2.69 
Demanding 3.56 2.20 3.12 2.09 
Control 3.15 2.26 2.81 1.63 
Percentage 
of Original 
Ideas  
Rest 35.09 18.14 50.56 22.64 
Undemanding 32.56 18.61 50.41 29.33 
Demanding 36.88 14.68 45.23 18.55 
Control 31.95 17.33 47.27 23.27 
 
In order to identify any effects of incubation, the experimental condition, and for 
any interactions, mixed ANOVAs were run, where the within-subjects variables 
were the pre- and post-incubation scores and the between subjects variable was 
the experimental group. There was one ANOVA per dependent variable (fluency, 
flexibility, originality, and percentage of original ideas). There were significant 
differences found pre- and post-incubation on total scores for fluency, flexibility, 
and percentage of original ideas, although not for originality alone.  
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From pre- to post-incubation, there were significant decreases in fluency scores 
(F (1,97) = 125.732, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .565: large effect size) and flexibility scores 
(F (1,97) = 75.932, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .439: large effect size). There was a significant 
increase in percentage of original ideas, as proportionally more ideas were 
original at post-incubation measurement: (F (1,74) = 24.231, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .247: 
large effect size). However, there were no significant differences in originality 
scores pre- and post-incubation (F (1,97) = 1.567, p = .214). Across all of these 
creativity variables, there were no significant main effects for experimental 
condition (all Fs < .448, p > .05), and there were no significant interactions 
between incubation scores and experimental condition (all Fs < 1.062, p > .05). 
Additionally, across the experimental groups, of the ideas produced post-
incubation, 62.3% (SD = 21.76%) belonged to additional, new flexibility 
categories not used pre-incubation.  
As reported, there were no pre- and post-incubation between-group differences 
in fluency, flexibility, originality, or in added flexibility scores or the percentage of 
original ideas. There were also no differences in UUT-TC performance between 
the control group and the experimental group as a whole. 
 
8.9.2 Mind-Wandering During Incubation and the Effect on Creativity: Results 
The second hypothesis was: levels of mind-wandering during the incubation 
periods will correlate with better scores for fluency, flexibility, and originality. 
Participants in the experimental groups were explicitly asked if they allowed their 
minds to wander during their incubation period, 67 (89.33%) stated that they did, 
and six (8%) did not (the remaining 2 (3.67%) were unsure). The maximum score 
possible was three, the means are shown in table 14.  
 
Table 14: Table of means for mind-wandering rates during incubation. 
Group Mean SD 
Rest 2.20 0.91 
Undemanding 1.64 0.76 
Demanding 1.00 0.58 
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Using a one-way ANOVA (mind-wandering during incubation score X condition), 
it was found that the amount of self-report mind-wandering was significantly 
different between-groups (F (2,72) = 15.540, p < .001, Ƞ²p = .302: large effect 
size), with the rest group allowing their minds to wander the most, and the 
demanding task group the least. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons indicated that 
there were significant differences between each condition, as shown in figure 25. 
 
Figure 25: Pairwise comparisons of within incubation mind-wandering. 
* indicates significance at 95% confidence level. ** indicates significance at 99% confidence 
level. 
 
Pearson correlational analyses indicated that self-reported mind-wandering 
during incubation was related to an increase in new categories of ideas post-
incubation (i.e., additional flexibility categories that did not appear pre-
incubation): r = .250, p = .030, but was unrelated to the other measures of creative 
problem-solving. 
Participants were also asked if they consciously attempted to generate further 
solutions to the UUT-TC during their incubation period, with 46 (61%) stating that 
they did consider the UUT-TC, and 29 (39%) saying they did not. Once again, 
the maximum score was three, and the means are shown below in table 15. 
* 
* 
** 
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Table 15: Table of means for UUT-TC consideration rates during incubation. 
Group Mean SD 
Rest 2.16 0.94 
Undemanding 1.32 1.22 
Demanding 0.36 0.64 
 
Between-group differences, determined by one-way ANOVA (‘task consideration’ 
X condition), were also found for this measure (F (2,72) = 21.937, p < .001, Ƞ²p = 
.379: large effect size). The pairwise comparisons are illustrated in figure 26, and 
show that there were significant differences between each comparison, with the 
rest group thinking of the UUT-TC the most, and the demanding group the least. 
 
Figure 26: Pairwise comparisons of within incubation UUT-TC consideration scores. 
** indicates significance at 99% confidence level. 
 
 
This continued task deliberation was also significantly related to the number of 
added flexibility categories post-incubation (r = .261, p =.024), but was unrelated 
to fluency and originality (p > .05). 
** 
** 
** 
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Self-reported mind-wandering (from the incubation task) and UUT-TC 
consideration during incubation were predictably related to each other (r = .451, 
p < .001), but they did not relate to any other measure of attention (i.e., self-report, 
selective, sustained, and divided attention; all p > .05). 
As with the pilot study, a paired-sample t-test determined that the demanding task 
(M = 6.23, SD = 2.37) was rated as significantly more difficult than the 
undemanding task (M = 4.19, SD = 1.41): t(100) = -9.643, p < .001, d = 1.046: 
large effect size. There were no significant differences in performance on the 
incubation tasks (undemanding task t(74) = -.520, p = .605, demanding task: t(74) 
= 1.933, p = .057) between those completing the tasks during incubation and 
those not.  
 
8.9.3 Incubation and Attention: Analysis of Covariance 
For the following regressions and ANCOVA analysis, guidance from Field (2013) 
was used. When each of the attentional factors (i.e., scores on the ASRS-v1.1, 
DDFS, MWQ, CPT, Stroop test, Dual-task, mind-wandering during incubation, 
and tin-can consideration during incubation) were entered in to a multiple linear 
regression, it was found that altogether, they accounted for 8.3% of the variance 
in overall fluency (adjusted R2 = .083, F(8, 47) = 1.620, p = .145, beta = -.244 to 
.277), 1.7% of the variance in overall flexibility (adjusted R2 = .017, F(8, 47) = 
1.117, p = .370, beta = -.176 to .224), and 2.8% of the variance in overall 
originality (adjusted R2 = .028, F(8, 47) = 1.200, p = .320, beta = -.146 to .206). 
As each produced a non-significant result, the attention measures collectively do 
not predict creativity scores. 
In order to investigate the effect that attention measures play in explaining 
incubation effects, factorial Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was carried out to 
test if any of the attention measures could predict creativity when they were 
controlled for.4 A significant ANCOVA would suggest that there could be an effect 
                                            
4 ANCOVAs were not carried out in the study investigating the relationship between creativity and 
attention (chapter six), as to control for attention would remove the benefit of including an ADHD 
comparison group. 
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of the attention variable covariate on the creativity scores. For those that were 
significant, the contribution that the attention variable made to the creativity score 
is specified (R2), as determined through the calculation of simple univariate linear 
regression (as recommended by Field, 2013).  
The ANCOVA results are presented in table 16. The significant results are 
indicated by accompanying effect sizes and R2 value. 
In summary of the significant findings, performance on the ASRS-v1.1, the Stroop 
task, and the dual-task separately and significantly predicted fluency, flexibility, 
and originality scores overall. These were the only cases of attention scores 
predicting an originality score. UUT-TC consideration during the incubation 
period could also significantly predict fluency and flexibility scores overall, but not 
originality scores.  
Each measure (with the exception of the CPT and dual-task) significantly 
predicted pre- and post-incubation scores for fluency and flexibility. The dual-task 
was found to predict pre- and post-incubation scores for fluency only. The CPT 
had no significant ANCOVA results.  
Controlling for each aspect of attention did not lead to between-group differences 
in creativity, showing that there truly was no effect of the experimental condition. 
Furthermore, there were no significant interactions between pre- and post-
incubation scores and condition, when the attention variables were controlled for. 
 
 
 
. 
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Table 16: ANCOVA results using attention measures as covariates. 
 
(Continued on next page) 
Covariate DT Aspect ANCOVA Test of Effects F df p Ƞ² p Effect Size R²
ASRS 5.010 1, 96 .028 0.050 small/medium .022
Pre/Post Incubation 38.039 1, 96 .001 0.284 large Pre: .014, Post: .054
Condition 0.016 3, 96 .997
Interaction 1.052 3, 96 .373
ASRS 4.984 1, 96 .028 0.049 small/medium .031
Pre/Post Incubation 9.686 1, 96 .002 0.092 medium/large Pre: .000, Post: .014
Condition 0.354 3, 96 .786
Interaction 0.436 3, 96 .727
ASRS 7.563 1, 96 .007 0.073 medium .036
Pre/Post Incubation 3.881 1, 96 .052
Condition 0.283 3, 96 .838
Interaction 0.151 3, 96 .929
DDFS 0.616 1, 96 .435
Pre/Post Incubation 30.014 1, 96 .001 0.238 large Pre: .074, Post: .032
Condition 0.029 3, 96 .993
Interaction 0.899 3, 96 .444
DDFS 1.029 1, 96 .313
Pre/Post Incubation 8.855 1, 96 .004 0.084 medium/large Pre: .005, Post: .019
Condition 0.399 3, 96 .754
Interaction 0.303 3, 96 .823
DDFS 0.349 1, 96 .556
Pre/Post Incubation 1.328 1, 96 .252
Condition 0.106 3, 96 .956
Interaction 0.656 3, 96 .420
MWQ 0.244 1, 96 .623
Pre/Post Incubation 15.147 1, 96 .001 0.138 large Pre: .000, Post: .018
Condition 0.018 3, 96 .997
Interaction 0.794 3, 96 .500
MWQ 0.849 1, 96 .359
Pre/Post Incubation 4.351 1, 96 .040 0.044 small/medium Pre: .006, Post: .015
Condition 0.340 3, 96 .797
Interaction 0.257 3, 96 .856
MWQ 1.274 1, 96 .262
Pre/Post Incubation 3.312 1, 96 .072
Condition 0.301 3, 96 .824
Interaction 0.171 3, 96 .909
CPT 0.230 1, 96 .633
Pre/Post Incubation 0.006 1, 96 .939
Condition 0.168 3, 96 .918
Interaction 0.807 3, 96 .494
CPT 0.091 1, 96 .764
Pre/Post Incubation 0.772 1, 96 .382
Condition 0.298 3, 96 .827
Interaction 0.404 3, 96 .750
CPT 0.109 1, 96 .742
Pre/Post Incubation 0.006 1, 96 .941
Condition 0.774 3, 96 .512
Interaction 0.156 3, 96 .926
Stroop Task 4.129 1, 96 .045 0.043 small/medium .020
Pre/Post Incubation 126.988 1, 96 .001 0.580 large Pre: .040, Post: .029
Condition 0.158 3, 96 .924
Interaction 0.674 3, 96 .570
Stroop Task 4.003 1, 96 .048 0.042 small/medium .060
Pre/Post Incubation 74.171 1, 96 .001 0.446 large Pre: .036, Post: .016
Condition 0.590 3, 96 .623
Interaction 0.302 3, 96 .824
Stroop Task 7.062 1, 96 .001 0.736 large .039
Pre/Post Incubation 1.732 1, 96 .191
Condition 0.850 3, 96 .470
Interaction 0.140 3, 96 .936
Selective Attention: 
Stroop Task
Fluency
Flexibility
Originality
Mind Wandering 
Questionnaire
Fluency
Flexibility
Originality
Sustained Attention: 
Continuous 
Perfromance Task
Fluency
Flexibility
Originality
Fluency
Flexibility
Originality
Adult ADHD Self-
Report Scale - v1.1
Daydreaming 
Frequency Scale
Fluency
Flexibility
Originality
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8.10 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to determine which aspects of attentional control 
(ADHD symptoms, daydreaming, mind-wandering, selective, sustained, and 
divided attention) were related to incubation success. Furthermore, the 
experimental manipulation was designed to improve incubation by using an 
undemanding interpolated task, and diminish it using a cognitively demanding 
task. 
 
8.10.1 The Incubation Effect 
The results indicate that the first hypothesis cannot be supported, as there were 
no significant differences in creative problem solving scores between any of the 
groups. In every group, mean scores on fluency, flexibility, and originality reduced 
Covariate DT Aspect ANCOVA Test of Effects F df p Ƞ² p Effect Size R²
Dual-task 4.799 1, 96 .031 0.048 small/medium .048
Pre/Post Incubation 6.022 1, 96 .016 0.059 medium Pre: .050 Post: .030
Condition 0.032 3, 96 .992
Interaction 1.067 3, 96 .367
Dual-task 5.540 1, 96 .000 0.257 large .053
Pre/Post Incubation 0.587 1, 96 .445
Condition 0.470 3, 96 .704
Interaction 0.348 3, 96 .791
Dual-task 8.469 1, 96 .004 0.081 medium .077
Pre/Post Incubation 0.002 1, 96 .965
Condition 0.542 3, 96 .655
Interaction 0.159 3, 96 .924
MW during Incubation 1.856 1, 71 .177
Pre/Post Incubation 16.554 1, 71 .001 0.189 large Pre: .010, Post: .020
Condition 0.361 2, 71 .699
Interaction 0.597 2, 71 .553
MW during Incubation 1.520 1, 71 .222
Pre/Post Incubation 13.629 1, 71 .001 0.161 large Pre: .001, Post: .021
Condition 0.750 2, 71 .476
Interaction 0.079 2, 71 .924
MW during Incubation 0.377 1, 71 .541
Pre/Post Incubation 0.449 1, 71 .505
Condition 0.007 2, 71 .993
Interaction 0.105 2, 71 .900
UUT during Incubation 4.152 1, 71 .045 0.055 medium .008
Pre/Post Incubation 28.98 1, 71 .001 0.290 large Pre: .022, Post: .034
Condition 0.903 2, 71 .410
Interaction 0.543 2, 71 .584
UUT during Incubation 7.319 1, 71 .009 0.093 medium/large .035
Pre/Post Incubation 17.849 1, 71 .001 0.201 large Pre: .023, Post: .053
Condition 2.322 2, 71 .106
Interaction 0.286 2, 71 .752
UUT during Incubation 2.803 1, 71 .098
Pre/Post Incubation 0.314 1, 71 .577
Condition 0.302 2, 71 .740
Interaction 0.166 2, 71 .848
Divided Attention: 
Dual-Task
Fluency
Flexibility
Originality
Mind Wandering 
during Incubation
Fluency
Flexibility
Originality
Consideration of the 
Unusual Uses Task 
during Incubation
Fluency
Flexibility
Originality
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after incubation, or after the first 2.5 minutes in the case of the control group. This 
does not corroborate with previous research that has found an improvement in 
creativity post-incubation.  
However, in contrast, one of the main findings is that of the ideas produced post-
incubation, a significantly higher percentage of them were original compared to 
those listed in part one, highlighting a benefit of taking a break from the problem-
solving task. This is not an improvement of pure originality, meaning there was 
not a quantitative increase in the number of original ideas, as fluency also 
decreased. So, there were fewer UUT-TC solutions, but a significantly higher 
proportion of them were original compared to those produced pre-incubation.  
This could illustrate that the ability to think of original responses comes after the 
unoriginal ideas have been written down and cleared from processing, and/or 
after the task has become familiar. Firstly, the ideas that immediately come to 
mind when the task is set may fill the available cognitive capacity, meaning there 
is no processing space to allow the exploration of new ideas. The proposal that it 
is necessary to clear the immediate responses from processing in order to 
generate more unusual ideas corroborates with the relief of mindset theory 
(Posner, 1973 in Snyder et al., 2004), as well as with theories of limited capacity 
in both attention (see Broadbent, 1958; Chun et al., 2011; Lachter et al., 2004; 
Treisman, 1969) and working memory (Baddeley, 2000). Secondly, it is 
commonly reported that familiarisation of the problem must take place in order 
for solutions to be generated (Kristensen, 2004; Lubart, 2000-2001; Wallas, 
1926), so the participants may be spending the first half of the task becoming 
accustomed to the task requirements.  
With consideration of the participant group as a whole, there were significant 
differences in fluency and flexibility, with scores lowering in the second half of the 
UUT-TC task. As fluency decreases, there is an expectation that flexibility and 
originality will decrease too, as they can only increase with the number of ideas 
produced (i.e., fluency). As originality did not decrease significantly, more ideas 
post-incubation must have been original, which was found to be the case as 
presented.  
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As an undemanding incubation condition had previously been found to benefit 
problem solving (Baird et al., 2012), it was expected that those in the 
undemanding group would show the greatest improvement, or smallest 
decrease, in creativity scores in this study. An explanation for the lack of a 
significant incubation effect in this case may be explained by the results related 
to hypothesis two. 
 
8.10.2 Mind-Wandering During Incubation and the Effect on Creativity 
The amount of mind-wandering during incubation reported by the participants 
differed significantly between the experimental groups. Those in the rest 
condition mind-wandered the most, followed by those in the undemanding group, 
and those in the demanding task the least. This supports the expectation that a 
cognitively easy task allows for more mind-wandering than a difficult task, and 
according to previous studies, should have led to successful incubation. Although 
mind-wandering was related to additional flexibility post-incubation, a similar 
effect was not found for fluency or originality.  
Further, there were significant between-group differences in the amount of UUT-
TC consideration during incubation reported by the participants, with the rest 
group carrying this out the most, and the demanding group the least.  
What is noteworthy is that participants in each experimental group appear to have 
behaved differently during the incubation period in terms of self-reported mind-
wandering and UUT-TC processing, but this had no effect on subsequent creative 
performance. This means that there was no benefit to mind-wandering, and that 
actively thinking of solutions may not lead to the production of more creative ones.  
Across the experimental group, self-reported mind-wandering and UUT-TC 
consideration during incubation were related to each other, as well as each being 
correlated to a significant increase in the number of additional idea categories 
(flexibility) post-incubation, but there were no significant between-group 
differences in this. This could show support for the relief of mindset theory 
(Posner, 1973 in Snyder et al., 2004), as there has been an increase in the 
number of types of ideas explored, indicating that unhelpful mental sets could 
have been broken. Support is also provided for the intermittent conscious work 
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theory (Seifert et al., 1995), as time spent considering the task has led to an 
improvement in the variety and percentage of original ideas.  
However, to revisit the description of incubation, periods of time spent away from 
a problem are thought to be beneficial to formulating the solution (Baird et al., 
2012; Gilhooly et al., 2013; Wallas, 1926). In the present study, it was found that 
although participants reported that they allowed their minds to wander from the 
incubation task, they were not distracted by irrelevant thoughts, but instead were 
consciously considering additional uses for a tin can. This reveals that they were 
not engaged in an incubation period at all, but were still actively and consciously 
working on the problem solving task, which could account for the lack of an effect 
on creativity. Further reasons for the lack of incubation findings replicating 
previous work are discussed in section 8.10.4. 
 
8.10.3 Incubation and Attention 
By using ANCOVAs, it was possible to control each attentional measure, in order 
to test their impact on the creativity scores. In union with this, regression analysis 
enabled the calculation of the contribution of each significant attention covariate, 
to the variance in each creativity score. The attention measures as a whole 
(ADHD symptoms, daydreaming, and mind-wandering scores; sustained, 
selective, and divided attention performance; and mind-wandering and UUT 
consideration during the incubation period) explained 8.3% of the variance in 
fluency scores, 1.7% of the variance in flexibility scores, and 2.8% of the variance 
in originality scores (shown by a multiple regression). However, as there were 
eight attention measures considered in this analysis, it was necessary to break 
this down to determine the possible contribution of each attention measure to the 
three aspects of creativity measured: fluency, flexibility, and originality. 
It was found that scores on the adult ADHD self-report scale (ASRS-v1.1), 
performance on the Stroop task measuring selective attention, and performance 
on the dual-task measuring divided attention could all significantly predict overall 
fluency, flexibility, and originality scores separately. The contribution of each 
attention measure to the creativity scores was fairly low, ranging from 2% to 7.7%. 
Although an interesting finding, these contribution percentages are weak. 
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Additionally, the consideration of solutions for the problem solving task during the 
incubation period (measured by self-report) was also found to significantly predict 
fluency scores (0.8%) and flexibility (3.5%) scores, but again the contributions 
are small. Every attention measure (except sustained and divided attention) was 
found to significantly predict fluency and flexibility scores pre- and post-
incubation. It could be that all of these findings described here exist because 
similar EFs or cognitive processes are used in both attention and DT tasks (e.g., 
Zabelina et al., 2015), as was proposed in section 6.4.3. Fluency and flexibility 
could arguably require the use of working memory, organisation, and selective 
attention/response inhibition in order to score highly. On the other hand, 
originality may be less affected by EF processes.  
Overall, the ANCOVAs did not reveal any effects of the incubation condition when 
the attention measures were controlled for, as all of the between-group tests were 
non-significant. This means that differences in attention performance cannot 
explain the lack of a significant effect of incubation and incubation type. 
Controlling for the attention measures in this study highlighted the effect that 
attention could have on creativity as measured by verbal DT. The contribution 
percentages were all small when divided up in to single attention measures, and 
overall they only explained 1.7 to 8.3% of the variance in fluency, flexibility, and 
originality. Performance on the Stroop task measuring selective attention, and the 
dual-task measuring divided attention seemed to have the largest effects on the 
creativity scores. Future research could therefore investigate this further, by 
isolating each attention type, measuring it in numerous forms to test reliability, 
and using different types of creativity tasks. This would determine if these results 
are consistent, and further analysis could help to clarify the influence of selective 
and divided attention on creativity.  
 
8.10.4 General Discussion 
This study has shown that incubation can lead to an increase in the percentage 
of original ideas. Thinking broadly and beyond this study, an expansion of this 
idea could relate to many fields, such as brainstorming, and individual or group 
decision making. If individuals were aware that taking a break from a problem 
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could lead to a more creative solution, then this could be more widely 
implemented. Specifically, this could be of benefit in business or politics where 
solutions are produced and decisions are made every day, some more hastily 
than others. For example, if methods of saving money were being deliberated 
within a cabinet meeting, a discussion of possible solutions could take place (as 
required in the preparation stage of problem solving), followed by a break for the 
cabinet members to consolidate their ideas, and then to incubate the problem. If 
the meeting was recalled some time later, each member may have a more 
creative, useful, and appropriate proposed solution. A period of incubation in 
problem solving and decision making processes could limit phenomena such as 
groupthink, and could perhaps result in more successful, and less risky 
outcomes.  
The results of this study do not demonstrate a significant benefit of a cognitively 
undemanding incubation period on creative problem solving, as was predicted. 
In contrast to Baird and colleagues (2012) who demonstrated that a cognitively 
undemanding task was beneficial for incubation, Segal (2004) has shown that a 
demanding task requiring full attention is more suitable. Contrary to both of these 
studies, this research has not shown a benefit of either task. Yet, those in the 
undemanding task group allowed their minds to wander and consciously thought 
of UUT-TC solutions significantly more than those in the demanding group. This 
did not lead to more creative solutions however, meaning that the importance of 
mind-wandering in incubation, as suggested by Baird and colleagues (2012), is 
not supported.  
The incubation period did allow for the mind to wander, but participants used this 
time to think consciously of more solutions to the problem solving task. 
Technically, this demonstrates mind-wandering from the incubation task, but 
does not show that the participants’ minds wandered away from the original 
problem solving task. Therefore, it is argued that the participants did not partake 
in incubation at all, at least not in the manner it was intended to occur. This may 
be because they were told that they would be returning to the task. Although this 
was thought to improve ecological validity and minimise individual differences in 
task expectations (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2013), it may have had an adverse effect 
in this particular study.  
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Furthermore, this finding shows that although those completing the cognitively 
demanding task reported significantly less mind-wandering during the incubation 
period, the task was not so demanding that it inhibited mind-wandering 
altogether. This highlights a potential problem with previous studies that have not 
controlled for the lack of incubation during a supposed incubation period, as 
results could be false positives. To control this, the incubation period would either 
need to be so long that the participant naturally stops consciously thinking of 
solutions for the problem, or the interpolated task would have to be more 
cognitively demanding. Alternatively, Madjar and Shalley (2008) have found that 
setting a goal for the creativity and the interpolated task improves creative 
responses. It was proposed that this encouraged the participants to maintain full 
focus and concentration on the task in hand, thus they committed to the 
incubation activity as well as the creativity task. Goal-setting could be further 
researched in relation to focused and selective attention in future incubation 
studies. 
As the hypotheses were not fully met, the applicability and support of theories 
discussed in the literature review is limited, but are summarised below.  
The relief of fatigue theory (Posner, 1973 in Snyder et al., 2004; Wallas, 1926) 
for successful incubation had previously been dismissed, as a period of rest was 
thought to be less effective than the completion of a secondary task. In this study, 
resting was not significantly worse than either of the other incubation tasks, so 
this theory may have been too eagerly rejected by others. 
Within the present study, the relief of mindset theory (Posner, 1973 in Snyder et 
al., 2004) has been related to an increase in the percentage of original ideas post-
incubation, but it was also specifically tested. This was done by calculating the 
percentage of post-incubation ideas that belonged to new categories. Across the 
experimental groups, a mean of 62.3% (SD = 21.76%) of post-incubation ideas 
belonged to new categories. Although there were no between-group differences, 
this is still a moderate percentage, which supports the theory that an interruption 
from actively solving the problem can break down limited mindsets, or enhance 
the use of/engage further mindsets. 
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The intermittent conscious work theory states that short amounts of conscious 
problem solving continues during incubation (see Gilhooly et al., 2013; Seifert et 
al., 1995). Unfortunately, in this study, the conscious work carried out by the 
participants appeared to be prolonged rather than intermittent, given the high 
scores on reported mind-wandering and UUT-TC consideration. Still, as this was 
related to increases in the production of idea categories and a higher percentage 
of original ideas, there may be merit to this theory. 
Finally, the non-conscious work theory cannot be supported by this study, as the 
participants did not disengage from the problem-solving task. 
Olton and Johnson (1976) also failed to replicate the incubation results from 
previous research, and illustrated that they were not the first to do so, suggesting 
that at the time, no study with positive findings had been replicated. They 
proposed that such difficulties could be due to differences in ability amongst 
participants and time limitations on initial problem solving being too short, yet they 
controlled for these aspects. Alternatively, it was suggested that real life 
incubation as reported by scientists and inventors, occurs in those who are highly 
motivated, over long periods of time possibly lasting days or months, and in those 
with an in-depth knowledge of the field in which their problem belongs (Olton & 
Johnson, 1976). Subsequently, it is possible that experimental laboratory studies 
may not reflect the conditions required for the consistent measurement of truly 
and significantly effective incubation. 
The limitations of this study and directions for the development of incubation 
research are presented below.  
 
8.10.5 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The main limitation of this study could be the time limit imposed on the incubation 
period. There is little consensus on how long an incubation period should be (Sio 
& Ormerod, 2009). This study followed examples of previous research by being 
five minutes in length, and support has been reported for reducing task time 
periods to benefit creativity (Madjar & Shalley, 2008). Madjar and Shalley (2008) 
stipulated that short periods of time on creativity tasks should be combined with 
a high attentional focus, something that may not have been apparent within the 
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participants. Furthermore, it is proposed here that this was not long enough for 
the task to move from conscious to non-conscious processing, as is required for 
incubation to be successful. This was evidenced as participants admitted using 
this period to think of extra solutions. This may be inhibited by telling them that 
the task was over before it was, but as previously discussed, this is not 
ecologically valid. Other methods of encouraging the participants to stop 
consciously thinking of solutions to the UUT-TC could be considered. For 
example, perhaps a distraction would be beneficial, such as a conversation or the 
viewing of a short film, rather than just a computer task. Alternatively, as 
previously mentioned, setting a goal for performance could also lead the 
participant to concentrate fully on the incubation task, in order to meet the goal. 
Another potential timing issue that could explain the lack of incubation success in 
the core creativity scores could be due to the length of part one of the problem-
solving task, and/or the timing of the incubation period. Breaking from the 
problem-solving task could be beneficial (as explained in the literature review) to 
the preparation and the working process of problem solving, or detrimental if the 
break comes at a time that is not optimal. For example, the break could lead to a 
lack of engagement with the problem-solving task, or to the forgetting of important 
details, meaning that a longer period of time is required on return to the task in 
order to re-engage with its requirements (Jett & George, 2003; Madjar & Shalley, 
2008). It is possible that with longer task durations, and a longer incubation 
period, there may have been significant improvements in fluency, flexibility, and 
originality from pre- to post-incubation.  
It has been suggested that the ideal timing for an incubation period would be at 
the discretion of the individual (Madjar & Shalley, 2008). Outwith experimental 
conditions, an incubation period only occurs when the problem-solver has 
completed the preparation stage, and when they choose to take a break from 
actively trying to find the solution. The incubation period could take place when 
the individual feels that they have run out of ideas, or if they need a break to rest 
their minds. Conversely, the incubation period need not take place if the individual 
is working productively and successfully on the problem (Madjar & Shalley, 2008), 
or if they are motivated to continue with the task. By enforcing an incubation 
period on participants in this study, the natural problem solving process could 
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have been interrupted, thus leading to the lack of results supporting the benefit 
of an incubation period (although this testing paradigm has been used 
successfully in studies finding a positive effect of incubation). Future studies could 
allow the participant the freedom to take their incubation break when they felt it 
was necessary, although this would be difficult to control experimentally. 
Furthermore, positive or negative priming could be used in a design such as this 
to ascertain if a ‘belief’ in the effects of incubation could in fact enhance it.  
Ecological validity could be improved upon by using incubation tasks that involve 
real-life activities, such as exercise, driving, or chores. These suggestions contain 
a physical aspect that may produce different results compared to completing a 
computer task during incubation. Driving in particular is known to utilise 
procedural memory, meaning it is an automatic, non-conscious skill that 
maintains an aspect of conscious processing in the decisions that must be made 
when negotiating a roundabout, for example. It may be that tasks of this nature 
could be the optimal undemanding task that could facilitate mind-wandering, and 
therefore incubation. This would relate to the anecdotal evidence provided by 
Poincaré and Helmholtz for example, as they stipulated that illumination occurred 
when they were physically relaxing or walking.  
In relation to these ideas of changing the modality of the incubation task, 
researchers have found that rapid eye movement (REM) sleep can be more 
effective than a period of rest and non-REM sleep for the production of remote 
associations (Cai, Mednick, Harrison, Kanady, & Mednick, 2009). It would be 
interesting to investigate the effect of REM sleep incubation on creative 
responses to a divergent thinking task such as a UUT. 
The most recent incubation research, as reviewed, has focused on DT. However, 
there is a large quantity of studies that have explored incubation in relation to CT. 
Future studies should consider attentional control and incubation success in 
relation to convergent thinking and insight tasks, in order to include these other 
aspects of creativity, and cover all of the bases.  
Future research could also investigate incubation success and mind-wandering 
behaviour comparing those with medicated and non-medicated ADHD. It would 
be valuable to know if medication enhances or inhibits mind-wandering, and if the 
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result was conducive to creative problem solving or not. This knowledge could be 
of benefit to those with the disorder, who could utilise it in consideration of their 
learning and working behaviour. 
 
8.11 Conclusions 
Some positive findings have become apparent. For example, in the second half 
of the UUT-TC, although the raw scores of fluency, flexibility, and originality 
decreased, a high percentage of these ideas were from new categories, and the 
concentration of original ideas was significantly higher. This shows that a break 
from writing down solutions could be beneficial, and when faced with a problem, 
the first solutions may not always be the most useful, appropriate, and novel. 
This study of attentional control and the effect of incubation on creative problem 
solving has not produced the results expected with consideration of the literature. 
All but one of the attention measures predicted fluency and flexibility scores pre- 
and post-incubation. This is a broad finding though, and was thought to be down 
to the functional similarities in the EFs required to complete both an attention task 
and a DT task. The incubation paradigm was not replicated, as participants did 
not engage in incubation in the intended manner, and this is thought to be due to 
the timing of the incubation period, as discussed. Propositions have been made 
on how to improve on the study, and directions for future research have been 
offered. 
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9.1 Overview 
E. B. White, Marie Curie, and Leonardo da Vinci, were three examples used here 
to illustrate that focused attention, and the ability to maintain concentration even 
in distracting environments, may be important for the production of creative ideas. 
Richard Wagner, Arthur Schopenhauer, Marcel Proust, Thomas Carlyle, and 
Franz Kafka, were all described as being unable to do just that, and complained 
that they were distracted by nature, with many using relatively extreme methods 
to soundproof their working environment in order limit distractions and to obtain 
any level of productivity. The empirical evidence presented in the literature 
supported this second example, with numerous findings indicating that both 
broad and narrow attention were beneficial for creativity. Details of a distinction 
between broad and narrow attentional sets or traits were published, along with 
corroborating evidence of the link between broad, unfocused attention, and 
higher creativity scores. 
After reviewing the literature in the fields of creativity, attention, ADHD, and the 
links between these concepts, it was concluded that aspects of attention were 
integral to theories explaining the construct of creativity. Focus and concentration 
must at some point be diffused to allow original solutions to be formed, for 
creative associations to be constructed, or to allow the unoriginal and unhelpful 
mindset limitations to be forgotten. The evidence, however, was mainly based on 
the results of one creativity and one attention measure being used to illustrate 
the relationship between the two processes. Reducing the extent of both creativity 
and attention, by representing them with one measure each, undermines the 
complexity and multifaceted nature of each entity, and has arguably led to an 
overgeneralisation. 
The research presented in this thesis was designed to determine whether or not 
a general relationship exists between creativity and attention, if those with ADHD 
are more creative and less attentive than those without, and if creativity could be 
improved. Evidence for each of these will be summarised in turn. 
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9.1 Is there a Relationship between Creativity and Attention? 
The findings advocated that there is no link between creativity and attention, and 
is not as clear as previously theorised. When separately controlling for self-
reported ADHD symptomology, selective attention, and divided attention scores, 
each was found to predict performance on a verbal DT task. These findings were 
very low on impact, but did show a connection between creativity and attention.  
As those with ADHD have problems with their attention, it was thought that any 
correlations between the constructs of creativity and attention would be larger, 
however no such relationships was found (chapter 6). This indicates that perhaps 
the deficits observed in ADHD are not conducive to creativity after all.   
Overall, it is therefore argued here that there is not a broad, inclusive relationship 
between creativity and attention.  
 
9.2 Are those with ADHD More Creative and Less Attentive than those 
without? 
While there was no statistical evidence of a relationship between scores on 
creativity and attention tasks, the ADHD groups consistently had higher mean 
scores (not always significantly) than the control groups on each measure and 
aspect of creativity, across the studies. This suggests that there could be 
something fundamentally different between the samples, but as attention was not 
related to creativity, it could be something else.  
It may be a creative strategy that is different between the groups, in that those 
with ADHD may be more inclined to think outside of the perceived boundaries, or 
are more open-minded. It may also be that those with the disorder are less likely 
to heed rules and limitations, thus leading to more unusual and creative 
responses. Or, a creativity task may provide cognitive stimulation that engages 
their interest and allows them to perform at a greater potential, as would fit with 
the cognitive energetic model (Sergeant, 2005) of ADHD, and the optimal 
stimulation theory (Zentall & Zentall, 1983). Another possibility is that those with 
ADHD are typically less inhibited and more impulsive than those without. For 
example, numerous control group participants stated that they were not very 
creative and had ‘mind-blocks’ when carrying out the creativity tasks, whereas 
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this was less frequent within the ADHD group. Although this was not specifically 
measured, a general trait of caring less about what others may think of their 
responses could have been present in the ADHD group. This research cannot 
stipulate exactly what the difference between the groups is. 
Another key finding was that compared to the control group, those with ADHD 
had significantly fewer on-target fixations during attention tasks (CPT and 
Stroop), which did not reflect in a drop in performance. Cognitive arousal from the 
visually stimulating environment was unlikely to have had an effect here. So 
again, this points to a potential difference in cognitive strategy and tactics for 
sufficiently allocating attention, as to complete the task successfully and to 
maintain cognitive stimulation. It could be argued that this is a form of 
multitasking: completing the task whilst moving the eyes to seek stimulation. This 
could be related to performance on the divided attention task (chapter six), where 
the ADHD group were as strong as the control group. This strategy could stem 
from differences in EF, rather than differences in attention specifically, in those 
with ADHD (as discussed in section 2.6). Those with ADHD are known to have 
EF differences compared to those without. Furthermore, creativity has been 
related to higher EFs and EF capacity (e.g., Benedek et al., 2012; Bott et al., 
2014; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Van Stockum & Decaro, 2014). 
It is therefore concluded here, that those with ADHD could have cognitive 
multitasking as a strength, as they repeatedly perform tasks whilst concurrently 
attempting to increase their levels of cognitive stimulation. Unfortunately it is not 
possible based on the results of this thesis to provide further detail of this 
assertion, but further research as described in previous chapters could help with 
this.  
The self-report measures of attention consistently yielded significant differences 
between the control group and the ADHD group, with the latter having higher 
scores in distractibility, ADHD symptoms, daydreaming, and mind-wandering. 
These show that there is a core difference in how individuals within each group 
analyse their own attentional abilities. If these results are taken at face value, they 
reflect the daily problems that individuals have with maintaining their focus and 
concentration, and minimising daydreaming and mind-wandering. This can be 
tiresome and frustrating, and could lead to the work, life, and social difficulties 
reviewed in chapter two. What is worth considering though, is that the participants 
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with ADHD knew or strongly believed that they had the disorder, and only took 
part in this research because of that. This could have led to a participant bias in 
the scores on these self-report measures. Accordingly, deficits in attention as 
reported by the participants did not always corroborate with their performance on 
tasks measuring attention.  
 
9.3 Can Creativity be Improved? 
This thesis tested just two of the many methods that have been described that 
could potentially improve creativity: a visually stimulating environment and an 
incubation period. These methods were very different, and neither appeared to 
significantly increase creative performance.  
The decision to carry out research comparing the effects of a plain laboratory 
environment and a colourful, visually busy office environment was made in order 
to improve ecological validity in the testing setting, and to further investigate 
previous findings that have found an environmental effect on creativity (as 
reported in section 7.2.4). Furthermore, an examination of the cognitive arousal 
and stimulation theories indicated that a stimulating environment could be 
beneficial to the concentration and productivity of those with ADHD (section 7.2).  
One of the main findings was that both a control and an ADHD group had 
significantly higher elaboration scores for figural DT in a visually stimulating 
environment compared to the plain environment, meaning that more details were 
added to their designs. The ADHD group also produced significantly more 
drawings in this task in the stimulating environment. Whilst interesting, this was 
not found for the verbal DT, and was not found for figural DT originality, which is 
arguably the most important measurement of creativity. The findings may have 
been down to individual differences between the plain environment group and the 
stimulating environment group. As this was the only effect to be found, it is 
concluded that the office-like environment in particular does not improve creativity 
in either a control group or an ADHD group. The testing environment should be 
an important consideration for creativity researchers, as past studies have found 
an effect. Future research could manipulate the environment, and use other 
creativity tasks (such as the construction of a creative product) to test this further.  
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The other method for improving creativity that has been reported is the use of an 
incubation period. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence has pointed to a benefit 
of spending time away from actively attempting to produce solutions, and doing 
a different but easy task instead (section 8.2).  
This research found that there was no positive effect of taking a break from the 
task to the aspects of fluency, flexibility, or originality. However, the key finding 
here was that a break from the task did lead to a higher proportion of original 
ideas on return to the task, meaning that more of the ideas produced were 
creative than before the incubation period. What was also found though, was that 
the participants reported that they consciously thought of more responses for the 
creative problem solving task when they should have been incubating from the 
task. This could explain the increase in the proportion of original ideas: the 
participants had time to think of more creative responses. Therefore, it was 
concluded that the incubation paradigm was not replicated here, and that other 
studies could perhaps consider whether incubation genuinely took/takes place in 
their studies too.  
It could be that this contemplation time (what should have been an incubation 
period) was beneficial to the production of original ideas, or the elimination of 
non-original ideas, in the verbal DT task. This should be further investigated, with 
manipulations of ‘thinking time’ and ‘writing time’. Furthermore, suggestions have 
been made for the application of ‘real-life’ incubation periods, as per the 
anecdotal evidence.  
 
9.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
It can be established from the literature that replicating the deficits associated 
with ADHD in laboratory conditions is difficult, and results from experiments using 
those with ADHD as participants yield inconsistent and disparate results. This 
body of work is perhaps the most comprehensive investigation of attention and 
creativity in ADHD and control adults, yet the results are not supportive of the 
literature. It is proposed here that attention tasks used in experimental research, 
such as those used in the present study, may not ‘induce’ ADHD symptoms as 
they are goal-directed, achievable, and easy. It is for this reason that the 
suggestion for ecologically valid, ‘real-life’ measurements of attention have been 
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repeated throughout this thesis. It may therefore be worth replicating parts of this 
research whilst measuring attention paid to an individual’s day to day work, rather 
than specific, laboratory based tasks, with a focus on selective attention. The 
symptoms of ADHD may be more apparent when an individual is completing a 
school or work assignment, as these tasks are less novel and longer in duration. 
As well as the previous recommendations that have been made, future research 
should consider the finding that those with ADHD consistently have higher scores 
across creativity tasks, but should measure this with respect to executive function 
and dysfunction, rather than attention specifically. This would help to relate the 
results to the cognitive theories of ADHD, and may help to pinpoint the 
characteristic of ADHD that sets this group apart in creativity.  
The OST (Zentall & Zentall, 1983) and MBAM (Söderlund et al., 2007) theories 
have been prominent in the literature in the explanation of the behaviour of those 
with ADHD, and the lack of supporting evidence here should not be a sign that 
these valuable theories are dismissed. Conversely, it is suggested that they 
should be studied further, and especially with the consideration of creativity, 
where there has been very little research. It is clear that the ADHD group tend to 
be more creative, but this pattern may not remain in settings where cognitive 
stimulation is very low or very high.  
Within this thesis, the individuals with ADHD were not monitored for medication 
use. It was deemed to be outwith the researcher’s expertise and justification to 
ask individuals to withhold their medication for the purposes of this study. As 
ADHD medication controls impulses, it may be the case the results would have 
been different, especially in the eye-tracking study, if medication had not been 
taken by the individuals. However, this is only conjecture, as conversations with 
some of the participants revealed that there was a mixture of people on 
medication and those not. Future studies should consider this as a covariate, and 
could study medication use alongside measures of both creativity and attention, 
to examine its effects.  
In a similar issue, a distinction was not made between participants who had 
ADHD-inattentive type, ADHD-impulsive type, and ADHD-combined type. It has 
been suggested recently that it is the combination of inattention and impulsivity 
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that benefits creativity (Fugate et al., 2013), so future research should control for 
the distinction.  
It is important to consider other factors that may influence the results in studies 
such as these. For example, personality was not directly measured within this 
thesis, and numerous studies highlight the influence that personality can have on 
creative performance (e.g., Baas, Roskes, Sligte, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2013; Dul, 
Ceylan, & Jaspers, 2011; Eysenck, 1993). Furthermore, the ability to produce, 
and the quality of, internal representations and imagery are also thought to 
contribute to creative problem solving (Goldschmidt & Smolkov, 2006), and were 
not measured here. Much of the early work investigating creative thought focused 
on mental imagery, and was driven by anecdotal evidence, such as Kekule’s 
dream that led to his discovery of the benzene molecules’ structure (Rudofsky & 
Wotiz, 1988), and Einstein’s imagery of travelling alongside a light wave (Malaga, 
2000). In experiments, relationships have been found between mental imagery 
and the use of image cues and creative thinking (e.g., Bogart, Pasquier, & 
Barnes, 2013; Finke, 2014; Kozhevnikov, Kozhevnikov, Yu, & Blazhenkova, 
2013). As creativity is a very complex construct, it would be unmanageable to 
measure and control for every possible influencing variable.  
Lastly, there is likely to be a sample bias present within these studies. Each 
participant volunteered to take part in the research in their own time, and the 
study was advertised as involving creativity and attention. It is therefore probable 
that the participants had a particular interest in psychology research, creativity, 
and/or attention before taking part. For example, participants may have had prior 
knowledge of research methods, or they may have been particularly creative or 
attentive/inattentive. The recruitment posters did state that participants did not 
need to be creative or attentive, yet this is not a safe-guard against group 
characteristics such as these. It could be the case that the control group had a 
particular interest in creativity, which could have raised their scores on the tasks, 
thus closing the gap between their scores and that of the ADHD group. 
Furthermore, the ADHD group participants may have taken part due to their 
interest in the disorder, and not because of an interest in creativity. These factors 
could explain the limited significant between group differences in creative 
performance, and may have offset the chances of finding a relationship between 
the two constructs. The scores collected and results obtained may therefore only 
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be applicable to others with the same mind-set or interest as the present sample. 
This is another key limitation of this research, which affects generalisability, but 
this is common to all psychology studies that recruit volunteers as participants.  
 
9.5 Conclusions 
This thesis has presented four large studies that comprehensively and rigorously 
investigated the relationship between creativity and attention, the effect that 
variances in attention can have on creativity, the differences between those with 
and without ADHD, and methods to improve creativity. Creativity was measured 
by self-report self-efficacy and past creative achievement, verbal and figural 
divergent thinking, and collage production. To measure attention, self-report 
distractibility, ADHD symptoms, mind-wandering and daydreaming were 
recorded, as well as tasks measuring attentional control, and sustained, 
selective, and divided attention.  
The five key findings were: 
1. There was no relationship between the constructs of creativity and 
attention.  
2. Those with ADHD had higher scores on all measures of creativity, 
significantly for the percentage of original ideas in verbal and figural 
divergent thinking, compared to those without, though these differences 
were not always significant. 
3. The performance of those with ADHD on attention tasks was not 
compromised when the participants spent less time looking at the target 
compared to a control group.  
4. A ‘busy’ visual environment does not improve creativity or attention. 
5. A break from writing down responses for a UUT can lead to a higher 
proportion of original ideas being produced.  
It has been made clear that there is not a demonstrable, overarching relationship 
between creativity and attention in the measures here used, and the participants 
tested. However, many directions for future research have been proposed, with 
an examination of cognitive strategies and executive function being held as the 
most important.  
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The examples of famous creative individuals highlighted throughout the chapters 
inspired this research as well as many other studies before it. However, and 
unfortunately, no grand conclusions can be drawn about their incredible talents 
and a link with their attentional problems. It is perhaps likely that if a historical 
analysis took place of a representative sample of notable creators, that attentional 
traits would be normally distributed.  
Russell Barkley (e.g., 2011), one of the world’s leading experts in ADHD, has 
frequently and repeatedly stated that ADHD is not a gift, and that there is no 
research evidencing a benefit to having the disorder. Whilst it is not the intention 
here to undermine the severe difficulties that those with ADHD face, and with the 
understanding that further research is required, it is concluded here that creativity 
and the production of original ideas could potentially be a small silver lining to the 
debilitating disorder.  
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Appendix 1: Preliminary Questionnaire 
 
 
  
Appendices 
 
263 
 
Appendix 2: Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) 
 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire. 
  
1. Place a tick beside the areas in which you feel you have more talent, ability, 
or training than the average person. 
(tick)  
  visual arts (painting, sculpture) 
  music 
  dance 
  individual sports (tennis, golf) 
  team sports 
  architectural design 
  entrepreneurial ventures 
  creative writing 
  humour 
  inventions 
  scientific inquiry 
  theatre and film 
  culinary arts 
  
2. Place a tick beside sentences that apply to you. Next to sentences with an 
asterisk (*), write the number of times this sentence applies to you. 
  
(tick) A. Visual Arts (painting, sculpture) 
  0. I have no training or recognized talent in this area. (Skip to Music). 
  1. I have taken lessons in this area. 
  2. People have commented on my talent in this area. 
  3. I have won a prize or prizes at a juried art show. 
  4. I have had a showing of my work in a gallery. 
  5. I have sold a piece of my work. 
  6. My work has been critiqued in local publications. 
  *7. My work has been critiqued in national publications. 
  
(tick) B. Music 
  0. I have no training or recognized talent in this area (Skip to Dance). 
  1. I play one or more musical instruments proficiently. 
  2. I have played with a recognized orchestra or band. 
  3. I have composed an original piece of music. 
  4. My musical talent has been critiqued in a local publication. 
  5. My composition has been recorded. 
  6. Recordings of my composition have been sold publicly. 
  *7. My compositions have been critiqued in a national publication. 
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(tick) 
 
C. Dance 
  0. I have no training or recognized talent in this area (Skip to Architecture) 
  1. I have danced with a recognized dance company. 
  2. I have choreographed an original dance number. 
  3. My choreography has been performed publicly. 
  4. My dance abilities have been critiqued in a local publication. 
  5. I have choreographed dance professionally. 
  6. My choreography has been recognized by a local publication. 
  *7. My choreography has been recognized by a national publication. 
  
(tick) D. Architectural Design 
  0. I do not have training or recognized talent in this area (Skip to Writing). 
  1. I have designed an original structure. 
  2. A structure designed by me has been constructed. 
  3. I have sold an original architectural design. 
  4. A structure that I have designed and sold has been built professionally. 
  5. My architectural design has won an award or awards. 
  6. My architectural design has been recognized in a local publication. 
  *7. My architectural design has been recognized in a national publication. 
  
(tick) E. Creative Writing 
   0. I do not have training or recognized talent in this area (Skip to Humour). 
   1. I have written an original short work (poem or short story). 
   2. My work has won an award or prize. 
   3. I have written an original long work (epic, novel, or play). 
   4. I have sold my work to a publisher. 
   5. My work has been printed and sold publicly. 
   6. My work has been reviewed in local publications. 
  * 7. My work has been reviewed in national publications. 
  
(tick) F. Humour 
  0. I do not have recognized talent in this area (Skip to Inventions). 
  1. People have often commented on my original sense of humour. 
  2. I have created jokes that are now regularly repeated by others. 
  3. I have written jokes for other people. 
  4. I have written a joke or cartoon that has been published. 
  5. I have worked as a professional comedian. 
  6. I have worked as a professional comedy writer. 
  *7. My humour has been recognized in a national publication. 
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(tick) G. Inventions 
  0. I do not have recognized talent in this area (Skip to Scientific Discovery) 
  1. I regularly find novel uses for household objects. 
  2. I have sketched out an invention and worked on its design flaws. 
  3. I have created original software for a computer. 
  4. I have built a prototype of one of my designed inventions. 
  5. I have sold one of my inventions to people I know. 
  *6. I have received a patent for one of my inventions. 
  *7. I have sold one of my inventions to a manufacturing firm. 
  
(tick) H. Scientific Discovery 
  0. I do not have training or recognized ability in this field (Skip to Theatre) 
  1. I often think about ways that scientific problems could be solved. 
  2. I have won a prize at a science fair or other local competition. 
  3. I have received a scholarship based on my work in science or medicine. 
  4. I have been author or co-author of a study published in a scientific journal. 
  *5. I have won a national prize in the field of science or medicine. 
  *6. I have received a grant to pursue my work in science or medicine. 
  7. My work has been cited by other scientists in national publications. 
  
(tick) I. Theatre and Film 
  0. I do not have training or recognized ability in this field (Skip to Culinary Arts). 
  1. I have performed in theatre or film. 
  2. My acting abilities have been recognized in a local publication. 
  3. I have directed or produced a theatre or film production. 
  4. I have won an award or prize for acting in theatre or film. 
  5. I have been paid to act in theatre or film. 
  6. I have been paid to direct a theatre or film production. 
  *7. My theatrical work has been recognized in a national publication. 
  
(tick) J. Culinary Arts 
  0. I do not have training or experience in this field (Skip to question K). 
  1. I often experiment with recipes. 
  2. My recipes have been published in a local cookbook. 
  3. My recipes have been used in restaurants or other public venues. 
  4. I have been asked to prepare food for celebrities or dignitaries. 
  5. My recipes have won a prize or award. 
  6. I have received a degree in culinary arts. 
  *7. My recipes have been published nationally 
 
 
K. Please list other creative achievements not mentioned above: 
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Appendix 3: Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS-v1.1) Symptom Checklist 
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Appendix 4: Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS) 
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Appendix 5: Mind-Wandering Questionnaire (MWQ) 
Mind-Wandering Questionnaire 
Each statement covers an aspect of mind-wandering. Please indicate your 
response to each statement by ticking the one box that best describes you. 
 
 
Appendix 6: Unusual Uses Task – Tin Can (UUT-TC) 
Task 
In the next five minutes, think of as many unusual uses for a TIN CAN as possible.  
Write your ideas down in the space below to create a list of as many ideas as you 
can. 
Think of the cleverest, most interesting, and most unusual uses. Try to think of 
things that no one else will think of. 
 
Appendix 7: Unusual Uses Task – Cardboard Box (UUT-CB) 
Task 
In the next five minutes, think of as many unusual uses for a CARDBOARD BOX 
as possible.  
Write your ideas down in the space below to create a list of as many ideas as you 
can. 
Think of the cleverest, most interesting, and most unusual uses. Try to think of 
things that no one else will think of.  
1.
Almost Never Very Infrequently Somewhat Infrequently Somewhat Frequently Very Frequently Almost Always
2.
Almost Never Very Infrequently Somewhat Infrequently Somewhat Frequently Very Frequently Almost Always
3.
Almost Never Very Infrequently Somewhat Infrequently Somewhat Frequently Very Frequently Almost Always
4.
Almost Never Very Infrequently Somewhat Infrequently Somewhat Frequently Very Frequently Almost Always
5.
Almost Never Very Infrequently Somewhat Infrequently Somewhat Frequently Very Frequently Almost Always
I do things without paying full attention
I mind-wander during lectures or presentations
I have difficulty maintaining focus on simple or repetitive work
While reading, I find I haven't been thinking about the text and must therefore read it again
I find myself listening with one ear, thinking about something else at the same time
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Appendix 8: Circles Task 
Task 
In five minutes see how many objects or pictures you can make from the 
circles below and on the reverse of this page. The circles should be the 
main part of whatever you make.  
With the pencil or pen add lines to the circles to complete your picture. You 
can place marks inside the circle or outside of the circle – wherever you 
want to in order to make your picture.  
Try to think of things that no one else will think of. Make as many different 
pictures or objects as you can and put as many ideas as you can in each 
one. Make them tell as complete and as interesting a story as you can.  
Add names or a title in the space below each circle. 
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Appendix 9: Collage Materials 
 
Material Colour Quantity 
PVA Glue and Glue Brush - - 
Scissors - - 
A3 Card White 1 (base) 
A2 Tissue Paper White, Brown, Black 3 (1 of each) 
A6 Card Red, Blue, Green, Yellow, Orange 5 (1 of each) 
6cmX5cm Card Red, Blue, Green, Yellow, Orange 5 (1 of each) 
6cmX5cm Metallic Card Red, Blue, Green, Gold, Silver 5 (1 of each) 
3cmX3cm Tissue Paper 
Red, Dark Blue, Light Blue, Dark Green, 
Light Green, Yellow, Orange, Purple, 
Pink, Brown, Black, White. 
60 (5 of each) 
Tissue Paper Cut-Offs Multi Approx 50 
Gummed Paper Shapes Red, Blue, Green, Yellow, Gold, Silver Approx 50 
Sequins Multi Approx 100 
Pipe Cleaners 
Red, Blue, Green, Yellow, Orange, 
Purple, Pink, Brown, Black, White. 
10 (1 each) 
Artificial Feathers Multi 4 
 
 
Appendix 10: Collage Instructions 
Collage Task 
In the next ten minutes, use the provided materials to create a collage.  
Use as many or as few of the materials as you wish, and try to make something 
that no one else will think of.  
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Appendix 11: Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) Task Instructions 
This experiment contains 32 trials. The screen will turn grey and there will be a fast 
stream of black letters in the centre. One letter will appear in white and will be B, G, or 
S. Bear in mind this letter. 
The letter X may or may not appear at any point AFTER the white target letter. This will 
be in black along with the other letters. 
When the fast stream of letters have finished, you will be asked if the target letter was 
B, G or S. Then, you will be asked whether or not the letter X was presented following 
the white target letter. 
Reaction time is not being measured. Please take your time in answering the 
questions. Please pay close attention and answer to the best of your ability. 
Press the space bar to advance to the next screen. 
 
Appendix 12: Continuous Performance Task (CPT) Introductory 
Instructions 
Please note that these appeared on screen for the participant, with white writing and a black 
background. 
In the following task, a single coloured shape will appear in the centre of the 
computer screen. 
The shape will be a triangle, circle, square or a star, and will be yellow, green, 
blue or red. 
The shape will appear for 100ms before disappearing. 
 
The task is to react only when the shape is a RED SQUARE. 
 
 
When a RED SQUARE appears, press the spacebar as soon as possible. 
 
Do not press the spacebar for any other coloured shape.  
 Don’t worry if you make a mistake; just carry on from where you left off. 
This task requires you to concentrate and pay continuous attention to the centre 
of the screen. 
Please make sure you are sitting comfortably.  
Press any key to begin a short practice run.   
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Appendix 13: Continuous Performance Task (CPT) Post Practice 
Instructions 
Please note that these appeared on screen for the participant, with white writing and a black 
background. 
 
That was a practice run. 
In the next task, please respond in the same way as you did before. 
This means pressing the SPACEBAR every time you see a RED SQUARE. 
Remember to maintain a high level of concentration. This section will last longer 
than the practice run. 
If you are comfortable, please press any key to begin. 
 
Appendix 14: Stroop Test Instructions 
 
Start a trial by pressing the space bar. A fixation dot will appear in the middle of 
the window. Focus on the dot. A short time later (less than a second) a word 
(either RED, GREEN, or BLUE) will appear on the screen, and the word will be 
drawn in either red, green, or blue font colour. Your task is to classify, as quickly 
as possible, the font colour, regardless of the word name.  
 
If the font colour is red, press the h-key; for green, press the j-key; for blue, press 
the k-key. It may take a bit of practice to make certain you remember which key 
corresponds to which font colour. You can change which keys go with which 
colour below. 
 
After pressing a key to identify the font colour, you will receive feedback on 
whether you were correct. If you were incorrect the trial will be repeated later in 
the experiment. If you find you are making lots of mistakes you should slow down, 
or make certain you understood which key goes with which font colour. 
 
Red – ‘h’ 
Green – ‘j’ 
Blue – ‘k’ 
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Appendix 15: Dual Task Number Lists 
Part One: Lists for Digit Span Determination 
 
 
 
 
 
List Result ( or 
) 
List Result ( or ) List Result ( or ) 
For Span = 2      
83  54  27  
28  37  91  
68  96  87  
For Span = 3      
829  687  871  
132  356  251  
152  637  915  
For Span = 4      
6241  1372  5316  
2359  7392  4815  
7132  6539  1872  
For Span = 5      
84132  85293  79514  
62143  91635  82691  
97438  16592  75468  
For Span = 6      
587261  492617  148239  
261384  247681  423896  
632147  429735  641357  
For Span = 7      
2941378  6297865  1897562  
1285394  8243167  3185624  
8693735  3945782  2473961  
For Span = 8      
65148279  28653197  85729136  
18472913  65792381  76591243  
42785921  74529638  76921358  
For Span = 9      
679174382  239874615  539748216  
746231958  867934612  513985267  
398724615  794831265  231986734  
For Span = 10     
4982176453  2853967624  2914984357  
5731298426  9781734826  6983285149  
8182397465  8491287637  6391727362  
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Part Two: Single Task Lists 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th  Score  Score/n 
A 
1 5 8 7 3 6 2 9 5 4     
                    
B 
3 7 9 8 1 4 6 1 2 5     
                    
C 
6 9 3 1 4 7 5 9 8 2     
                    
D 
2 4 3 8 7 1 9 4 2 3     
                    
E 
2 1 5 3 8 6 4 7 9 6     
                    
F 
7 9 6 3 1 4 2 8 3 5     
                    
G 
8 1 6 3 9 5 7 4 2 1     
                    
H 
1 7 3 2 9 3 6 4 8 5     
                    
I 
9 6 1 2 5 3 8 2 7 4     
                    
J 
8 7 1 3 9 4 6 5 7 2     
                    
K 
3 2 1 9 5 4 3 6 8 7     
                    
L 
4 7 2 4 5 8 1 9 3 6     
                    
M 
8 4 5 1 6 2 3 4 9 7     
                    
N 
6 2 7 1 3 8 5 2 9 4     
                    
O 
8 3 9 1 6 2 7 6 5 4     
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List Memory (Single Task). Table for converting raw scores to proportions.  
Length
. 
Score 
of 
list 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2 0 .5 1         
3 0 .33 .67 1        
4 0 .25 .5 .75 1       
5 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1      
6 0 .17 .33 .5 .67 .83 1     
7 0 .14 .29 .43 .57 .71 .86 1    
8 0 .13 .25 .38 .5 .63 .75 .88 1   
9 0 .11 .22 .33 .44 .56 .67 .78 .89 1  
10 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 
 
Part Four: Dual Task Lists 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Score  Score/
n 
9 5 6 1 3 6 1 9 8 2   
            
7 2 9 1 5 4 8 1 6 3   
            
5 8 9 7 2 4 5 3 1 4   
            
9 6 3 8 2 5 4 7 1 8   
            
2 4 6 3 1 8 7 2 5 4   
            
5 7 8 7 2 9 4 3 5 2   
            
1 3 4 8 3 1 2 6 2 9   
            
8 2 7 5 4 6 1 3 8 9   
            
1 9 4 2 7 4 8 3 6 2   
            
3 1 2 6 9 4 8 3 5 2   
            
2 5 4 9 6 1 9 4 8 2   
            
3 8 6 4 5 7 5 2 9 6   
            
7 5 6 3 2 8 5 1 9 1   
            
9 3 5 9 6 8 2 1 3 7   
            
5 4 3 6 5 7 3 8 7 3   
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Appendix 16.1: Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
Information Sheet: Which specific attentional processes are related to 
creativity? 
 
My name is Lindsey Carruthers and I am a postgraduate student at 
Edinburgh Napier University. I am currently undertaking research as a part 
of my Masters Project. I am aiming to determine how aspects of creativity 
(e.g. divergent thinking, picture completion) are related to variable attention 
factors (e.g. sustaining attention, completing two tasks at once, and 
ignoring irrelevant stimuli). 
 
I am looking for volunteers over the age of 18 and who are fluent in English 
to take part in my research. It will take approximately one hour and 15 
minutes to complete. 
 
The experiment will consist of several short tests which will measure 
different aspects of attention and creativity. Two of these will be computer 
based and five will be paper based. There will be short breaks available for 
participants between these tests. There will also be two short 
questionnaires regarding demographic information, for example your age 
and gender, plus any past creative recognition you may have achieved. 
 
The data I collect will be used in a project report for my academic work and may 
be used towards an oral presentation. Your data will only be viewed by me and 
my project supervisors, and we will ensure that you cannot be identified in any 
way. 
 
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not wish to do so. If you decide 
to take part, you do not have to answer any question that you do not wish to 
answer. You may withdraw from the research at any time without giving a reason 
and any data that have been collected on you will be deleted from the study. You 
have been provided with a participant number at the top of this page. All of the 
data you provide will be coded with this number. If you wish to withdraw your 
data, please e-mail me, quoting your participant number, at the address provided 
below. This will allow me to retract all of your data. 
 
If you wish to contact me for more information or to retract your data, please e-
mail me at L.Carruthers@napier.ac.uk. Or alternatively to contact my project 
supervisor about this research, please e-mail Dr. A. Willis, at Edinburgh Napier 
University, A.Willis@napier.ac.uk for more information. 
 
This information sheet is for you to take away with you.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and please to not hesitate to get in 
touch afterwards with any questions or queries about the research. 
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Appendix 16.2: Information Sheet 
  
Information Sheet: The differences in eye movements, and the effect of a visually 
stimulating environment, on performance of attention and creativity tasks 
between those with and without ADHD. 
My name is Lindsey Carruthers and I am a postgraduate student at Edinburgh 
Napier University. I am currently undertaking research as a part of my PhD Project. 
I am aiming to determine how aspects of creativity (e.g., divergent thinking) are 
related to variable attention factors (e.g., sustained, selective, and divided 
attention). I am also interested in how the type of environment these tasks are 
completed in may influence performance. 
I am looking for volunteers who are to take part. Participants need to be over the 
age of 18 and fluent in English to contribute. It will take approximately 55 minutes 
to complete and takes place at the Sighthill campus of Edinburgh Napier 
University. A £10 gift voucher will be given to each participant.  
The experiment will consist of several short computer- and paper- based tests 
which will measure different aspects of attention and creativity. There will be short 
breaks available for participants between these tests. There will also be a short 
questionnaire regarding demographic information, for example your age and 
gender, plus a self-assessment of your attention skills. 
Participants would be required to wear eye-tracking glasses (these fit like 
spectacles) during the completion of these tasks, although they can be removed 
during short breaks. This is in order to assess distraction levels and focus 
priorities.  
The data I collect will be used in a project report for my academic work and may be used 
towards an oral presentation or publication. Your data will only be viewed by me and my 
project supervisors, and we will ensure that you cannot be identified in any way. The 
information I collect will be kept in a secure, locked drawer and will only be unlocked by 
me, and will be destroyed after use. 
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not wish to do so. If you decide to 
take part, you do not have to answer any question that you do not wish to answer. You 
may withdraw from the research at any time without giving a reason and any data that 
have been collected on you will be deleted from the study. You have been provided with 
a participant number at the top of this page. All of the data you provide will be coded with 
this number. If you wish to withdraw your data, please e-mail me, quoting your participant 
number, at the address provided below. This will allow me to retract all of your data. 
If you wish to contact me for more information or to retract your data, please e-mail me 
at L.Carruthers@napier.ac.uk or write to me at Room 2B46, Edinburgh Napier 
University, Sighthill Campus, Edinburgh. Or alternatively to contact my project supervisor 
about this research, please e-mail Alex Willis at Edinburgh Napier University, 
A.willis@napier.ac.uk for more information. Should you wish to discuss any issues or 
questions regarding this research with someone who is not involved, the independent 
advisor is Barbara Neades: B.neades@napier.ac.uk. 
This information sheet is for you to take away with you.  
Thank you very much for your time and please to not hesitate to get in touch 
afterwards with any questions or queries about the research. 
  
Appendices 
 
278 
 
Appendix 16.3: Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Information Sheet: Individual Differences in Attentional Control and the 
Effectiveness of Incubation on Creative Problem Solving 
 
My name is Lindsey Carruthers and I am a postgraduate student at 
Edinburgh Napier University. I am currently undertaking research as a part 
of my PhD Project. I am aiming to determine which aspects of attentional 
control (sustained, selective divided, and self-report attention) are related 
to creativity, and how they affect the success of incubation.  
 
I am looking for volunteers over the age of 18 and who are fluent in English 
to take part in my research. It will take approximately 50 minutes to 
complete. 
 
The experiment will consist of several short tests which will measure 
different aspects of attention and creativity. Four of these will be computer 
based and four will be paper based. The longest of these tasks lasts for 12 
minutes; otherwise they are all five minutes long.  
 
The data I collect will be used in a project report for my academic work and may 
be used towards an oral presentation or journal publication. Your data will only 
be viewed by me and my project supervisors, and we will ensure that you cannot 
be identified in any way. 
 
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not wish to do so. If you decide 
to take part, you do not have to answer any question that you do not wish to 
answer. You may withdraw from the research at any time without giving a reason 
and any data that have been collected on you will be deleted from the study. You 
have been provided with a participant number at the top of this page. All of the 
data you provide will be coded with this number. If you wish to withdraw your 
data, please e-mail me, quoting your participant number, at the address provided 
below. This will allow me to retract all of your data. 
 
If you wish to contact me for more information or to retract your data, please e-
mail me at L.carruthers@napier.ac.uk. Or alternatively to contact my project 
supervisor about this research, please e-mail Dr A. Willis at Edinburgh Napier 
University, a.willis@napier.ac.uk for more information. Alternatively you can 
contact an independent advisor, Barbara Neades, at b.neades@napier.ac.uk. 
 
This information sheet is for you to take away with you.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and please to not hesitate to get in 
touch afterwards with any questions or queries about the research. 
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Appendix 17: Consent Form 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
 I have read the information sheet. 
 I have had an opportunity to ask questions. 
 I have received satisfactory answers to my questions. 
 I know that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a 
reason. 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you are willing to take part in the study. 
 
I consent to taking part in this study:   
 
Participant’s Signature  ……………………..... 
Date     ……………………..... 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant Number   ……………………..... 
Researcher’s Signature  ……………………..... 
Date     ……………………..... 
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Appendix 18: Warm Up Task 
Below is a curved shape. Think of a picture or an object which you can draw with 
this shape as a part. 
Try to think of a picture that no one else will think of. Keep adding new ideas to 
your first idea to make it as interesting and exciting as you can. You have 3 
minutes to complete this task. 
When you have completed your picture, think up a name or title for it and write it 
at the bottom of the page in the space provided. Make your title as clever and 
unusual as possible. Use it to help tell your story. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: 
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Appendix 19.1: Debrief 
 
 
 
Debrief Sheet: Which specific attentional processes are related to creativity? 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this research. The main aim of this study is to 
determine which aspects of attention have an effect on creativity.  
 
Participant attention was measured by using two computer based and one paper 
based tasks. In particular, these tasks measured the ability to ignore irrelevant stimuli 
(i.e. distractibility), sustaining attention, and Dual-Task Processing. 
 
Four types of paper based tasks were used to measure creativity, or creative 
potential. Several of these tasks measured divergent thinking, which is the 
generation of several, varied responses to open questions (Runco, 1991, 2007). For 
example, to think of as many different uses for a cardboard box as you can, would 
be a measure of divergent thinking. The answers given on this measure are scored 
in terms of fluency (total number of ideas), originality (uniqueness of answers 
compared to other participants), flexibility (the number of discreet categories that the 
answers can be grouped in to) and elaboration (additional detail provided by the 
participant to their own ideas) (Kaufman, Plucker & Baer, 2008). Furthermore, 
divergent thinking was measured in terms of verbal (words) and figural (pictures) 
creativity. Participants were also asked to physically produce a creative product.  
 
During the experiment, the participants were also asked to complete two 
questionnaires. One was concerning simple demographics such as age and gender, 
as well nine questions regarding participant’s creative self-efficacy, which explicitly 
asked the participants to rate their own creative abilities. The other was the Creative 
Achievement Questionnaire, which is used to determine whether or not participants 
have had past recognition for their creativity. 
 
Previous research has been incoherent in terms of clarifying the relationship between 
attention and creativity. For example, it has been posited by several researchers that 
creative performance is supported by a wide breadth of attention (a summary of this 
research is provided by Kasof, 1997), however the findings have been inconsistent 
and most studies only measured one aspect of creative ability or attention. Therefore 
the present study is addressing this issue by aiming to thoroughly investigate the 
relationship between attention and creativity by using a variety of numerous tasks. 
The scores from the attention tests will be correlated with the scores from creativity 
tests in order to determine any links. This should allow the researcher to clarify which 
aspects of attention are related to creative performance.  
 
If you wish to contact me for more information or to retract your data, please e-mail 
me at L.Carruthers@napier.ac.uk. Or alternatively to contact my project supervisor 
about this research, please e-mail Dr. A. Willis at Edinburgh Napier University, 
A.Willis@napier.ac.uk for more information. 
 
Thank you for taking part in my research, any feedback would be welcomed. 
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Appendix 19.2: Debrief Sheet 
 
Debrief Sheet: The differences in eye movements, and the effect of a visually 
stimulating environment, on performance of attention and creativity tasks 
between those with and without ADHD. 
Thank you very much for taking part in this research. I am investigating the relationship 
between attention and creativity, and how this might differ in those with ADHD. 
Furthermore, I would like to investigate the effect of a visually stimulating environment 
on performance. Eye-tracking measures were taken in order to test for distractibility and 
the difference of visual focus in those with and without ADHD. 
Participant attention was measured by using two computer based and questionnaires. In 
particular, these tasks measured the ability to sustain attention and ignore irrelevant 
stimuli. The ASRS – v1.1 is a symptom checklist for ADHD. Reading speed and 
comprehension was also measured. 
Three types of paper based tasks were used to measure creativity, or creative potential. 
The tasks measured divergent thinking, which is the generation of several, varied 
responses to open questions (Runco, 1991, 2007). For example, to think of as many 
different uses for a cardboard box as you can, would be a measure of divergent thinking. 
Divergent thinking was measured in terms of verbal (words) and figural (pictures) 
creativity. The opposite, convergent thinking, was also measured with the remote 
associates task. 
Previous research has been incoherent in terms of clarifying the relationship between 
attention and creativity. For example, it has been posited by several researchers that 
creative performance is supported by a wide breadth of attention (a summary of this 
research is provided by Kasof, 1997), however the findings have been inconsistent and 
most studies only measured one aspect of creative ability or attention. Therefore the 
present study is addressing this issue by aiming to thoroughly investigate the relationship 
between attention and creativity by using a numerous of variety tasks. Furthermore, the 
optimal stimulation theory states that a “there exists a biologically determined optimal 
level of arousal for achieving the best level of cognitive functioning” (Leung, Leung, & 
Tang, 2000:189). It is suggested that those with ADHD behave in a hyperactive or 
inattentive manner in an attempt to raise their naturally low cognitive arousal to an 
optimal level (Zentall & Zentall, 1983). Studies have found beneficial effects of 
background auditory and visual stimulation on task performance in those with ADHD, 
compared to silent or neutral conditions (e.g., Abikoff, Courtney, Szeibel, & Koplewicz, 
1996; Leung et al., 2000; Soderlund, Sikstrom, & Smart, 2007). 
In order to make recommendations about the type of environments those with ADHD 
should be learning and working in, it is necessary to measure the effect of a visually 
stimulating environment, against that of a visually neutral environment on computer- and 
paper-based task performance. A mobile eye-tracker (fits like a pair of spectacles) was 
used to determine where visual attention is drawn, and if there is a relationship with 
distractedness and the type environment. 
For more information about ADHD, please visit http://www.addiss.co.uk/ or call 020 8952 
2800, which is the National Attention Deficit Disorder Information and Support Service. 
If you wish to contact me for more information or to retract your data, please e-mail me 
at L.carruthers@napier.ac.uk. Or alternatively to contact my project supervisor about this 
research, please e-mail Dr. A. Willis at Edinburgh Napier University, 
A.willis@napier.ac.uk for more information. 
Thank you for taking part in my research, any feedback would be welcomed.  
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Appendix 19.3: Debrief Sheet 
 
 
Debrief Sheet: Individual Differences in Attentional Control and the Effectiveness 
of Incubation on Creative Problem Solving 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this research. The main aim of this study is to 
determine which aspects of attentional control are related to creativity, and how they 
affect the success of incubation.  
 
It has been found that periods of time spent away from a problem can be beneficial to 
coming up with the solution (Baird et al., 2012; Gilhooly, Georgiou & Devery, 2013; 
Wallas, 1926). This break is called incubation, and it is thought to allow non-conscious 
processing of the problem to continue whilst conscious processing works on something 
else (Gilhooly et al., 2013). Previous studies have alluded to the concept of attention in 
their explanations of how incubation may work, but it has not been thoroughly measured, 
leaving a gap in the literature. This study will make a unique contribution to the literature 
as it will determine which aspects of attentional control are important for incubation 
during a creative problem solving task. 
 
Attentional control was measured by using two computer based and three paper based 
tasks. In particular, these tasks measured the ability to ignore irrelevant information (i.e., 
selective attention), sustaining attention over time, and dual-task processing. The Adult 
ADHD self-report scale was used as a further measure of distractibility and the 
Daydreaming Frequency Questionnaire measures just that, the propensity to daydream. 
 
Creative problem solving was measured using the unusual uses task (UUT). The 
instruction was to produce as many unusual, novel and creative uses for a tin can as 
possible. This is a measure of divergent thinking, coming up with many ideas for one 
question. This type of task is very common in creativity research and will be scored for 
the number of ideas produced as well as the originality of them, according to the 
guidelines provided by Torrance (1990).  
 
There were four test conditions within the study. Condition one was the control group, 
where there was no incubation break during the 10 minute UUT. Participants in condition 
two had a five minute break, but this involved sitting quietly with no other task 
involvement. Those in conditions three and four both had to complete a five minute task 
during their incubation period, a cognitively undemanding task (target response) in 
condition three and a demanding task (odd/even number distinction) in condition four (as 
in Gilhooly et al., 2013).  
 
If you wish to contact me for more information or to retract your data, please e-mail me 
at L.Carruthers@napier.ac.uk. Or alternatively to contact my project supervisor about 
this research, please e-mail Dr. A. Willis at Edinburgh Napier University, 
a.willis@napier.ac.uk for more information. 
 
Thank you for taking part in my research, any feedback would be welcomed. 
 
